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In the last decade, populist radical right actors have enjoyed success across a host of 
advanced Western liberal democracies by mobilizing economically, culturally, and socio-
culturally anxious majorities. The United States, a Republic with constitutional structures 
designed by Founders to prevent the rise of demagogic actors, was thought to be the 
exception to the populist advance. However, the rise of Trump during the 2016 Republican 
primaries and his subsequent victory against Hillary Clinton in the general election prompts a 
re-evaluation. This thesis therefore provides an exploration of the salient economic, cultural, 
and sociocultural forces that led a majority of White voters to cast their ballots for Donald 
Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election. To investigate which of these factors is the most 
salient, the thesis adopts a quantitative research design by analysing nationally representative 
secondary survey data. While I find that negative economic evaluations mattered in 2016, the 
most noteworthy set of results concerns the salient relationships between outgroup prejudice 
and White voters’ fear of impending demographic change on vote choice for Trump. The 
essential contribution to knowledge to which this thesis lays claim is in its ability to better 
approximate which of these factors mattered the most in contributing to Trump’s victory. In 
this respect, the doctoral thesis builds on the burgeoning literature on White political 
behaviour in the aftermath of the 2016 election by providing a robust framework that aims to 











Chapter 1: Trump and the Populist Wave 
 
Introduction 
Writing before the unprecedented success of the populist radical right (hereafter, 
PRR) in Europe, Mudde (2013) thought it ‘unlikely’ that such fringe parties would become 
major players in European politics (1). Nonetheless, Mudde (2013) hypothesized about a 
number of factors that had the potential to increase the potency of the PRR message to 
European voters.  The first of these was the “tabloidization” of political news, which caused a 
crisis of communication for citizens because of the inability of media organizations to 
provide an accurate or relevant message to voters about rival, competing political candidates. 
The second was the aftermath of the Great Recession which began in December 2007, with 
the effects of job losses and lower wages still being felt well into the recovery for millions of 
voters (Mudde 2013).  
In addition to the robust literature on the success of the PRR in appealing to the 
economic “have nots” (Norris and Inglehart 2019), scholars have likewise noted that 
immigration functions as a lightning rod that attracts culturally-anxious voters to PRR parties 
(Hogan and Haltinner 2015). Ever since Mudde’s (2013) seminal lecture, a host of PRR 
political parties and political actors have increasingly enjoyed electoral success in a host of 
advanced Western liberal democracies by appealing to these salient economic and cultural 
grievances. Examples include the success of the Freedom Party (FP) in Austria (Heinisch and 
Hauser 2016), the Danish People’s Party (Christiansen 2016), Viktor Orban and Fidesz in 
Hungary (Bocskor 2018), Lega Nord in Italy (Brunazzo and Gilbert 2017), and the Swiss 
People’s Party (Mazzoleni and Ivaldi 2020).1 
 
1 Though there is a degree of heterogeneity in the beliefs of PRR parties, it is important to note that 





By contrast, PRR parties in the UK did not enjoy the same level of electoral success 
as these other aforenoted PRR parties during this time; the British National Party (BNP) had 
all but disappeared, getting less than 2,000 votes in the 2015 general election. Elsewhere, 
UKIP had the largest representation in UK delegation to the European Parliament in 2014, 
but were unable to translate their success into seats at Westminster the following year. 
Nonetheless, the prospect of losing Eurosceptic voters to a surging UKIP in the 2015 general 
election was enough cause for David Cameron to pledge to hold an in/out referendum on UK 
membership of the European Union (EU). When the referendum was held just over a year 
later, over 17.4 million voted against the status quo to exit the EU. Though the Brexit 
referendum cannot be characterised as a victory for the populist radical right in an electoral 
sense, numerous scholars have noted that the influence of UKIP in getting Cameron to hold 
the referendum in the first place cannot be overstated (Goodwin & Health 2016; Virdee & 
McGeever 2018).  
It is with this pattern of electoral and political success for the PRR in Europe in mind 
that we turn to consider the case of Donald Trump and the 2016 US Presidential election. 
When thinking about the success of populist actors in the US, it is important to note that the 
American system was designed by the nation’s Founders, who were guided by a concern to 
curtail any excess of popular sovereignty to prevent the rise of demagogic actors.2 Populism 
thrives in democracies that have unconstrainted popular sovereignty (Ellis 2002). When 
designing the Republic, the Founders were aware of the large number of democracies that 
had destroyed themselves over time by giving too much power to “the people” (Canovan 
 
vilifying those who are seen as threatening to the interests of the demos – whether this be elites, or 
immigrants and minorities (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017). 
2 Demagogue comes from the Ancient Greek dēmagōgós - or a popular leader. To be a demagogue is 
to be leader of the people, or demos. However, the historical denotations of the word are more 
nefarious. Demagogue referred to a rabble rouser who sometimes arose in Athenian democracy 





2005). For this reason, the Founders were wary of the dangers of too much people power. 
Consequently, the US Constitution was designed with impediments against the rise of 
populist demagogues who seek to exploit majority faction.3 
While constraints against an excess of majority faction and demagoguery inherent in 
the US Constitution explain why presidential candidates with a populist bent historically 
failed to gain traction in national elections, these constraints were not enough to prevent the 
election of Trump in 2016. It is certainly true that Trump ran for the nomination of one of the 
two major parties, but his ascendency during the 2016 Republican primaries has been 
characterised by some as a hostile takeover of a major political party by a radically different 
type of politician to previous Republican nominees, and was also met with intra-party 
hostility from GOP elites (Johnson et al. 2018; Saldin & Teles 2020).  
The significance of Trump’s victory cannot be overstated; his election represented a 
fundamental divergence from America’s post-war electoral patterns. Trump was a candidate 
beyond the mainstream, widely seen as having little chance of winning power (Brooks 2015; 
Enten 2015), who rode to victory by reaching out to a particular demographic rather than a 
broad coalition of voters.  Trump’s election therefore connects with what scholars contend is 
a broader “populist wave” enveloping advanced Western liberal democracies (Eatwell & 
Goodwin, 2018). This wave is significant because it represents a challenge to traditional 
centre left/centre right mainstream political parties in Europe and the US, as well as their 
political agendas and worldviews. Understanding Trump’s unlikely victory in the 2016 US 
 
3 To prevent the rise of a demagogic leader, the Founders ensured that the President was not directly 
elected by the people, but indirectly via the Electoral College. Each state has a number of Electors 
equal to its combined Congressional delegation of Representatives and Senators. In turn, these 
Electors cast their vote for President based on the winner of the state’s popular vote. This system was 
designed as a safeguard against those who Hamilton (Kesler 2003) noted had ‘talents for low intrigue, 
and the little arts of popularity’ from becoming President (354). Therefore, one does not become 
President by appealing to the most populous states; they require broad support throughout the Union 





Presidential election this context is particularly important as we need to understand what it 
represents. Trump’s success poses a key question that has significant import considering the 
current and future patterns of the political values and electoral preferences of citizens in 
advanced Western democracies. His success could be a one off, or, it could be indicative of a 
new pattern of political behaviour in which White voters are now resistant to the old offers of 
the political class.  
 
Objectives 
There is a major knowledge gap present within the extant body of literature that 
considers what the salient factors are that created the conditions for Trump’s victory. To 
briefly surmise these explanations, on the one hand, scholars have posited that Trump’s 
victory was a “White working-class revolt” on the part of economically anxious US voters in 
the Rust Belt region (McQuarrie, 2017). Equally, however, scholars have demonstrated that 
White identity was a force that led racially-conscious Whites to express exhibit favorable 
estimations of Trump (Jardina, 2019). Elsewhere, scholars such as Kaufmann and Goodwin 
(2018) and Major et al. (2018) posit that the threat of increasing diversity is leading White 
majorities in advanced Western democracies to vote for radical right populist parties and 
actors.  
Critically, there is a broader lack of comparative awareness of these explanatory 
contexts in the White voting behaviour literature. For example, studies have analysed 
whether Trump’s victory is best explained by economic anxiety or racial resentment without 
considering the effects of socio-cultural forces such as the threat of increasing diversity 
(Schaffner et al. 2018). This is problematic because it is not altogether clear which of the 
particular explanatory contexts are the most potent in shaping the Trump vote. However, it is 





because we need to understand whether Trump’s victory is best understood in light of 
traditional theoretical frameworks that have long explained voter behaviour4 or, whether his 
election represents a more fundamental re-alignment of US voting patterns along the lines of 
culture (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018).  
Consequently, the principal objective of the doctoral thesis is to better understand the 
factors that created the conditions for Trump’s victory in the 2016 US Presidential election. 
Because Trump’s base of electoral support is overwhelmingly White, the doctoral thesis 
focuses on the electoral behaviour of White voters only. In order to meet this objective, the 
doctoral thesis poses three pertinent questions that serve as a basis to help us better 
understand why 54 per cent of Whites voted for Trump in 2016. The purpose of asking these 
questions is to further our understanding of which particular dimension of White 
estrangement from mainstream politics is best represented by Trump’s unlikely victory. 
Having discussed the principal objective guiding the doctoral thesis, the introductory chapter 
will now turn to address the specific research questions and hypotheses.  
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Consistent with the aforenoted research objective, the doctoral thesis poses the 
following three research questions:  
1. Is Trump’s victory indicative of a White working-class revolt against the political 
elites in Washington for their perceived failure to adequately address their economic 
grievances?   
 
4 For instance, rational choice economic voting (Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000) posits that individual 
voting intention is based on voters’ evaluations of the performance of the governing party on the 
economy.  However, this framework is somewhat limited in explaining vote choice for Trump when 
we know that prior evaluations of Obama were also likely to be influenced by factors such as racial 





2. Or, is Trump’s victory explained by the activation of a number of forms of White in-
group identity/psychological predispositions and out-group prejudice through the 
usage and deployment of radical right electoral cues?  
3. Or, is Trump’s victory indicate of the successful electoral mobilization of a cohort of 
White voters who are increasingly feel as though their dominant-majority status is 
coming under threat by America’s changing demographics?  
 
 As will be clear in Chapter 2, which provides an examination of the factors that are 
claimed to have underpinned the conditions for Trump’s victory, each research question is 
underpinned by an explanatory context that aims to attest to a specific dimension of White 
estrangement from mainstream politics. These are: “left behind” thesis for research question 
1, the cultural decline thesis for the research question 2, the changing America thesis for 
research question 3. In assessing the robustness of each of these explanatory contexts as 
frames through which we might better understand why 54 per cent of Whites voted for 
Trump (Pew Research Center 2018), the doctoral thesis tests a total of 6 hypothesis that 
contribute to our understanding of each of the explanatory contexts. The introductory chapter 
will now outline each of these hypothesis briefly.  
 In asking the first research question, the doctoral thesis tests the robustness of the “left 
behind” thesis as a frame for understanding White vote choice for Trump. There are two 
competing hypotheses underpinning our understanding of “left behind” explanations for 
Trump’s victory. The first hypothesis (H1) posits that Trump’s victory can indeed be 
conceptualized as a “revolt” on the part of the economically-anxious White working class. 
The critical argument underpinning H1 is that White voters – and especially those without a 
college education in blue-collar occupations – were mobilized to vote for Trump because of 





Conversely, the second hypothesis (H2) puts forward a more nuanced theory to explain 
Trump’s victory. Most notably, Eatwell and Goodwin observe that classifying phenomena 
such as Brexit and Trump as White working-class “backlashes” are unsupported when one 
looks at both events with a more nuanced lens (2018, p. xviii). Consistent with this argument, 
a number of analyses of the “left behind” literature have noted that the economic anxieties of 
White voters are becoming increasing difficult to disentangle from such voters’ cultural 
grievances (Vance 2016; Bhambra 2017; Hochschild 2018).  
 In asking the second research question, the doctoral thesis addresses the robustness of 
the cultural decline thesis as a frame for understanding why a majority of Whites voted for 
Trump (Pew Research Center 2018). As was the case with the first explanatory context, there 
are a further two hypotheses contributing to our understanding of the cultural decline thesis. 
Consistent with the emerging theoretical importance of in-group favouritism as a predictor of 
Whites’ political behaviour (Jardina 2019), the third hypothesis (H3) posits that Trump’s 
victory was dependent on the “activation” of a number of salient in-group identities. 
Examples of these in-group identities include American ethnic identity (Thompson 2020), 
White ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2010), and White racial identity (Jardina 2019). By 
contrast, the fourth hypothesis (H4) contends that forms of out-group prejudice, and most 
especially anti-Black racism, will be salient predictors of vote choice in 2016 because of 
Trump’s rhetoric towards immigrants and minorities throughout the campaign.  
Finally, in posing the third research question, the doctoral thesis is assessing the 
robustness of the changing America thesis as a frame for better understanding why the 
majority of Whites voted for Trump. Once again, there are an additional two hypotheses 
underpinning this final explanatory context. These hypotheses are respectively known as the 
“exit route” and the “voice route.” The “exit route” hypothesis (H5) posits that there is a 





liberal democracies including the US (Putnam 2007; Murray 2010). Specifically, this 
hypothesis contends that increasing ethnic diversity causes individuals to “hunker down” and 
withdraw from civic life, including formal participation in the electoral process. H5 contends 
that diversity causes Whites to withdraw from multiple aspects of civic life including, 
crucially, formal participation in politics (such as voting in elections). By contrast, the “voice 
route” hypothesis (H6) posits that White majorities perceive diversity as a threat to their 
group status, which in turn may mobilise them to vote for radical right actors who promise to 
reduce immigration (Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018).  
 
Thesis Structure 
 In order to meet the research objectives, the doctoral thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 begins with a comprehensive review of the extant academic literature concerning 
Trump’s White support. An examination of over 120 works of the White vote choice 
literature reveals three conceptually-distinct explanatory contexts (these are the “left behind” 
thesis, the cultural decline thesis, and the changing America thesis). Discussion of extant 
literature is structured around each of these explanatory contexts. The chapter concludes with 
a reflection on the limitations of these explanatory contexts as frames through which we 
might understand why so many Whites voted for Trump in 2016. 
 Following on from the review of the popular and scholarly accounts of Trump’s 
White support, Chapter 3 provides a methodological outline of the doctoral thesis. The 
chapter begins with an elucidation of the onto-epistemological approach (positivism) 
underpinning the empirical investigation of the robustness of the three explanatory contexts 
delineated in Chapter 2. The chosen methodology (quantitative) and research design 
(correlational analysis of cross-sectional, secondary survey data) used to investigate the 





chapter details the sources of survey data that will be used to specify the vote choices models. 
Having delineated these data sources, the chapter then outlines the modelling strategy that is 
used to assess the vote choice of White 2016 voters, providing an overview of the baseline 
socio-demographic and structural covariates that are included as model parameters. The 
chapter considers additional factors that may have influenced vote choice in 2016, but were 
nonetheless excluded from the vote choice model because of constraints in the existing data. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a reflection on the methods employed to investigate vote 
choice for Trump, laying the groundwork for the first principal findings chapter which tests 
the robustness of the first explanatory context.  
Chapter 4 is the first of the three principal findings chapters. This first principal 
findings chapter tests the empirical validity of the “left behind” thesis. The first test of the 
robustness of this explanatory context involves examining whether Trump’s victory can be 
conceptualized as a White working-class “revolt” (H1). To do this, Chapter 4 analyses 
support for Trump in the Industrial Midwest – a region of the US that has experienced the 
effects of deindustrialization and resulting job losses in manufacturing over the years. 
Additionally, the chapter analyses whether Whites’ opposition to free trade and outsourcing 
is associated with voting for Trump. The chapter then specifies a series of models testing 
whether White voters’ short-term economic assessments are associated with voting for 
Trump.  
To test H2, Chapter 4 examines whether Whites’ perceptions of the pace of the 
economic recovery from the 2008 recession feeds into evaluations for Obama. Analysis of 
the relationship between evaluations of the economic recovery and affect for Obama is 
important because we begin to see the ways in which the economic assessments of White 
voters often intersect with their attitudes towards racial minorities. To further explore these 





economic assessments are moderated by perceptions of the effect of immigration on the US 
labor market and economy. As an additional test of H2, Chapter 4 explores why White 
Americans are perceived as voting for Trump largely at the behest of their own economic 
interests (Frank, 2004; Hochschild 2018). Specifically, the chapter analyses whether Whites 
with poor evaluations of their local communities, but likewise express an opposition to 
increased state spending and government intervention, voted for Trump in 2016. Chapter 4 
then concludes by reflecting on the significance of the findings and lays the groundwork for 
examination of the second explanatory context in the next principal findings chapter. 
Chapter 5 is the second principal findings chapter, and tests the robustness of the 
cultural decline thesis as a frame for understanding why 54 per cent of Whites voted for 
Trump (Pew Research Center 2018). To test H3, Chapter 5 first delineates the salient forms 
of White in-group identity/psychological predispositions (namely, White ethnocentrism, 
American ethnic identity, and White identity). Chapter 5 hypothesizes that the “activation” of 
these in-group identities by radical right populist actors such as Trump prompted Whites with 
salient levels of group consciousness to coalesce around his candidacy. The hypothesized 
effects of these identities are then tested in a series of White models. Having analysed the 
salience of these in-group identities/psychological predispositions on vote choice, the chapter 
then turns to analyse the salience of out-group prejudice on vote choice (H4). Here, Chapter 5 
explores why racial resentment remained a significant predictor of White vote choice in 2016 
in spite of Obama’s absence on the ballot. Chapter 5 then concludes by reflecting on the 
significance of the findings and lays the groundwork for the examination of the final 
explanatory context in the next principal findings chapter.  
 Chapter 6 is the final principal findings chapter, and tests the robustness of the 
changing America thesis as a frame for understanding White vote choice. Chapter 6 begins 





the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, which ended historical quotas on immigration from 
outside Western and Northern Europe. Next, Chapter 6 tracks the decline of community in 
the US, which key theorists in the American social capital literature such as Putnam (2000) 
posit began in the early Seventies. To bridge the link between increasing ethno-racial 
diversity and crumbling social capital, Chapter 6 then unpacks Putnam’s (2007) “hunkering 
down” thesis. To test H5, Chapter 6 explores the relationship between political participation 
and Whites’ contact with diversity using a subset of Whites from the most recent wave of the 
General Social Survey (GSS). Having tested H5, Chapter 6 finally turns to explore H6 by 
seeing if Whites who felt as though the dominant-group position was threatened by diversity 
in 2016 were likely to vote for Trump.  Chapter 6 then concludes by reflecting on the 
significance of the findings, and lays the groundwork for the critical synthesis of the 
changing America thesis with the other explanatory contexts in the discussion chapter.  
Chapter 7 provides a discussion and critical synthesis of the findings and conclusions 
of the three principal findings chapters. The chapter aims to assess which of the explanatory 
contexts provides the greatest amount of explanatory power in helping us to better understand 
what Trump’s victory best represents. To do this, the chapter estimates a model that fully 
accounts for the various economic, cultural and socio-cultural explanations of Trump’s 
victory. Crucially, this estimation strategy allows for comparison of the magnitude, direction, 
and significance of the various effects of each explanatory variable. Consequently, we will be 
able to empirically approximate which factor (or, indeed set of factors) were the most salient 
predictors of White vote choice.  
Once the chapter has established which factor (or set of factors) were the most salient 
in contributing to Trump’s victory, the chapter then turns to assess the limitations of this new 
knowledge. To do this, Chapter 7 adopts a number of empirical strategies to test the 





President in 2016 would have been successful in appealing to the same set of economically, 
culturally, and socio-culturally aggrieved Whites that voted for Trump. Therefore, the chapter 
specifies a series of alternative vote choice models where White respondents were presented 
with a series of hypothetical candidate matchups. Another important factor to consider is 
whether the factors that contributed to Trump’s victory were uniquely important in the 2016 
election, or whether such factors are merely the continuation of trends that have long shaped 
White voter behaviour. To test this expectation, the chapter looks at the vote choice of Whites 
in past Presidential elections to see if voters’ cultural and socio-cultural concerns were 
especially salient cleavages before 2016.  
Chapter 8 concludes with a reflection on how these results further our existing 
understanding of the 2016 US Presidential election, as well as which voter cleavages we may 
expect to continue to be especially important to understanding White political behaviour in 





Chapter 2: The Accounts of Trump’s White Support 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter reviews the relevant literature on White vote choice for Trump in the 
2016 US Presidential election. The literature is trifurcated into the following significant 
explanatory contexts. These are (i) the “left behind” thesis; (ii) the cultural decline thesis; and 
(iii) the changing America thesis. The chapter begins with an exploration of the “left behind” 
thesis. The “left behind” thesis primarily frames Trump’s victory as a “revolt” on the part of 
the White voters, and especially those without a college education (Gest 2016; Williams 
2017). A number of these studies assert that many Whites lack upward mobility due to lower 
rates of educational attainment. Likewise, many Whites are crippled by a lack of geographic 
mobility and are unable to migrate to find better opportunities beyond their hometowns 
(Wuthnow 2018). A lack of upward mobility thus leaves many Whites angry at the 
Washington elites for not improving their situations, leading them to vote for Trump as an act 
of defiance against the political class.  
The second significant explanatory context is the cultural decline thesis. Authors of this 
thesis frame Whites through a “dominant majority” ethnoracial paradigm (Mutz 2018). They 
contend that America’s demographic and cultural change has eroded White American’s 
position as the “dominant group” in US society. White Americans’ fear of losing the status 
afforded to them by their dominant position has been mobilised into a political cleavage. This 
makes the group receptive to political messages that stoke racial resentment and animus 
towards immigrants (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Increased support for Trump is thus 
correlated with resonance between his ethno-nationalist rhetoric and latent “racist” attitudes 
within the broader pool of White voters (Bonikowski 2017). The cultural decline thesis also 





identity has become a salient factor in their party politics and policy preferences (Jardina 
2019). However, authors of the cultural decline thesis only explore white Americans’ 
reactions to diversity, rather than looking at the effects of diversity itself on White 
Americans’ political behaviour.  
Consequently, the chapter also explores a third significant explanation related to the 
implications of a changing America for White Americans. Elucidating the history of nativist 
movements before the passage of landmark immigration legislation in 1965 indicates that 
Americans have long expressed uneasiness about new immigrants and still do today. 
Scholarly reactions against nativist thinking led to formulations of sociological theories of 
cultural assimilation (Kallen 1916). More contemporary assimilation theories such as 
acculturation explore the relationship between intergroup relations and increasing diversity in 
America today (Berry 1997). Bringing together Berry’s (1997) framework and the social 
capital/trust literature (Putnam 2007) highlights a troubling relationship between diversity 
and decreasing levels of intra/intergroup ethnoracial trust. This relationship is significant 
because it explains why Whites are increasingly voting for right-wing populist actors such as 
Trump (Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018).  
The chapter concludes with a reflection of the significance of the findings and lays the 
groundwork for the development of an empirical model in the upcoming methodology 
chapter. Crucially, this model will allow us to test the robustness of the three explanatory 
contexts as frames through which we can better understand why 54 per cent of Whites voted 






The “Left Behind” 
Trump and the White Working-Class  
Scholars of the “left behind” literature frame Trump’s victory in 2016 as a “revolt” on 
the part of the White working-class (Gest 2016; McQuarrie 2017; Williams 2017). An analysis 
of the election data indicates that there was room for Trump to improve on Mitt Romney’s 
performance among white Americans in 2012. Some two million who had voted for John 
McCain in 2008 were ‘missing’ on Election Day in 2012 (Trende 2013). Obama’s margin 
over Mitt Romney in the popular vote was 5 million. However, the number of non-college-
educated whites of voting age who did not vote was 24 million (Wassermann 2016). The 
question that remained was whether enough white-working-class Americans would turn out 
to elect Trump.  
Morgan and Lee (2018) find that the White working-class did indeed compromise a 
sizeable proportion of Trump’s base in the 2016 Election. Using self-report voter data from 
the American National Election Study (ANES), they observe that 28 percent of those who 
voted for Trump in 2016 had either voted for Obama in the 2012 Election or had not voted in 
2012 (Morgan and Lee 2018: 240). Of these two pools of voters that went for Trump, those 
who had voted for Obama in 2012 were ‘disproportionately’ likely to be working-class 
whites’, while non-voters were most likely to be white (Morgan and Lee 2018: 240). These 
findings are significant as they provide empirical weight to popular observations that the 
White working-class were crucial for Trump’s victory. 
Nonetheless, there are those who remain sceptical of the notion that Trump’s victory was a 
“revolt” on the part of White voters, and especially those without a college degree. For instance, 
Silver (2016a) points to state-level exit poll data from Republican primary states. The data 
indicated that median household income of Trump voters was $72,000, a figure that was 'well 





data from Republican primary states and post-election day data from ANES, with the data 
leading the authors to conclude that the ' Trump coalition ‘looked a lot like it did during the 
primaries’ (Carnes and Lupu 2017).  
There are, however, reasons to be wary of the conclusions drawn from data released 
straight after the election. Roediger notes class is ‘not well studied by anyone via instant 
analysis of election results’ (2017). Roediger (2017) points to the ‘crude’ definitions based on 
measurements of income from the exit poll data (2016). Indeed, statisticians such as Silver 
(2016b) corrected their prior conclusions when the exit poll data was released. After the 
election, Silver (2016b) reran the numbers and found that ‘educational levels are the critical 
factor’ in determining shifts in the vote between 2012 and 2016. The 2016 election data 
indicate a 9-point shift in the non-college educated White vote towards the Republican Party 
between 2012 and 2016 (Schaffner et al. 2018). This is a critically important observation, 
given that educational attainment is a robust determinant of one’s class status. Given the 
intrinsic link between education and class, it is useful to consider the differences between 
college- and non-college educated individuals. This is because elucidation of these 
differences may help us understand why so many Whites without a college education voted 
for Trump in 2016.  
The social and familial networks of American college graduates are entirely different 
from those of non-college-educated individuals. Sociologists approximate these differences 
with the use of the terms “professional” and “clique” ‘networks’ (Williams 2017: 35–36). On 
the one hand, College graduates enter professional vocations, forming professional networks. 
Professional networks are composed of large matrices of acquaintances whom elite 
professionals encounter in their specialised career field. Conversely, the working-class live 
their lives in tightly formed and deeply rooted “clique” networks (Nelson 1966). These 





individuals in such communities “have each other’s backs” from babysitting their friends’ 
children to assisting with house repairs (2017).  
The full title of Williams book is White Working-class: Overcoming Class Cluelessness 
in America (2017), but class and race are not explored in a way that elucidates their complex 
relationship in the American context. This is a critical omission, given that non-college 
educated Whites made up 63% of the Trump coalition, while 20 per cent were college 
educated White (Pew Research Center 2018). Consequently, we must look elsewhere if we 
are to clarify the role of race and class in understanding why Trump won in 2016. Greater 
clarity in this respect comes from Reed (2002). Reed notes that the juxtaposition of class and 
race so ‘familiar… in debates about American inequality’ misunderstands both phenomena 
by ‘treating them as… indistinguishable’ (Reed 2002: 266).  
Discussing class in a vacuum errs on the side of ‘simplistic, economistic interpretation’ 
(Reed 2002: 270). However, this is problematic, for it disregards the importance of the role 
race plays in class struggles in the United States. Indeed, such thinking was endemic of the 
inability of large parts of the American left to think of race and class together during the 2016 
campaign season. Bernie Sanders, for instance, who ran to the left of Hillary Clinton in the 
Democratic primaries, consistently emphasised that class was more important than race and 
identity politics (Arceneaux 2016). By contrast, Clinton was more embracive of the role that 
ethnic identity plays in class struggles, and subsequently won the nomination.  
A way of thinking about race and class that brings the two into one frame comes from 
Roediger (1999). In Wages of Whiteness, Roediger (1999) asserts that antiracist identity 
politics are a just response to the “racialisation” of class politics. Wages of Whiteness thus 
sets the foundations for critical whiteness studies to note how the category of “working-class” 
became intertwined with connotations of race. As Virdee (2017) asserts, to see oneself as 





social groups’ (2). To authors such as Roediger (1999), race is thus not a false construct of 
ideas and beliefs, but a simulacrum with a basis in reality. Consequently, we now see how 
race and class are better understood when construed as ‘equivalent and overlapping elements’ 
rooted in a ‘singular system of social power and stratification’ (Reed 2002: 266).  
Race and class have a ‘historically specific’ meaning in America, with their intersection 
being a ‘fact of life’ that is older than the Republic itself (Reed 2002: 266). Examination of 
this history is absent in the Williams’ (2017) work. Consequently, the chapter now turns to an 
authoritative past voice on the subject. An authoritative text on the history of whiteness and 
labour is Black Reconstruction by Du Bois (2014). The “White Worker” that Du Bois posits 
reaps the monetary benefits ascribed by their class status. While a position predicated on 
racial disparities had prevailed since the early time of the Republic, the institution of 
involuntary servitude had started to weaken by the mid-Nineteenth Century.  
In 1857, anti-slavery fervour was catching in the English labour movement. However, 
such feelings found ‘limited influence’ across the Atlantic (Du Bois 2014: 25). American 
unions were willed to abolish servitude, but ‘[presently] self-preservation called for slavery’ 
(Du Bois: 2014: 25). In other words, unions expressed concern at the prospect of millions of 
poor White labourers competing for jobs with free slaves. Indeed, poor Whites expressed the 
‘vivid fear of the Negro as a competitor in labor [sic]’ (Du Bois: 2014: 29). While Wilson 
(2012) questions the relevance of race around the economic arrangements of contemporary 
American society, the election of Trump prompts a re-evaluation. Consequently, scholars 
such as Schaffner et al (2018), who debate whether economic insecurity or racial animus 
drove Trump’s election, may have missed whether, in a Du Boisean vain, it is some alchemy 
between the two.  
 This sub-section has assessed the extent of Trump’s support among the White 





Elucidation of the extent of Trump’s White working-class support and the meaning of White 
class identity in the American context is important given that 63 per cent of non-college 
educated Whites voted for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018). We need to know 
what the Trump coalition looks like demographically if we are to test the robustness of the 
“left behind” thesis in the upcoming principal findings chapter.   
Critically, however, Trump’s robust levels of support among the White voters without 
a college education is only one aspect of the “left behind” thesis. The socio-demographic 
group did not vote for Trump in such large numbers because they were White and did not 
have a college education. Rather, it is likely the case that there were a number of salient 
factors which explain why so many saw Trump as a viable candidate for President in 2016. 
Indeed, a common motif in the “left behind” literature is the observation that many support 
populist actors because of their anger towards elites (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). Among 
other things, this anger is grounded in the perception that those in power have failed to 
improve conditions that are necessary for upward mobility (Sensier and Devine, 2017). 
Consequently, the next sub-section unpacks the relationship between upward mobility and 
support for Trump in 2016.  
 
Upward Mobility 
Examples of upward mobility between classes seem outliers considering the many 
barriers to success that working-class children face in their early development. Belonging to a 
higher social class provides middle-class parents with the resources to support their 
children’s learning (Lareau 1987). Children from middle-class families and children who go 
to middle-class schools often enjoy the encouragements their parents and teachers give them 
to learn, from helping them with homework, to getting highly structured private tuition (Reay 





their parents and teachers. This is because their home and educational environments are not 
furnished with the same resources that middle-class children have. Such examples include 
access to the internet at home and attendance at schools with a higher teacher–pupil ratio. As 
a result, Reay et al. (2009) observed that working-class children tend to report higher levels 
of self-regulation in learning than those who are not of a working-class background (1108).  
Working-class students possess a resilience to cope with adversity; an ability with a 
more significant association among working-class cohorts vis-à-vis ‘middle-classness [sic]’ 
(Reay et al: 2009: 1110). In working-class contexts, one assumes resilience. The quality 
becomes a valuable resource for working-class students; when entering the world of higher 
education (HE), they find themselves in new and unfamiliar contexts. Still, working-class 
students entering HE experience difficulties in their first year (Reay et al. 2009: 1112).  
In one study of the English education system, Reay (2001) interviewed mature working-
class students, many of them entering university for the first time. Reay (2001) found that 
students expressed fears of becoming lost within their new environment while they tried to 
“hold on” to a ‘cohesive self that retained an anchor in what had gone before’ (337). 
Granfield (1999) finds that working-class students experience class stigma from 
“asymmetrical class interactions”, with many finding themselves interacting with middle-
class students for the first time (332). Consequently, working-class students experience 
devaluations of their own identity, reacting in ways typical of stigma management. Students 
came to see their backgrounds as a barrier to success since they lacked the cultural capital 
necessary to interact with their middle and upper-class counterparts (Granfield 1991: 332).  
Cultural capital refers to a collection of items such as tastes, clothing, mannerisms, 
personal objects and formal qualifications that are associated with membership of a particular 
social class. Bourdieu (1984) argues that cultural capital comes in three forms. These three 





capital compromises one’s property. The possession of cultural capital is thus symbolically 
conveyed and facilitated through the ownership of objects that one associates with higher 
forms of capital. Meanwhile, institutionalised cultural capital refers to the acquisition of 
formal titles and qualifications such as university degrees that symbolise cultural authority. 
We know from the postelection data that the majority of Trump’s working-class base lack 
possession of formal qualifications such as a bachelor’s degree (Silver 2016). Therefore, we 
begin to see a relationship between a lack of institutional forms of cultural capital and higher 
levels of support for Trump in the 2016 election.  
The other form, embodied cultural capital, is best understood when considered in 
relation to Bourdieu’s (1984) notion of habitus. Habitus is the embodiment of cultural capital. 
It refers to the long-established set of habits and dispositions that individuals acquire through 
their experiences in a variety of distinct “fields”. Each field thus has its own set of rules and 
unwritten truths (Doxa), as well as forms of cultural capital. One’s habitus, or taste in cultural 
objects such as art and clothing, thus differs depending on what field they belong to. In 
Distinction, Bourdieu (1984) links individual tastes to one’s ingrained social class position 
(100). For instance, Bourdieu (1984) observes that individuals in French society belonging to 
upper-class strata had “highbrow” tastes in art (32). Such individuals had been exposed to art 
at a relatively young age and had learned a longer amount of time to begin to appreciate it. 
Conversely, working-class individuals had not had the same level of exposure to high art. By 
extension, they had not accrued the habitus necessary to partake in the “game” of ‘high art’ 
appreciation (1984: 34).  
This condition is likewise apparent in the field of elite education. Working-class 
students entering this field have the distinction of being cultural outsiders. This is because 
they lack the ‘manners of speech, attire, values and experiences’ associated with those of 





stigma by adopting such mannerisms but afterwards felt guilty for “selling out” on their class 
as a result of their adjustment strategies. They managed this ambivalence by maintaining an 
‘ideological distance’ between the very classes that they were trying to emulate (Granfield 
1992: 344). Successful working-class students also feel guilty about their newfound upward 
mobility, including, for instance, avoiding those who ‘remind [them] of their social 
obligations towards helping the less fortunate’ (Granfield 1992: 347). Just the mere 
association with individuals whose career trajectories involve helping the disadvantaged led 
to ‘considerable uneasiness’ in working-class law-students who had entered large firms 
(Granfield 1992: 347).  
However, upward mobility is only one example of various types of mobility that 
accounts for why so many Whites are “left behind”. Another type of mobility especially 
relevant in the “left behind” literature is the notion of “horizontal” or geographic mobility. 
Whereas the notion of upward mobility refers to mobility between class strata, geographic 
mobility, on the other hand, refers to the mobility of labour across geographically defined 
spaces, as well as the migration of people from one community to another. The next 
subsection thus explores whether geographic mobility provides a robust explanatory context 
as to how the White Americans who voted for Trump in 2016 are “left behind”.  
 
Geographic Mobility 
A lack of geographic mobility mainly affects rural communities. Areas across America 
with the highest variation in rates of upward mobility tend to be in rural areas. In a recent 
county-level analysis, Krause and Reeves (2018) conclude that rural areas with higher rates 
of geographic mobility tend to have higher quality education and lower rates of residential 
segregation. Most strikingly, however, they find that rural areas with the best rates of upward 





It is clear from qualitative interviews with rural Americans that they are “angry” at 
Washington and the political class (Fallows and Fallows 2018; Hochschild 2018). Rural 
Americans are in no doubt that the federal government is to blame for many of the problems 
raised in Krause and Reeves (2018) Brookings report. Findings from the 2017 Kaiser Family 
Foundation/Washington Post Partnership Survey reveal that rural Americans express broad 
scepticism that Washington is fair or effective at improving people’s economic situations. For 
instance, 64% of rural Americans believe federal assistance is going to “irresponsible people 
getting government help they do not deserve” is a more common occurrence than “needy 
people getting by without government help” (Washington Post/ Kaiser Family Foundation 
2017: 14). Elsewhere, the rural–urban schism becomes apparent—another 50% of rural 
respondents consider that Washington does more to help those living in urban areas. While 
only 37% think Washington treats rural and urban areas the same (Washington Post/Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2017: 17). 
These statistics echo the findings of Wuthnow (2018). Based on an eight-year study 
involving interviews with rural Americans, Wuthnow (2018) finds that Washington is not 
only geographically distant from the rural heartland, but that its inhabitants bespeak a cultural 
divide. The federal government is also perceived in ways which are “threatening” to their 
small-town ways of life (Wuthnow 2018). Wuthnow (2018) heard a common refrain when 
asking rural-folk what they thought of Washington—a variation of the phrase "leave us 
alone!” (101). Interviewees also expressed anger at overburdensome government regulations; 
not in the way that one might hear Congressional Republicans decry excess “red tape”, but 
because of the impact that regulations had on their local facilities (Wuthnow 2018: 104–105). 
It is not a simple case of rural Americans disliking regulations. If it were, it becomes difficult 
to explain why so many ‘think [that] Washington is broken’ and how this relates to the 





Some argue that rural Americans are not entirely blameless for their predicament. For 
example, in an interview with Vox, Illing (2018) proposes to Wuthnow that rural American’s 
were not “left behind”, they just ‘chose not to keep up.’ However, this is too simplistic an 
argument that ignores the barriers to successful horizontal mobility that rural residents face 
(Chetty et al. 2017). Leaving also entails losing the little semblance of community that rural 
Americans have left; Wuthnow concurs and observes that rural townsfolk ‘like knowing their 
neighbours’ and living in a community which feels ‘small and closed’—they are making the 
best of a bad situation, and ‘they [nonetheless] choose to stay’ (Illing 2018).  
In summary, the “left behind” thesis has brought two major contributions to the chapter, 
which aims to understand why 54 per cent of White Americans voted for Trump. First, we 
see that White Americans without a college education have low rates of economic and 
geographic mobility, and lack accrued forms of institutional and embodied cultural capital 
Second, we are aware that a lack of these items might explain why Whites coalesced around 
Trump. Part of this stems from the observation that “left behind” Americans tend to see the 
elites in Washington at fault for failing to improve their conditions and make their lives 
better. By contrast, Trump positioned himself as an outsider who claimed that the 
Washington swamp was broken and that he was the one who could fix the problems faced by 
so many “left behind” Whites.  
Notwithstanding, there are salient forces behind the election Trump that does not fit “left 
behind” thinking. For instance, how are we to explain the unexpectedly high levels of public 
acceptance from a sizeable wedge of the American populace of Trump’s controversial 
statements aimed at minorities and immigrants? Examples of these questions are ones 
broadly concerning issues of culture. More specifically, however, they are ones that are 
motived by a fear of the erosion of a dominant cultural position expressed by White 





mobility in the works the chapter has discussed thus far. Consequently, the chapter next turns 
to examine a second significant explanatory context. The second major section will address 
the salient issue of cultural decline, and how such a decline may have led white Americans to 
coalesce around Trump in the 2016 Election 
 
Cultural Decline 
In a widely read article published during the 2016 US primary season, Malone (2016) 
observed that something was driving Trump’s support that was considerably more significant 
than working-class anger at being “left behind”. ‘Looking at the numbers’, noted Malone, it 
seemed that Trump’s voters cared more about ‘cultural conservatism [and] racial resentment’ 
than they did other issues (2016). Indeed, results of a FiveThirtyEight/SurveyMonkey poll 
found that ‘one of the most indicative’ variables in determining Trump support was the 
number of people who agreed with the statement: ‘the number of immigrants who come to 
the United States each year should decrease’ (Malone 2016).  
Trump’s rhetoric was highly polarising and yet, it is clear that his words resonated with 
the Republican primary electorate. Understanding Trump’s victory in this context is 
especially important because the 2016 Republican field was the largest in the recent history 
of either major political party until the 2020 Democratic primaries. Voters had a full range of 
varying forms of conservatism to choose from, from libertarianism (Rand Paul) to social 
conservatism (Mike Huckabee, Rick Santorum), to neoconservatism (Lindsey Graham). 
Despite all of these choices, however, Trump prevailed with a unique brand of nationalist 
populism (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). In light of these observations, the following section 
proceeds to discuss what it was Trump said regarding America’s cultural decline that seemed 






Trump and the Politics of Resentment  
As the values of today’s younger, more ethnically diverse cohorts have become 
cosmopolitan, the more ‘traditional’ values of older, less educated and more ethnically 
homogenous generations have not changed (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 101). Today’s post-
material society is out of step with the world that older White Americans once knew, leading 
them to feel displaced and resentful. The faster that these changes have occurred, the more 
stoked the ‘culture wars’ (that is, the conflict between older generational values and 
postmaterialist values) have become (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 123). Examples of 
significant sources of resentment include hostility towards immigrants, as well as religious 
and ethnic minorities, who bring change to previously homogenous advanced Western liberal 
democracies. Using intergenerational cohort analysis, Norris and Inglehart (2019) find that 
older, less educated generations tend to express such sentiments more so than younger 
cohorts (p. 98). Most strikingly, they find that support of populist parties and leaders who 
defend traditional cultural values and make xenophobic and nationalist overtures skew 
towards the same group (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 20).  
Scholars observe that Trump stoked resentment towards immigrants and minorities in an 
attempt to mobilise support among white Americans (Thompson 2020). Jardina (2019), for 
instance, notes that the only agenda issue on Trump’s campaign website when he first 
launched his candidacy for President in July 2015 was about immigration restriction (233). 
This was a sign that resentment towards immigrants was one of his primary strategies in 
garnering greater support among anxious white voters. In another example, Bobo (2017) 
notes that Trump ‘fuelled and exploited anxiety’ about America’s increasing diversity by 
‘demonising [sic] and scapegoating Mexican immigrants [and] Muslims’ (99). Likewise, 
Schaffner et al. (2018) note that Trump’s ‘strategy’ involved ‘using explicitly racist… 





racism without exploring the meaning of the term concerning the group (White Americans) 
studied. While Schaffner et al. (2018) do not raise racism as a moot point, greater conceptual 
clarity of racism is needed if we are to understand how it drove Trump support.  
Bobo’s (2017) study stands out in this regard. Devoting four pages to a careful 
elucidation and definition of racism, Bobo (2017) contends that ‘white supremacist notions’ 
influenced Enlightenment thinking and its subsequent application in the construction of 
American institutions at the Founding (p. 89). Throughout American history to today, racism 
in America has meant a continual denial of ‘full and common humanity for members of a 
particular group’ (Bobo 2017: 99). Bobo (2017) goes on to say that Trump’s desire to “Make 
America Great Again” was a ‘none-too-subtle dog whistle’ to a desire for his supporters to 
return to a privileged white position (100).5 
Bobo’s (2017) theoretical piece does not set out to engage in a detailed empirical 
explanation of the relationship between levels of anxiety and threat towards increasing 
ethnoracial diversity and white working-class voter mobilisation in the 2016 election. 
Nonetheless, tying the “MAGA” message of ideas of white hegemony in this analysis lays 
the groundwork for further empirical research into the fact that white Americans feel as if 
their group position is under threat. Consequently, the next subsection turns to examine what 
authors of the literature call “group-threat”, and whether or not the condition has any effect 
on the coalescing of white Americans around right-wing populist actors such as Trump. 
 
 
5 Indeed, the notion of the “restoration” of American greatness is far from new. Many a politician 
employed “Make America Great Again” as a slogan in their political campaigns before Trump 
service-marked the term in 2015. For example, amid stagflation and a worsening economy under 
President Carter, one of Reagan’s campaign slogans in the 1980 presidential election was “Let’s 
Make America Great Again” (Klingbeil et al. 2018). This earlier example highlights the evolution of 
the type of restoration promised by its chief orator; while Reagan’s message was primarily a promise 
of the restoration of economic security of the working-class, Trump’s use of the term harks to the 





Group Threat and the Dominant Majority  
Theoretical analyses on the motivational foundations of conservatism posit that societal 
instability, uncertainty and the perception of threat are associated with endorsement of 
conservative views (Jost et al. 2003; 2007). However, dominant group members do not just 
react to physical threats of danger, but also abstract concerns such as the future loss of their 
majority status. Threats to a group’s position trigger what authors of the intergroup relations 
literature call “out-group prejudice” (Pratto and Shih. 2000; Zarate et al. 2004). For example, 
in an experimental study testing if intergroup threat moderated the relationship between 
group status and group identification, Morrison et al. (2009) found that members of ‘high 
status’ groups were more likely than those with lower-group membership to respond to threat 
with a high social dominance orientation.6 
Research examining reactions to majority–minority ethnoracial demographic shifts 
reveal that white Americans imagining a future white minority perceive the shift as a threat to 
their ethnoracial group’s societal status. This perception leads whites to express more 
negative racial attitudes. In an experimental study using psychological items to gauge how 
the salience of America’s demographic shifts affected white American’s party-political 
preferences and ideologies, Craig and Richeson (2014a) exposed their participants to 
information conveying facts about demographic change. After exposure, they found that 
white Americans endorsement of more conservative candidates and policies increased (Craig 
& Richeson, 2014a, p. 1196). The most important implication of the study was that white 
Americans might become increasingly likely and motivated to support conservative 
candidates and policies in response to increasing ethnoracial diversity (Craig & Richeson, 
 
6 High levels of social dominance orientation are a “strategic” or group-serving response to an 
external threat. The casual inference being that dominant group members ‘feel as though they have 
more to lose’ if a threat becomes realised and thus react strategically to preserve their dominance 





2014a, p. 1196). The study carries further foresight because Craig and Richeson noted that 
commentators were being too premature about the decline of the Republican Party due to the 
waning electoral influence of white Americans (Heavey 2012; Wickam 2012).  
The literature that has been published since Trump’s victory attests to Craig and 
Richeson’s (2014a) prescience. Mutz (2018) tracks the same voters between the 2012 and 
2016 Presidential Elections to see if issue positions on race reflecting perceived status threat 
increased the likelihood of voters shifting to Trump in 2016. Perceived status threat, Mutz 
(2018) theorises, makes the status quo and existing hierarchical and political arrangements 
‘attractive’ to dominant group members (4331). Amidst changing times, conservatism then 
surges as dominant group members long for the stable hierarchies of the past.  
Perceived threat triggers “defensive” reactions from the dominant group, who place 
greater emphasis on the importance of group norms while expressing increased negativity 
towards out-groups. When confronted with evidence of ‘racial progress’, Whites perceive 
threat and experience lower levels of control as a control group (Mutz 2018: 4337). Mutz’s 
findings are consistent with those of Craig & Richeson (2014a) in that we find that increased 
levels of threat led to greater levels of Republican support. Overall, changes in time over 
items related to racial threat, vis-a-vis economic anxiety, were ‘far more influential’ as 
predictors in vote change towards greater support for Trump (Mutz 2018: 4338).  
The “threat” literature also focuses on the exploitation of dominant group anxieties by 
right-wing populist political actors such as Trump. For instance, Bonikowski (2017) argues 
that tendencies generally considered hallmarks of populist sentiment in the literature (for 
example anti-immigrant) from contemporary radical political actors are actually hallmarks of 
ethnonationalism. Ethnonationalism prioritises ascriptive, immutable criteria such as race to 
dominant group membership, while emphasising exclusionary political behaviours such as 





Ethnonationalist majority fears are likewise expressions of collective status threat. More 
specifically, the effects of these changes are seen as ‘impugning on the life chances, dignity 
and moral commitments of in-group members’ (Bonikowski 2017: 201). However, what 
makes these changes especially salient is that they can be mobilised into political cleavages. 
Right-wing political actors use these cleavages to their electoral advantage by fuelling a 
‘politics of resentment’ (Bonikowski: 2017: 184). Resentment is fired towards non-dominant 
group members such as racial and ethnic minorities and immigrants (Hooghe and 
Dassonneville 2018).  
The fact that these are ethnonationalist hallmarks rather than populist hallmarks explains 
why, when Mudde’s (2007) framework is used, Bonikowski (2017) finds that the supply and 
demand sides of populism have remained relatively stable in an era of tremendous electoral 
success for radical right political actors (197). Mudde’s (2007) supply/demand side schema, 
while seminal in the study of populism, is nonetheless deficient when attempting to account 
for Trump’s victory, Bonikowski (2017) argues, since it misses a statistically independent 
dimension related to the degree of resonance of various political frames and corresponding 
popular attitudes.  
In classic framing theory, resonance is a cultural process that shapes a social 
movement’s ability to mobilise its supporters around a core message (Goffman 1974; 
Fairhurst and Sarr 1996). In this way, framing theory tends to see popular beliefs as static, 
and their “activation” dependent on the right message. However, Bonikowski (2017) 
proposes that resonance is a more fluid and dynamic process (193). Bonikowski (2017) posits 
that resonance involves feedback effects whereby “solutions” encoded in frames serve to 
generate or reinforce similar popular fears the impact of about demographic change. Seen in 





Americans to connect their fears associated with America’s changing demographics with 
their latent attitudes and support a candidate that offered radical solutions (193)  
Importantly, change is threatening to some but not all white Americans; a qualification 
that Bonikowski (2017) and Mutz (2018) omit. In a social-psychological study of white 
American voting behaviour in the 2016 election, Major et al. (2018) found that white 
Americans’ responses to increasing racial diversity depended on how strongly they identified 
with their ethnic group (937). Whites in high ethnic identification with their group shifted 
towards Trump, whereas Whites in low ethnic identification with their group become less 
positive towards Trump. Concurring with Craig and Richeson (2014a), Major et al. (2018) 
observe that as white Americans’ numerical majority keeps shrinking, White identity 
concerns are becoming increasingly salient in affecting white Americans’ voter preferences. 
While previously disregarded in research on White voting behaviour (Sears and Savalei 
2006), America’s current political events indicate this is no longer the case. 
However, a critical limitation of the “threat” literature is that it uses ‘ideas of [W]hite 
racial identity and mobilisation without mentioning [Whites] specifically’ (Wong and Cho, 
2005: 700). In the contemporary literature on ethnic identity/group consciousness in America, 
the dominant focus is on the status of minorities such as Asian Americans and Hispanics 
(Utsey et al. 2002; Sanchez 2006; Masuoka 2006). An ‘implicit comparison, control group or 
counterfactual in many of these studies is White American’, note Wong and Cho (2005: 700).  
The omission of white Americans in both strands of literature is problematic for two 
reasons. First, a comparison point is needed with other races to understand how racial identity 
applies to ‘all racial groups’ and when (and under what) circumstances it behaves differently 
(Wong and Cho 2005: 701). Second, White Americans’ changing numerical majority status 
affects levels of White racial self-identification (Wong and Cho 2005: 701). White identity 





racial identity has changed as America has become more diverse (Wong and Cho, 2005: 
701). Addressing the lack of broader understanding of the role that white ethnoracial identity 
may play in driving higher levels of perceived threat is thus vital if we are to understand the 
salient factors that explain why 54 per cent of White Americans voted for Trump in 2016 
(Pew Research Center 2018). Consequently, the following subsection turns to examine the 
conceptualisation and construction of white ethnoracial identity. Specifically, the next section 
also examines how the formulation of a collective white ethnoracial identity feeds into 
political mobilisation of white Americans around radical right social movements and political 
parties.  
 
White Identity and Support for the Radical Right 
Conceptualisations of White identity in the empirical literature hinge on two competing 
theories - colour-blindness and White privilege. Colour-blindness contends that White 
Americans have little-to-no race consciousness and are unaware of themselves as “whites”. 
Such conceptualisations claim whiteness to be a ‘sense of self and subjectivity… unaware of 
its social foundations (Hartmann et al. 2009). The notion of “invisibility” is thus implied in 
works which reference “colour-blind racism” (Carr 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2006). Findings from 
the psychology literature add weight to the conceptual foundations of colour-blindness 
through the construction of validation and measurement instruments for individual racial 
identification and attitudes (Neville et al. 2013). While the empirical findings of 
psychological studies also buttress the case for colour-blindness, such studies have relatively 
small sample sizes (Gushue and Constantine 2007), limiting their effectiveness in observing 
larger populations.  
The second theory, White privilege, concerns whether whites possess an awareness of 





integral role in enabling whites, as the dominant group, to maintain their position atop the 
ethnoracial hierarchy. The crux in the literature is whether Whites are aware of these 
advantages. The straightforward answer is that whites are unaware and therefore cannot 
acknowledge their advantaged position (Roediger 1999). The more nuanced answer is that 
Whites are aware of the consequences of racial inequalities generated by unequal hierarchies 
(Solomona et al. 2005) yet cannot place themselves within a system of race relations to see 
how their structural advantages perpetuate the struggles of nondominant group members. 
However, as Hartmann et al. (2009) point out, quantifying Whites’ awareness of white 
privilege is ‘impossible’, since the action involves pointing out awareness in the question 
itself (407). 
For reasons noted, nationally representative data are scarce to test the validity of colour-
blindness and white-privilege and their relation to formulations of White identity in America 
today. Some scholars, however, have attempted to fill the gap. For example, Torkelson & 
Hartmann (2010) use survey data from the American Mosaic Project (AMP) to measure the 
comparative effects of racial/ethnic identity on White Americans (1316–1317). To assess the 
strength of white Americans’ ethnic identification, survey participants were tallied and 
categorised as “salient” or “nominally” white ethnic. Torkelson and Hartmann (2010) found 
that ethnic whites were ‘not aligned with colorblind ideologies’ (1324). While ethnicity did 
not have a subsequent influence of the racial ideologies of white Americans, it was correlated 
with increased levels of Whites’ awareness of their own racial identities (Torkelson and 
Hartmann 2010: 1325). However, the population of whites who identify as being ethnically 
white was rather small. Only 14% of all whites identified as white ethnic, with only half of 
those holding a salient identity (Torkelson and Hartmann 2010: 1321).  
Likewise, Wong and Cho (2005) use American National Election Studies (ANES) 





of racial self-identification among Whites and African Americans varied between 1972 and 
2000. They found that African Americans had consistently high levels of self-identification 
between 1972 and 2000 (76–87%), with only 11% maximum variance between any given 
reference point (Wong and Cho 2005: 705). Conversely, White Americans levels of racial 
self-identification fluxed over time (41%–75%), with a maximum variance of 34% between 
any given reference point (Wong and Cho 2005: 705). While White identity did exist and 
affected out-group attitudes to other races, they noted that it had not yet become a ‘politicised 
[sic] identity’ in 2000 (Wong and Cho, 2005: 716). Nonetheless, there was a ‘danger’ that 
white identity, while in an unstable state, could be ‘easily triggered’ by a ‘demagogue’ 
(Wong and Cho, 2005: 716).  
Indeed, a paper presented by Sides et al. (2017) indicates that there is evidence that 
Trump “activated” white American group consciousness in the 2016 election. Using 
longitudinal panel data from the 2004 National Politics Study and the 2012 American 
National Election Study (ANES), they found a negative relationship between perceptions of 
discrimination against White Americans and voter choice for the Republican candidate in the 
2004 and 2012 presidential elections respectively (Sides et al. 2017: 16–17).  
By 2016, however, this had begun to change. Using similar datasets, the authors report a 
‘significant relationship’ between perceptions of white discrimination and higher levels of 
support for Trump (Sides et al. 2017: 17). This paper is significant because it indicates that 
the activation of white group consciousness, previously considered dormant in earlier 
elections is dependent on electoral candidates who highlight the purported “threat” posed to 
white Americans by non-white ethnoracial groups. While previous right-wing presidential 
nominees and candidates used similar tactics in previous polls7 Trump’s activation of White 
group consciousness is noteworthy because he won his election whereas Wallace and 
 





Buchanan did not. The data thus suggests that the activation of white group consciousness 
has the potential to be a dominant force in the mass mobilisation of white Americans in 
future polls if it leads to electoral victory.  
Most notoriously in the American context, White ethnoracial identity has been the 
mobilising force behind white supremacist/nationalist movements. The sociology literature 
has long explored the relationship of White identity as the basis for collective action. Well-
known examples of such formations include the Ku Klux Klan and White militia movements 
(Kimmel and Ferber 2009) as well as more contemporary White nationalist movements such 
as the Alt-Right (Hawley 2017; Niewert 2017). As social movements, they provide ‘concrete’ 
organisations and institutions within which collective White identities are formed 
(McDermott and Samson, 2005: 255). These identities are often realised through the creation 
of a space where a collective sense of group belonging can be fostered, allowing members to 
imagine a ‘larger White community,’ as well as through the dissemination of ‘cultural 
markers’ that signal white supremacist ideas (McDermott and Samson 2005: 255). Examples 
include hooded costumes in the case of the Ku Klux Klan, and Pepe the Frog in the case of 
the Alt-Right 
Nonetheless, there is a tendency to conflate these fringe groups with more mainstream 
social and political movements around which white Americans coalesce. This is problematic 
because, despite their relatively small membership bases, white supremacist/nationalist 
movements have been afforded a ‘comparatively large role’ in scholarly definitions of white 
racial identity (McDermott and Samson 2005: 253). This observation, as well as the 
‘ignominious history’ of White supremacy in America have created ‘underlying normative 
bias’ tying expressions of white racial identity to ‘pathological… Jim-Crow style racism’ 





Weller and Junn (2018) argue that there are other ways of thinking about White identity 
in light of Trump’s robust base of White support. The authors do not see white voters as 
voting against their material interests by voting for the Republican Party. Rather, by 
combining a rational choice voting perspective with a social psychological approach, they 
conceptualise white racial self-identification as a utility-based trait affecting voting and 
electoral candidate preferences (Weller and Junn, 2018: 437). Seen in this way, White 
Americans’ perceptions of their own “whiteness” may be distributed across the cohort in 
ways identifiable and quantifiable in systematic survey data (Weller and Junn, 2018: 439–
440).  
To summarise the cultural decline section, we have seen that as America has become 
more diverse, scholars have studied how white Americans have reacted to change - for 
example through expressions of threat/fear of status loss. However, such analyses go no 
further, and they have not examined how such reactions are endemic of modifications in 
intra/intergroup behaviour related to the underlying changes caused by diversity. This is an 
essential limitation of the data, because it ignores a growing body of literature primarily 
interested in ethnoracial American intergroup relations in an era of increasing diversity; 
America is becoming more ethnoracially diverse at an increasingly fast rate due to 
historically high levels of immigration and low White birth rates. If indeed whites do see 
themselves as an ethnoracial group and vote as such, then an examination of this literature is 
especially relevant. This is because it provides a greater contextual awareness of the data 
presented in studies of the cultural backlash thesis. The inclusion of this body of literature in 
the review is thus justified if we are to, while remaining consistent with the research question, 
understand why 54 percent of Whites voted for Trump in 2016. Consequently, the chapter 
now turns to examine the literature which explores the effects of increasing diversity on the 






The Implications of a Changing America for White Americans 
No historic “wave” of immigration to the United States has changed the country’s 
demographic makeup more so than the 1965 Immigration Act. Under the 1965 Immigration 
act, immigrants of nationalities were on an even footing for admittance into the United States 
whereas they had not been before. In just a short time, this new immigration, predominately 
from Central and Latin America as well as Asia, has radically altered the racial and 
demographic composition of America. In 1960, 85% of the population was non-Hispanic 
white. By 2016, this number was 61%. Meanwhile, Hispanics made up 3% of the population 
in 1960, and by 2016, this had increased to 18%. Likewise, Asians made up 1% of the 
population in 1965 and 6% by 2015. A study by the Pew Research Center (2015: 9) indicates 
that without passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, the composition of America would be 
markedly different today: 75% would be non-Hispanic White, 14% would be African 
American, 8% would be Hispanic and Asian would make up less than 1%. If these trends 
continue as projected, non-Hispanic Whites will only constitute a plurality of the population 
by 2055 (Pew Research Center 2015: 10).  
 
A History of American Nativism  
The data presented leads us into our first subsection of the “changing America” section. 
This subsection elucidates the history of nativist movements and nativist literature in the 
United States. Elucidation of the history of nativist movements and nativist literature before 
1965 indicates that Americans have long expressed uneasiness toward new immigrants. This 
uneasiness fed into Congressional legislative agendas and scholarly thinking in the early 
Twentieth Century. The 1965 Immigration Act superseded the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act. 





included Italians, Slavs and Polish Jews. The overwhelming majority of immigrants who had 
come to America under these quotas were from Northern and Western Europe. The passing 
of the Johnson-Reed Act was primarily a reaction to the influx of immigrants from Southern 
and Eastern Europe at the turn of the 19th Century.  
The “second wave” of immigration resulted in a surge of nativist sentiment. Nativists of 
the time were concerned that “America” was not defined in a meaningful way. A concern that 
America lacked a unified national culture or identity was central to the development of 
nativist thinking. While immigration levels during this period reflected demands for cheap 
labour by big business (Dubofsky 2013: 351), it increasingly became seen by nativists as a 
major threat. For nativists, immigration restriction was seen as a way to preserve “America” 
(Friedman 2017; Bouie 2018). However, their conception of America was essentially a 
cultural monist one—by America, they meant the White, Anglo-Saxon culture of Colonial 
times. As Kallen (1916) puts it, the masses of white English men in the colonies were seen by 
nativists as being possessed of ‘ethnic and cultural unity’, homogenous with respect to 
‘ancestry and ideals’ (191). Such racial overtures were blatant in pseudo-scientific nativist 
works of the time. In the Passing of the Great Race, for instance, Grant considers American 
culture racially determined as opposed by other indicators such as language or values 
(Higham 2002: 156). Grant feared that mixing with “lesser” groups (i.e., non-English white 
immigrants) would lessen the quality of ‘Nordic’ (Anglo-Saxon) stock, ultimately leading to 
a diminished America. Slavs were one such group believed to be racially inferior to Anglo 
Saxons (Roucek 1969: 35).  
In Trans-National America, an article remarkable for its optimistic internationalist 
fervour amidst the prevailing nationalist sentiment during the First World War, Bourne was 
fiercely critical of the nativists’ conceptualisation of “Americanization” for retaining 





‘cosmopolitan federation of national colonies [and] foreign cultures, from whom the sting of 
devastating competition has been removed’. The American fold has a cosmopolitan spirit. 
There are ‘no… masses of aliens waited to be assimilated… into the dough of Anglo-
Saxonism’, but rather ‘threads of living… cultures… striving to weave themselves into a[n] 
international nation’ (Bourne 1916). America shall be ‘what the immigrant [has] a hand in 
making it’ not what those ‘descendant of… British stocks… decide that America shall be 
made’ (Bourne 1916).  
 
Cultural Assimilation  
Competing theories of cultural assimilation began to emerge as a reaction against the 
ideas of authors of the nativist literature. Israel Zangwill’s 1908 play The Melting Pot tells 
the story of David Quixano, a Jewish immigrant who comes to America from Russia after his 
entire family is killed in the Kishinev pogrom. Quixano writes a symphony espousing his 
hope for a world in which ethnic divisions have “melted” away. By all accounts historical 
reception to Zangwill’s play was enthusiastic. The Melting Pot presented an ideal ‘that was 
attractive to many Americans’ (Shumsk 1975: 29) and was operationalised into a sociological 
theory that accounted for the assimilation and transformation of different ethnic and religious 
groups into Americans sharing a common culture, developing common attitudes, values and 
lifestyles. 
Scholars began to discredit the melting pot theory as early as the late Forties. Early 
studies pointed to the fact that assimilation of immigrants along religious lines had not 
occurred. Analysing longitudinal marriage data over 70 years, Kennedy found that religious 
endogamy among Protestant, Catholic and Jewish individuals residing in New Haven was 
rampant (Kennedy 1944: 332). Kennedy argued that the single melting pot theory must be 





study a decade later, Herberg (1983) concurred that the three great faiths in the United States 
constituted a triple melting pot. Until the sixties, the majority of scholarly works on 
American integration were ‘explicitly or implicitly based’ on melting pot theory (Bisin and 
Verdier 2000: 955). However, theoretical developments in the sociology literature during the 
sixties disregarded the theory for describing interethnic relations in the United States (Gordon 
1964). For example, the seminal work of Glazer and Moynihan (1963) observed that ethnic 
assimilation was at best preceding very slowly. The five respective groups of interest in their 
enquiry, African Americans, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish, retained their distinctive 
cultural patterns long after making port in New York.  
Another theory that emerged amidst the surge of nativist sentiment at the time of the 
First World War was Kallen’s (1916) theory of cultural pluralism. Instead of assimilating by 
“melting-down”, the idea was that different ethnic groups instead co-existed in their separate 
identities much like the ingredients in a salad bowl, bound only by the “dressing” of 
America’s democratic values and institutions. Kallen (1916) places emphasis on the inherent 
value of the ethnic and cultural differences of migrants, using Switzerland as an example of 
being ‘the most successful democracy in the world’ despite their ‘language, literary and 
spiritual conditions’ being German, Italian and French in equal measure (220). While 
“Americanization” denotes the adoption of ‘English speech, of American clothes and 
manners, [and] the American attitude in politics’ by new arrivals, the process does not change 
the importance of those fundamental cultural and ethnic distinctions (Kallen 1916: 192). For 
one can change their ‘clothes, politics… religions and philosophies’, but not their 
grandfathers (Kallen 1916: 220). 
Berry’s (1997) theory of acculturation presents a more theoretically sophisticated 
contemporary formulation of how various ethnoracial groups interact with one another in 





(diverse) as a result of immigration (Berry 1997: 8). Cultural groups within society are 
unequal in terms of the power (numerical, political, economic) they wield (Berry 1997: 8). 
These power differences have given rise to the notion of majority/minority and 
dominant/nondominant groups in the contemporary social science literature (Islam and 
Hewstone 1993; Binder et al. 2009). In all pluralist societies, both dominant and 
nondominant groups ‘must deal’ with how to acculturate (Berry 1997 9). Acculturation in its 
simplest definition is, therefore, the process by which one cultural group comes into 
‘continuous first-hand contact’ with another (Redfield et al. 1936: 149). As America has 
become more culturally diverse, the interaction between its constituent groups has become an 
increasingly important factor in people’s everyday lives. Dominant/nondominant groups must 
devise what Berry (1997) terms ‘acculturation strategies’ (9). These strategies are devised 
concerning two major considerations — first, cultural maintenance, or the process of valuing 
and preserving one’s own cultural identity. Second, contact and participation, or the level of 
involvement with the host culture or dominant cultural group (Berry 1997: 9).  
Assimilation is only successful when people can do so freely. If they are forced to, ‘it 
becomes like a pressure cooker’, Berry (1997) observes (9). Likewise, integration can only be 
freely chosen and well-pursued by nondominant groups when those in the dominant group 
are ‘open and inclusive in [their] orientation towards cultural diversity’ (Berry 1997: 10). The 
data on these conditions are striking among white Americans. Forty-three percent think those 
immigrating to the United States are making the country worse in the long run compared to 
41% who do not (Pew Research Center 2015: 53). Conversely, African Americans and 
Hispanics both think immigrants have a positive impact. Many Americans also think today’s 
immigrants are not assimilating. It is the perception of two-thirds of white Americans that 
immigrants ‘want to hold on to their home country customs and way of life’, while only 32% 





Americans are also likely to hold more negative views on immigrants who mostly came after 
the 1965 Immigration Act. For example, over 72% say immigrants of Latin American origin 
have made a neutral or negative impact on American society (Pew Research Center 2015: 
14). 
 
Diversity and Social Trust  
It is not just that White Americans hold low levels of trust towards post-1965 
immigrants. Across the board, there is evidence that their trustworthiness is decreasing in 
everyone (Rahn and Transue 1998; Robinson and Jackson 2001). Trust is the bedrock of what 
social scientists call social capital. ‘It is hard to think of any form of social capital that could 
exist without trust’, notes Murray (2012: 251). Low levels of social trust are endemic of 
lower levels of social capital. Specific dimensions of social capital, such as political and 
religious participation, are tangible and are statistically measurable using specific indicators. 
Examples of these indicators include rates of participation in political organisations and 
church attendance (Putnam, 2000: 43–71). Trust, however, is somewhat intangible and thus 
harder to quantify. Therefore, the crux of the matter is how we take an abstract concept such 
as trust and operationalise it into a statistically measurable and observable phenomenon.  
Many studies examining levels of social and civic trust in America use data from the 
General Social Survey (GSS), which has asked variations of the same question on 
trustworthiness since the survey’s inception in 1972 (Kawachi et al. 1997; Putnam 2000). 
Until recently, however, there has been a paucity of research on the levels of trust between 
America’s racial and ethnic groups and white Americans specifically. One of the few 
analyses comes from Murray (2012). In Coming Apart, Murray (2012) pared down into the 
GSS attitudinal data on social trust going back to the early seventies. Murray (2012) found 





the issues of trustworthiness, fairness and the helpfulness of others had crumbled between 
1970 and 2010 (252–254). Murray (2012) does not affix chief responsibility to any particular 
variable to explain the precipitous decline in social trust among white Americans. However, 
he observes that social trust seems to be declining most precipitously in communities where 
ethnic heterogeneity is on the rise.  
Indeed, a substantial body of evidence in the social capital literature shows that 
increasing diversity can have adverse effects on the levels of social capital within 
communities (Letki 2008; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010; Portes and Vickstrom 2011). Putnam’s 
(2007) E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century is the most 
well-known study on the adverse effects of diversity. The literature before Putnam (2007) 
shows two divergent strands in social capital. These are conflict theory and contract theory 
(Allport 1979; Sherif et al. 1988). Conflict theory contends that diversity enhances the in-
group/out-group distinction and strengthens in-group solidarity (or bonding social capital), 
thus increasing ethnocentrism (Putnam 2007: 144). Contrastingly, contact theory contends 
that diversity erodes the in-group/out-group distinction and enhances out-group solidarity (or 
bridging social capital), thus lowering ethnocentrism (Allport 1979: 144). Since Allport 
(1979) formulated contact theory, much research has shown that positive group contact 
experiences towards groups such as the elderly (Caspi 1984) and those with disabilities 
(Yuker and Hurley 1987) resulted in reduced levels of self-reported group prejudice. 
Though contact theory and conflict theory have been compared against one another in 
the academic literature for over four decades, conflict theory is essentially an extension of 
contact theory under less-than-ideal conditions. Before Putnam’s study, virtually none of the 
hundreds of empirical enquiries had ever attempted to quantify in-group attitudes. Instead, 
they measured positive or negative out-group attitudes, merely assuming that in-group 





attitudes were measures of ethnocentrism. Putnam (2007) puts forward a thesis he terms 
‘constrict theory’, contending that diversity, at least in the ‘short-to-medium term’, reduces 
both in-group and out-group solidarity (144). Putnam’s findings demonstrate a ‘strong 
positive relationship between inter-racial trust and ethnic homogeneity’ (2007: 147).  
Ethnically diverse communities thus experience lower levels of social trust than those 
that are more homogenous. Prima facie, this is an admonition of conflict theory, but Putnam’s 
findings are more complex, with Putnam (2007) finding that ethnocentric trust is ‘completely 
uncorrelated’ with ethnic diversity (148). The effect on diversity on intragroup relations was 
even starker in his findings. It was not, as Putnam said, that people were only distrusting of 
those whose race or ethnicity was different from their own; they did not even trust members 
of their group. Colloquially, people in ethnically diverse communities tend to ‘hunker down’ 
(Putnam, 2007: 137). Kaufmann and Goodwin (2018) call the phenomena of the withdrawal 
of whites from community participation under conditions of increasing ethnic heterogeneity 
an ‘exit route’ (12). This “exit route” has been the subject of empirical scrutiny since 
Putnam’s (2007) analysis (Van Der Meer and Tolsma 2014). However, the ‘voice’ route, in 
which native-born whites express negative attitudes towards increasing diversity, and 
subsequently vote for right-wing populist actors, has not been examined to the same depth 
(Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018: 120).  
Kaufmann and Goodwin (2018) address this gap by performing a meta-analysis of 171 
articles that explore conditions of increasing ethnic heterogeneity and opposition to 
immigration, and how the two relate to support for anti-immigrant party platforms. They find 
that over 70 percent of studies report that community heterogeneity primes threat, thus 





parties among native Whites (Kaufman & Goodwin 2018: 130).8 These observations are 
important because a host of Western democracies are becoming diverse at an increasingly 
fast rate (Kaufmann 2018). Consequently, as our democracies become more diverse, support 
for anti-immigrant parties – at least the micro and marco levels - might increase too.  
 
Conclusion 
An important lacuna in the existing scholarship relates to a lack of broader comparative 
awareness of the various factors that contributed to Trump’s unlikely victory in the 2016 US 
Presidential election. In the previous chapter, I have argued that this is a critical omission,  
because without such evidence we are unable to tell whether Trump’s victory on the part of 
White voters is best explained by existing frameworks that have long explained voter 
behaviour - for instance, voter concerns related to rational choice economic voting and 
upward mobility (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Equally, however, the unprecedented 
salience of xenophobic and racist overtures during the 2016 campaign could be indicative of 
the successful electoral mobilization of a cohort of White voters that are increasingly 
concerned about cultural and socio-cultural issues (Norris and Inglehart 2019). We need to 
understand what Trump’s victory means in light of these developments. This is so that we are 
able to better understand whether Trump’s victory is simply an aberration, or whether his 
victory might be indicative of a broader trend of White voter re-alignment in which such 
voters are now resistant to the existing offers of mainstream politicians and political elites 
(Eatwell and Goodwin 2018).  
 
8 When it comes to diversity levels, however, the relationship between community heterogeneity and threat 
perceptions was found to be nonlinear. Crucially, this nonlinear relationship took the form of a diversity 
“wave,” whereby greater community heterogeneity predicted threat at the micro and marco community levels, 
while at the meso level – for instance, in Census tracts or neighbourhoods of between 5,000 to 10,000 people - 





 The present literature review speaks to the lack of broader comparative awareness in 
the extant literature. Despite the burgeoning number of scholarly works on the 2016 US 
Presidential election, there is no single or authoritative work which attempts to understand 
which factors or set of factors that created the currents for Trump’s unlikely victory. 
Nonetheless, by trifurcating accounts for Trump’s victory into three broader explanatory 
contexts, we can begin to better conceptualize whether 2016 was emblematic of a White 
voter realignment or, equally, of “revolt” against the political elites in Washington.   
As of yet, this doctoral thesis makes no claims as to which of these explanatory 
contexts (“left behind” thesis, cultural decline thesis, changing America thesis) is the most 
robust in contributing to our existing understanding of White voter behaviour in 2016. 
However, it is important to note that the literature review chapter functions as an important 
bridge between the purely theoretical understandings of Trump’s victory and the empirical 
study of White voter behaviour that is to follow in the upcoming chapters. Now that we have 
a better theoretical approximation of these three explanatory contexts, therefore, it is now 
possible to begin to probe their empirical robustness and validity as frames for understanding 
why 54 per cent of White voters cast their ballots for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 
2018). To begin to test the empirical robustness of the three explanatory contexts, it is crucial 
that we have a sound methodological foundation underpinning guiding research investigation. 
Consequently, Chapter 3 will unpack the broader methodological approach underpinning the 







Chapter 3: Modelling Presidential Vote Choice 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter reviewed the extant literature on White vote choice for Trump in 
the 2016 US Presidential election. This review revealed three significant explanatory contexts 
that explain the vote choice of Whites in 2016. These are: i) the “left behind” thesis, ii) the 
cultural decline thesis; and (iii) the changing America thesis. To test the robustness of these 
explanatory contexts as frames through which we can better understand why 54 per cent of 
White Americans voted for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018), this chapter 
provides an outline of the methodological approach underpinning the doctoral thesis. The 
thesis adopts a quantitative research design and analyses secondary cross-sectional survey 
data to empirically investigate whether the three explanatory contexts are robust frames for 
understanding White vote choice.  The chapter will detail why a quantitative design was 
adopted to investigate the research aims, any issues that might arise from the use of 
secondary survey data, and will detail the sample, sources of data, the modelling strategy, and 
model robustness.  
 The chapter begins with a reflection on the onto-epistemological approach 
underpinning the theoretical orientation of the doctoral thesis, outlining why positivism was 
chosen as the preferred research paradigm to investigate the hypotheses. Having outlined the 
broader theoretical approach underpinning the investigation, the chapter then unpacks the 
methodology and research strategy. Afterward, the chapter turns to discuss sources of data 
and the sampling strategy. The chapter then outlines the modelling strategy that will be used 
to assess vote choice, providing an overview of the baseline socio-demographic and structural 
covariates that will be used in the vote choice models. The chapter will also consider 





parameters in the baseline model. Finally, the chapter concludes with a reflection on the 
methods employed to investigate the research aims and lays the groundwork for the first 
principal findings chapter in which the robustness of the “left behind” thesis as a frame for 
understanding White vote choice will be tested.  
 
Onto-Epistemological Considerations 
 Research paradigms in the study of the social sciences are underpinned by 
assumptions that researchers claim to know about the world, including what hypotheses 
should be investigated, and how these hypotheses are tested (Kuhn 1962). Research 
paradigms are compared with one another on three bases (Guba 1990). These are the 
ontological, or claims as to the nature of reality itself; the epistemological, concerning how 
we know what we know about the world, as well as the forms that this knowledge takes; and 
the methodological, concerning the instruments that researchers use to acquire this 
knowledge. Given that ontology and epistemology are the bases on which research is built, it 
is important that we first have a substantive approximation of the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions underpinning the doctoral thesis. This is so that we are able to 
better understand the methodological choices used to investigate why 54 per cent of Whites 
voted for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018).  
 Ontology is primarily concerned with understanding the overall nature of the 
existence of a given phenomenon. In seeking answers to the research questions posed by the 
doctoral thesis specifically, I am referring to a particular kind of knowledge that exists 
external to myself as a researcher that is investigating vote choice for Trump. It is important 
to note that this notion of “reality” may apply to an approximation of the world that is real 
and independent from knowledge (positivism), or, equally, to the notion that the world is 





underpinning the social sciences has been between positivism on the one hand, and 
constructivism on the other. To the positivist researcher, the answers to why so many White 
Americans voted for Trump are “out there” waiting to be discovered. By contrast, to the 
constructivist researcher, answers to questions concerning electoral behaviour may be are 
subjective to each White voter.  
  From these ontological positions, researchers make epistemological decisions to 
address the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge. More specifically, these decisions 
pertain to the possible ways of how researchers gain knowledge about reality. Positivists 
assume that reality can be measured. As such, positivist researchers place emphasis on valid 
and reliable tools to obtain knowledge about reality. Consequently, positivism is associated 
with quantitative research strategies that are used to obtain knowledge. Statistical techniques 
are especially central to positivist research, which adheres to structured techniques to uncover 
knowledge about objective reality. For instance, a positivist researcher assessing vote choice 
for Trump would assume that Whites’ electoral behaviour is explained by a number of factors 
that can be robustly approximated by a vote choice model (Mutz 2018; Schaffner et al. 2018; 
Valentino et al. 2018; Reny & Collingwood 2019). In light of these considerations, the 
doctoral thesis will adopt a positivist research paradigm to assess vote choice for Trump. 
Having delineated the onto-epistemological approach (positivism) underpinning the doctoral 
thesis, the chapter now turns to discuss the specific methodology and methods employed to 
conduct the research.  
 
Methodology 
 This section provides an outline of the methodological approach underpinning the 
doctoral thesis. The specific research strategy employed to investigate the research aims are 





section. Accordingly, the doctoral thesis has adopted a quantitative research strategy to 
investigate why 54 per cent of Whites voted for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018). 
An elucidation of why a quantitative approach was adopted over a qualitative approach is the 
primary focus of this section.  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, contemporary ethnographies of Whites’ political 
behaviour that were seen as especially important works in the aftermath of Trump’s unlikely 
victory have not been treated as partial accounts of why Trump won (Vance 2016; Gest 2016; 
Hochshild 2018). One concern related to these aforenoted ethnographic narratives about 
White political behaviour in the Trump era relates to the ways in which such works have 
become essential tenets of explanations for Trump’s victory, often exceeding the scope of 
academic works that aim to assess vote choice for Trump in a more robust, empirical 
fashion.9 One of the major risks of over-emphasing these narratives concerning the 
importance of the White-working class to Trump’s victory is that explanations rooted in the 
“left behind” thesis have become pervasive without robust empirical comparison to the 
cultural decline thesis and the changing America thesis.  
Given that the principal research objective is to understand which dimension of White 
estrangement Trump’s unlikely victory best represents, it was therefore imperative to adopt a 
methodological approach that aims to account for the various dimensions of support for 
Trump in a systematic fashion. Whereas qualitative research methodologies interpret social 
reality through emphasising the importance of the subjective experiences of individuals, 
quantitative methodologies function as a means of providing a more systematic account of 
social reality. Given the aforenoted concerns with qualitative works on White voters, a 
 
9 It is also useful to note that the specific socio-demographic categories that have been mobilised in these 
ethnographic works – specifically those of “left behind,” working-class Whites – are, themselves, constructed. 
Indeed, the categories that are developed in these works rely on a series of motifs that are consistent with 
contemporary conceptualizations of working-class Whiteness, including race, education, and geography 





quantitative design was therefore adopted as the methodological approach to meet the overall 
objectives of the doctoral thesis. 
Quantitative research methodologies are strongly associated with the positivist 
research paradigm. As such, researchers use objective, logical, and systematic methods of 
analysis that allow for the accumulation of knowledge. Researchers adopting a quantitative 
approach gather statistical data, and will analyse data using a variety of empirical methods 
with the objective of yielding results that are generalizable to a wider population. Just as 
there are a number of ethnographies that attest to the subjective experiences of White voters 
(Gest 2016; Vance 2016; Hochschild 2018), there are an equal number of studies that adopt a 
quantitative methodological approach to investigate White vote choice for Trump (Schaffner 
et al. 2018; Whitehead et al. 2018; Reny and Collingwood 2018; Setzler and Yanus 2018). 
The consistent thread running through all of these quantitative studies is that they test a series 
of hypotheses that are associated with a variety of causal explanations for why 54 per cent of 
Whites voted for Trump (Pew Research Center 2018).  
Quantitative methods use “deductive reasoning” in order to extract conclusions from 
research hypotheses (Johnson-Laird 1999). The deductive approach involves developing a 
hypothesis (or a set of hypotheses) based on the existing literature, and then deploying a 
variety of empirical methods to test the theoretical expectations of the study. This process is 
useful because it allows researchers to investigate causal relationships between hypotheses 
and variables of interest. Crucially, quantitative methods allow researchers to operationalise 
key constructs of interest into statistically measurable phenomena, meaning that researchers 
are able to empirically test the robustness of their theory against the existing literature.  
The vote choice literature is replete with examples of the deductive reasoning process. 
For instance, Whitehead et al. (2018) hypothesize that Christian nationalism – a belief system 





predictor of vote choice that mobilised Whites to cast their ballot for Trump.10 The authors 
situate their theory within the existing vote choice literature, outlining where Christian 
nationalism intersects with and distinguishes from other predictors of vote choice. The 
authors then use survey data to operationalise Christian nationalism into a statistically-
measurable construct. The item for Christian nationalism is then entered a series of vote 
choice models in order to test the robustness of their explanation against other predictors that 
are known to be closely associated with vote choice for Trump (Whitehead et al. 2018). The 
sum of these types of analyses are that researchers investigating vote choice with set of 
specific hypotheses are able to make robust inferences about Trump’s particular appeal 
among White voters.   
 A vast array of different methods and designs are available to researchers in 
quantitative research. There are four main types of quantitative research, these are descriptive 
analysis, correlational analysis, causal-comparative/quasi-experimental analysis, and 
experimental analysis. Descriptive analysis aims to provide a systemic approximation about 
the status of an identified variable. Researchers do not begin with a hypothesis a priori. 
Rather, they are likely to develop a hypothesis after collecting the data. The test of the 
hypothesis then emerges in the analysis and critical synthesis of the data. Some studies of the 
vote choice literature have adopted this approach. For instance, McQuarrie (2017) utilised a 
descriptive design to investigate 2016 vote choice in Rust Belt counties. Here, McQuarrie 
analysed election data to probe trends in turnout and shifts in partisan preferences between 
2012 and 2016 in predominately White working-class areas of the Industrial Midwest. 
Analysis of these trends led McQuarrie (2017) to hypothesise that sharp declines in African 
American turnout, as well as Trump’s strong showing in overwhelmingly White and blue-
collar communities contributed to Clinton’s defeat in the Industrial Midwest. 
 





 By contrast, correlational analysis aims to determine the extent of a relationship 
between two or more variables using statistical data. In correlational research designs, 
researchers aim to assess trends or patterns within the data, but do not go as far in their 
analysis as to prove causes for these observed relationships. Cause and effect are not the 
objective of analyses that use correlational data, since the data are “observed” only. As such, 
variables are not manipulated as is commonly the case in experimental data. Rather, they are 
only identified and studied.  
Most studies of the vote choice literature have used survey data to determine the 
nature of the relationship between a given variable (𝑥) and vote choice for Trump (𝑦). For 
instance, Knuckey (2019) used survey data from the 2016 ANES to examine the relationship 
between sexist attitudes and opposition to Clinton in the general election. Using regression 
modelling, Knuckey established that sexist attitudes were statistically significant (p <.05) 
predictors of voters’ opposition to Clinton. As indicated by the author, however, the findings 
were only ‘suggestive’ of the continued obstacles faced by female candidates when running 
for prominent positions in American politics (Knuckey 2019).  
 Distinct from correlational analyses, causal-comparative and quasi-experimental 
research methods are those that attempt to establish cause and effect relationships among a 
group of variables. These types of research designs are somewhat similar to “truly” 
experimental research designs, but nonetheless exhibit a number of key differences. One key 
difference is that independent variables are identified (as opposed to being manipulated) by 
the researcher, and thus the effects of 𝑥 on 𝑦 are measured. Another difference is that 
researchers do not randomly assign groups, and must therefore use pre-existing ones.11 
Identified control groups exposed to the treatment variable are studied and compared to the 
 
11 Usefully, statistical packages such as Stata contain a number of built-in features such as treatment effects and 





experimental group. When conclusions are derived from quasi-experimental analyses, 
determining any causal relation must be done with a degree of care because other variables 
(known as “confounders”) may still affect the outcome.  
Studies of the vote choice literature that adopt a quasi-experimental research design 
use a number of strategies to mitigate confounding. For instance, Mutz (2018) used a panel 
design to assess whether White voters who felt as though their dominant group status was 
under threat by immigrants and racial minorities were more likely to vote for Trump relative 
to Obama in 2012. Using panel regression, Mutz (2018) found that such voters were indeed 
likely to be Obama-Trump vote switchers. Though the study was not “truly” experimental, 
the panel design nonetheless mitigated much of the concern related to establishing causality 
that is common with the use of survey data.  
 The final type of quantitative method is experimental research designs. Often used 
interchangeably with the term “true” experimentation, these research designs attempt to 
establish a cause-and-effect relationship between a group of variables. In a “true” experiment, 
researchers identify and impose controls over all variables with the exception of the 
independent variable. The independent variable is manipulated to determine any effects on 
the dependent variable. In contrast to quasi-experimental methods, subjects are randomly 
assigned to the experimental treatments.  
Though a relatively smaller number of studies of the vote choice literature have 
utilised experimental research designs to assess vote choice for Trump, we nonetheless find 
examples in the existing scholarship. For instance, Cassese and Holman (2019) used an 
experimental design to assess whether Trump’s use of sexist attacks against Clinton in the 
general election mobilised voters with latent, sexist, attitudes. In their study, the authors 
found that hostile sexists exposed to the attack (the treatment condition) were more likely to 





(Cassese & Holman 2019). These experimental results offered greater insight into the ways in 
which sexist attitudes shaped opposition to Clinton’s candidacy by adding robust causal 
inference to studies which primarily adopted a correlational research design to investigate the 
relationship between sexism and vote choice (Knuckey 2019).  
 In light of these different quantitative research designs, the doctoral thesis adopts a 
correlational analytical approach. Given that the main objective of this doctoral thesis was to 
analyse the salient predictors of White vote choice for Trump, the thesis will attempt to 
quantify the degree of association between a given explanatory variable on the probability 
that a White voter will cast their ballot for Trump. Importantly, adopting a correlational 
analysis will allow me to i) assess the relative magnitude (or effect size) of a given predictor 
of vote choice relative to a host of socio-demographic and structural controls that are likely to 
be associated with vote choice, and ii) establish the relative statistical significance of a given 
predictor of vote choice. Crucially, once we have established the magnitude and significance 
of these predictors, the doctoral thesis will be able to better-discern which predictor (or 
predictors) were the most potent in explaining White vote choice for Trump. Having 
established the quantitative methodological approach underpinning the doctoral thesis, the 
chapter next turns to unpack the research designs that are common in quantitative analyses, 
and will outline the specific research design chosen for the thesis.  
 
Research Design 
 The research design for the doctoral thesis can be conceptualized as the systemic plan 
and structure of the research process that aims to investigate why 54 per cent of Whites voted 
for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018). The research design functions as a means of 
allowing myself as a researcher to address the research aims and objectives underpinning the 





us with a robust framework for choosing the appropriate research methods to investigate vote 
choice for Trump, as well as decisions about the collection and analysis of data.  
As is the case with the large number of methodological approaches underpinning 
quantitative research, there also are number of research designs available to researchers 
investigating vote choice for Trump. Examples of research designs include case and case 
series, cross sectional designs, cohort and longitudinal designs, and experimental designs. 
The doctoral thesis adopts a cross sectional design to investigate the research aims and 
objectives. Cross sectional analyses are defined by three essential features. These are i) no 
time dimension, ii) a reliance on existing difference within the data, as opposed to change 
following intervention, and iii) groups of participants that are selected based on existing 
differences, as opposed to random assignment. Consequently, the cross-sectional design will 
only measure differences between White respondents, as opposed to within-subject changes 
as would be the case with panel data.  
The cross-sectional design captures information about the political and electoral 
behaviour of White Americans at a particular point in time during the 2016 election. This 
design is useful because it allows for the study of a relatively large number of White voters at 
points in time when issues important to voters are likely to be most potent – namely, 
immediately before or after the election. This feature of the research design is particularly 
important because the large sample sizes will allow us to draw robust inferences from the 
wider pool of White 2016 voters.  
When considering which quantitative research design is the most appropriate in light 
of the research objectives, researchers of the White vote choice literature have often collected 
primary data (Mutz 2018). Primary data are data that are gathered to fulfil a specific research 
objective. Consequently, the research instrument is focussed on addressing the purpose and 





collecting the data. The chief advantage of using primary data is that they are tailored to the 
specific aims of the study, and are available for analysis once gathered. Nonetheless, an 
important limitation of primary data is not only identifying the sample population, but also 
getting that population to respond (Lynn et al. 2008). Americans are constantly surveyed 
about a range of issues concerning voter behaviour and public opinion, but are often reticent 
of providing the time necessary to participate in academic research (Groves and Peytcheva 
2008). In many cases, scholars have ended up with fewer responses than initially planned for 
their analyses, and as such have had to adapt their analyses to account for a reduced sample 
size.  
An alternative approach is the use of secondary survey data. Secondary survey data 
refers to data that have been collected for a different purpose, but may nonetheless be useful 
in investigating the aims of different study. Just as scholars studying vote choice for Trump 
have used primary data to investigate their research aims, there are an equal number of 
studies that use secondary data (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Schaffner et al. 2018; 
Setzler et al. 2018). These data are often publicly available online for academics and 
researchers, and include Census data and those from collaborating institutions with an interest 
in furthering knowledge in the social sciences.12  
However, the central challenge with the use of secondary data centres around 
developing strategies to make the existing data fit the objectives and the research questions 
posed by the doctoral thesis. More specifically, these strategies often involve creating 
variables and measures that are robust and valid indicators of the various constructs that 
projects are interested in studying. Often, this requires transformation of the data, and 
creating constructs of interest by combining multiple indicators when the measures are not 
already present in the secondary survey datasets. At times, this strategy may also require a 
 





degree of inventiveness - this can especially be the case when devising measures that serve as 
proxies for constructs of interest.  
Having considered the advantages and disadvantages for both types of data, the 
doctoral thesis chose secondary data as the preferred source of data to investigate the research 
aims. Secondary data was primarily chosen because of the scope of breadth of the doctoral 
theses required a dataset that was sufficiently large enough to test the robustness of the three 
principal explanatory contexts delineated in the previous chapter. Importantly, this data 
strategy also mitigated much of the concern regarding missing data and non-response that is 
endemic in many analyses of Presidential vote choice (Whitehead et al. 2018). Despite these 
benefits however, a great deal more time was spent preparing, cleaning, and recoding the 
secondary survey data than would have otherwise been the case in a primary analysis. 
Nonetheless, the end result was a number of datasets that allowed me to better attest to the 
various dimensions of White estrangement that are likely to be associated with vote choice 
for Trump. 
 Consistent with the broader research objectives underpinning the doctoral thesis, 
analysis of cross-sectional, secondary survey data was thus adopted as the chosen research 
design. The use of secondary survey data is beneficial because it allows us to analyse a large 
sample of White 2016 voters, thus allowing for generalisability of results to the larger pool of 
White voters. Having delineated the research design underpinning the doctoral thesis, the 
chapter will next outline the sample population of interest to the analysis.  
 
Sample 
 The sample population of the analysis is White Americans. Because the objective of 
the doctoral thesis is to examine the salient predictors of White vote choice for Trump, all 





identify as White and non-Hispanic in the survey datasets.13 Non-Hispanic White is an ethno-
racial classification of the US Census Bureau. The US Census Bureau classifies race and 
ethnicity as distinct identities; when completing the Census form, respondents are asked two 
questions related to their race and ethnicity. In addition to being asked their race, respondents 
are also asked whether they are Hispanic or Latino. It is important to note that these 
categories are socio-political constructs that are manifestations of what Census respondents 
consider themselves to be (US Census Bureau, 2020). In this way, these racial and ethnic 
classifications are not intended to be scientific or anthropological conceptualizations but, 
rather, those that account for one’s individual ancestry and socio-cultural characteristics.  
A majority of White Americans trace their ancestry to Western and Northern Europe. 
White Americans are predominately descended from the English and Dutch settlers of North 
America that made the Atlantic crossing to the New World during the 16th and 17th Centuries 
(Jacobs, 2009; Shi & Tindall, 2016). By the time of the American Revolution, around 2.5 
million Whites lived in the Colonies (Wells, 2015). Between the Revolution and the 1820s, 
there was relatively little immigration to the US. Starting after the 1820s, however, 
exponential growth in the White population was associated with significant increases in 
levels of immigration from Western and Northern Europe.  
In addition to ancestry, White Americans are also characterised by their use of 
English.14 While the term “White American” is sometimes used interchangeably with the 
notion of “Anglo American,” it is important to note that Anglo Americans are in fact a sub-
group of White Americans that are primarily descended from Great Britain (Kaufmann, 
2004). Though many White Americans of non-English ancestry retained a degree of cultural 
traditionalism from their ancestral forebears (Bisin & Verdier, 2000), most second and third 
 
13 Hereinafter referred to as White, or White American.  
14 By contrast, a substantial majority of Whites of Hispanic and Latino origin speak Spanish as their primary 





generation immigrants descended from first generation immigrants of the major waves of 
European migration speak English as their primary language today (US Census Bureau, 
2020). Having defined “White American” so that we can better understand the sample 
population of the analysis, the methodology chapter now turns to the sources of data that will 
be used to model presidential vote choice in the upcoming chapters.    
 
Sources of Data  
 In the upcoming chapters, the doctoral thesis relies on data taken from multiple 
national benchmark surveys to model White vote choice for Trump. The most common 
source of data used across chapters is the American National Election Survey (ANES). The 
use of the ANES is beneficial to investigate the research aims underpinning the doctoral 
thesis. This is because the dataset is considered the “gold standard” of national benchmark 
surveys for American electoral and political behaviour (ANES, 2020). The ANES is a large 
N national survey that has conducted interviews with Americans both on and before election 
day since the 1948 Presidential election. Given the large sample size and the survey weights 
that make results generalizable to the US adult population provided by the ANES, we can 
express a degree of confidence that the results of the models that use the White only sample 
are broadly representative of the White American populace.  
As well as asking White respondents who they voted for, the ANES contains a 
number of useful items on public opinion of a range of issues.  Therefore, the doctoral thesis 
primarily relies on the 2016 ANES Time Series Study. For the 2016 ANES, researchers 
conducted a series of face-to-face and online interviews across a pre and post-election wave 
in 2016. The face-to-face component of the 2016 ANES interviewed 797 White Americans. 
By contrast, the online component of the 2016 ANES consisted of 2,242 White Americans. 





 In addition to the 2016 ANES, the doctoral thesis also turns to a number of additional 
national benchmark surveys to assess the vote choice of White Americans in 2016. The first 
of these additional sources is the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). The 
2016 CCES is a nationally representative survey that interviewed 64,000 US adults aged 18 
or over across two waves. The 2016 pre-election wave of the survey was conducted between 
September 28 to November 7, and the post-election wave was conducted between November 
9 to December 14. After sample selection, there was a total of N = 47,567 White respondents.  
Lastly, data are also taken from the 2016 Voter Survey. The 2016 Voter Survey is an 
internet survey that surveyed N = 8,000 American adults aged 18 or over between 29th 
November and 29th December 2016. Respondents to the 2016 Voter Survey were part of a 
larger sample (N = 45,000) originally interviewed by YouGov for the 2012 CCAP for the 
2012 Presidential election. N = 11,168 panellists from the original 2012 sample were invited 
to respond to the 2016 survey. Of these, N = 8,637 (or 77%) completed the 2016 Voter 
Survey. YouGov uses a stratified sample design whereby respondents from YouGov’s panel 
are matched to a synthetic sampling frame constructed using Census data from the American 
Community Survey and the Current Population Survey Voter and Registration Supplement 
(Democracy Fund, 2017, p. 2). The resulting sample is then weighted by a set of 
demographic/non demographic variables to make it representative at the national level. 
Because the objective is to examine White vote choice, all models using the Voter Survey 
data are estimated using a sub-sample of N = 4,853 White Americans who reported voting for 
either Clinton or Trump.  
In sum, the doctoral thesis analyses vote choice for Trump using three principal 
sources of national benchmark survey data. This is important because my analyses 
demonstrate that the results of the vote choice are robust across several sources of data. As 





socio-demographic and structural covariates that are used to estimate the baseline vote choice 
model are not the same across models which use separate sources of data. This is because the 
wording and measurement of certain items is different across surveys. Having detailed the 
sources of data for the investigation, the chapter now turns to unpack the modelling strategy. 
This is crucial because the model will help us assess whether any of the three explanatory 
contexts are robust frames that help us better understand why 54 per cent of Whites voted for 
Trump (Pew Research Center 2018).1516 
 
A Model of Presidential Vote Choice  
 The primary objective of the doctoral thesis is to test the salience of various predictors 
on the probability of a White voter having cast their ballot for Trump in the 2016 US 
Presidential election. However, it is necessary to account for the relative importance of a 
number of additional factors that might have influenced vote choice in 2016. This is because 
a host of political, socio-demographic, and structural factors might be acting as a proxy for a 
 
15 A 2016 exit poll conducted by Edison Research for the National Election Pool – a consortium of 
ABC News, the Associated Press, CBS News, CNN, Fox, and CNN - suggested that Trump won 58 
per cent of the White vote (Huang et al. 2016). However, there are a number of reasons to be sceptical 
of this figure. First, surveys conducted after an election can be affected by errors stemming from a 
respondents recall of their vote choice (Atkeson 1999; Wright 1993). Second, election surveys – 
including the one conducted by the major news organisations for the 2016 election - face challenges 
from refusals to participate, as well as the fact that a sizeable minority of voters actually voted prior to 
election day. As such, respondents must be interviewed before election day using conventional survey 
methodology. Given these limitations, I instead use Pew Research Survey’s (2018) validated voter 
estimates. To generate these estimates, Pew conducted a post-election survey between November 29-
December 12, 2016. After conducting the survey, respondents were then matched to publicly 
available voter registration databases that contain information about voter registration and turnout for 
nearly every US adult. Consequently, by match respondents to voter files, the validated estimates 
from Pew avoid problems related to recall error. These validated voter estimates indicate that 54 per 
cent of White voters cast their ballot for Trump – a figure that is 4 per cent lower than the estimates of 
the 2016 exit poll.  
16 It is also important to note that a majority of White voters have supported Republican candidates in 
the 10 election cycles prior to 2016, suggesting that Trump’s election is, in part, the continuation of a 
general trend of White voters coalescing around the GOP. For example, the average share of the 
White vote for Republican candidates between 1976 and 2012 was 54.8 per cent (Phillips 2016) –a 
figure that closely mirrors the 54 per cent figure for Trump in 2016. In fact, Trump only received 1 





hypothesised predictor of vote choice for Trump. Consequently, the doctoral thesis uses 
multivariate regression. Importantly, the baseline multivariate regression model will allow us 
to consider possible explanations for vote choice, notwithstanding the principal explanatory 
variables of interest in a given findings chapter.  
 In chapters 4 through 6, therefore, the doctoral thesis employs a “standard model” of 
vote choice. It is important to note that there is no benchmark model in the study of 
Presidential vote choice. Nonetheless, there is a degree of concurrence in the existing vote 
choice literature as to the factors that shape the electoral behaviour of American voters. 
Models that aim to understand vote choice for White Americans in 2016 are therefore 
estimated with a basic set of controls for a number of political-behavioural, socio-
demographic, and structural factors.  
The purpose of specifying the vote choice models with these additional controls is to 
provide additional robustness to the findings, as well as to account for any factors that may be 
closely related to a given predictor. Nonetheless, the model specification is made somewhat 
parsimonious for two reasons. The first is so that the model is not overfitted. This is 
important because specifying a model with too many parameters may lead to the vote choice 
model failing to fit the additional data, which has substantive implications for the ability of a 
model to make accurate predictions about vote choice for Trump (Cawley & Talbot, 2010). 
The second is so that we are able to determine the effect size of the explanatory variables on 
vote choice while considering only the most relevant alternative explanations.   
 
Partisanship and Ideology 
The first covariate that the baseline model controls for is partisanship. It is critically 
important to control for partisanship because the bonds that individuals have towards a given 





Partisanship is one of the most important variables in the study of voting behaviour. Indeed, 
perhaps no other variable has been more important to understanding American voting 
behaviour (Bartels 2000). To put this argument simply, individuals with a strong affiliation to 
a given political party will generally vote for political candidates who run under that party’s 
banner. For instance, this means that individuals with a partisan affiliation with the 
Republican Party, by and large, will have voted for Trump in 2016, given that he ran as a 
Republican. Consequently, all models that follow in chapter 4 through 6 account for the 
strength of an individual’s partisan identification. The variable is measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging between 1 = “strong Democrat,” to 7 = “strong Republican.”  
Notwithstanding the importance of partisanship as a covariate, it is also the case that 
many Americans sort themselves according to their ideological self-placement (Davis & 
Dunaway, 2018). That is, Americans adopt liberal, moderate, or conservative ideologies, and 
likewise describe themselves in these terms. However, the degree to which these ideological 
placements represent actual viewpoints or core beliefs is rather mixed (Kinder & Kalmoe, 
2017). This is despite the fact that many Americans sort themselves according to a given 
ideology. Despite these concerns, however, and to the extent that many White Americans do 
possess a meaningful and substantive political ideology, models also control for a 
respondents’ ideology. Ideology is measured a 5-point Likert scale ranging between 1 = 
“very liberal,” to 5 = “very conservative.”  
 
Socio-Demographic Covariates    
In addition to partisanship and ideology, models are estimated with a number of 
sociodemographic covariates that are employed as controls. One of these covariates is age. 
Age is an important covariate to account for in analyses of voter behaviour because of the 





actors and political parties. The literature has long given weight to the hypothesis that 
individuals become more likely to hold conservative viewpoints the older they get (Glenn, 
1974; Truett, 1993). Critically, these trends feed into individual voter behaviour, with 
research demonstrating that ageing increases the likelihood that an individual will vote for a 
conservative party (Tilley & Evans, 2014). This trend bears out in the validated voter data 
from 2016 election, with the data indicating that there were substantive differences in voter 
preferences by age. Specifically, the data indicate that 53 per cent of those aged 65 and over 
voted for Trump, while only 44 per cent voted for Clinton (Pew Research Center, 2018).  
By contrast, younger voters tend to hold more cosmopolitan views than older 
generations (Sloam & Henn, 2019). As such, they are more likely to support liberal 
candidates in national elections, just as 58 per cent of those aged between 18-29 did in 2016 
by voting for Clinton (Pew Research Center, 2018). However, there are significant 
generational differences in electoral turnout, with younger Americans tending to vote at much 
lower rates than older voters (Holbein & Hillygus, 2016). This means that, despite Clinton’s 
large lead over Trump among younger voters, the cohort composed a smaller share of the 
electorate than those who were older and had a greater proclivity to turn out and vote. To 
account for these trends in multivariate regression, models are thus estimated by controlling 
for a respondent’s age. Age is a continuous variable measured in years.  
Gender is likewise an important covariate to account for when modelling individual 
voter behaviour. There has been evidence of an increasing gender gap (that is, the difference 
in party vote share for men and women) in US politics in recent decades. Before 1980, the 
Democratic Party had a partisan advantage over men and women due to the party’s electoral 
support from conservative Whites in the “Solid South.”17 However, since Reagan’s first 
 
17 The “Solid South” refers to a bloc of Southern states whose interests were aligned with the Democratic Party 





victory in the 1980 Presidential election, men have increasingly begun to vote Republican 
(Kaufmann & Petrocik, 1999).  One consequence of this trend is that female Republicans are 
now a minority in their party. Trump’s candidacy is especially important in this context 
because his pattern of sexist and misogynist rhetoric during the 2016 campaign was noted as 
being a significant contribution to an unprecedented gender gap in the November election 
(Setzler and Yanus 2018). The gender gap in 2016 was the largest since the 1972 Presidential 
election; Among men, the gender gap was 11 points, with 52 per cent of men voting for 
Trump and 41 per cent voting for Clinton. Among women, by contrast, the gender gap was 
13 points and the direction was reversed, with 54 per cent of women voting for Clinton and 
39 per cent voting for Trump (Pew Research Center, 2018).  
Nonetheless, the most significant observation concerning the gender gap in 2016 was 
Clinton’s inability to win White women (Malone, 2016). Indeed, White women preferred 
Trump over Clinton by 2 points (Pew Research Center, 2018).18 This observation is important 
because it provides a riposte to the notion that the gender gap is driven by egalitarian 
attitudes. Among White women at least, scholars have concluded that the gender gap is 
explained by the extent to which voters held sexist and racially resentful attitudes (Setzler & 
Yanus, 2018). Given these trends in White voter behaviour along the lines of gender, 
therefore, models are also estimated with controls for gender. Gender is operationalised as a 
dichotomous variable where 1 = “female,” 0 = “male.” 
In addition to gender, models also account for a respondent’s marital status. Distinct 
from the gender gap, there is also some evidence of a “marriage gap” in American politics. 
Numerous scholars have observed that single individuals are more likely to vote for 
Democratic candidates than married voters (Kingston & Finkel, 1987; Weisberg, 1987). One 
 
era, a majority state legislatures and federal offices from the Southern states were held by Democrats. The bloc 
also voted almost exclusively Democratic in every Presidential election between 1880 and 1964.  





explanation for this gap is that married individuals are more likely to own a home and are 
thus more likely to express concern about protecting their property (Plissner, 1983). 
Individuals who are married might be more inclined to support Republican candidates who 
espouse the importance of law and order. Nonetheless, an alternate hypothesis that explains 
the marriage gap is that the gap is driven by the drift of single women over to the Democratic 
Party over time. This trend was first observed in the Eighties (Gerson, 1987), and has been 
confirmed in subsequent analyses which test the determinates of partisan identification with 
the Democratic Party (Edlund & Pandle, 2002). In light of these trends, models are estimated 
with a control for a respondent’s marital status. The doctoral thesis creates a dichotomous 
variable for a respondent’s marital status from a categorical variable from the 2016 ANES. 
The variable is coded such that 1 = “married,” 0 = “not married.”  
Educational attainment is also a crucial variable in understanding vote choice for 
Trump. White voters were highly polarized in 2016 by levels of education; the data indicate 
that the education gap (that is, the difference in Republican vote share for Whites with and 
without a college degree) was three times higher than it was in 2016 than at any time since 
the 1980 Presidential election (Schaffner et al. 2018). This polarization was characterised by 
Whites with a college degree tending to be more supportive of Clinton in 2016 than they 
were of Obama in 2012, and Whites without a college degree being far more supporting of 
Trump in 2016 than they were of Romney in 2012. Given these stark trends in White voter 
behaviour in 2016, it is therefore important to control for education in regression when 
estimating models that aim to understand White vote choice. Models are thus estimated with 
additional controls for a respondent’s level of education. Education is measured on a 6-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 = “high school or less,” to 6 = “postgraduate.”  
 The next socio-demographic covariate controlled for in multivariate regression is a 





significant differences in partisan voting by levels of income. Broadly speaking, the nature of 
the partisan divide is such that higher incomes are associated with an increased likelihood of 
voting Republican in US elections. Crucially, these partisan differences in voting by levels of 
income have largely persisted since the New Deal Era. Indeed, research by Gelman et al. 
(2010) indicates that the share of voters who voted Republican in every US Presidential 
election since 1940 have been between 5 and 20 points higher among voters in the upper 
third of the income distribution relative to voters in the lower third (p. 1204).  
Though much scholarly attention has been paid to Trump’s ability to electorally 
mobilise the economic “have nots” in 2016 (Norris & Inglehart, 2019),19 multiple analyses 
demonstrate that Trump’s rise was facilitated by an appeal to voters whose incomes were 
relatively high (Silver 2016a; Manza 2017). For example, Silver (2016) notes that the median 
income of a Trump voter in the 2016 Republican primary was $72,000 – a figure that was 
well above the national median household income of $51,000 in 2016. In this respect, there is 
a case to be made that partisan voting differences by levels of income in 2016 were more of a 
continuation of the trend noted by Gelman et al. (2010), whereby the Republican Party has 
long enjoyed an electoral advantage among high-income voters. Given that high levels of 
income were still a relatively robust predictor of support for Trump in 2016, it is important to 
account for a respondent’s level of income when modelling vote choice. Family income is a 
16-point ordinal variable where 1 = “less than $10,000,” to 16 = “$250,000 or more.”  
 Another socio-demographic covariate controlled for in multivariate regression is a 
respondent’s status as a labour union member. Belonging to a union is associated with an 
increased likelihood of casting a ballot in US elections (Delaney et al. 1988; Leighley & 
Nagler, 2007). Beyond the relationship between union membership and political 
 
19 Norris and Inglehart classify the economic “have nots” as those voters who work in skilled or unskilled 
manual occupations, those who may be long-term unemployed or whom are in receipt of social benefits, as well 





participation, there is also evidence of a robust and enduring relationship between union 
affiliation and support for the Democratic Party. As scholars have noted, unions ‘were the 
agents that bound the working-class to the Democrats’ in the US (Hout et al. 1999: 85). 
Leading Democrats gave unions a significant role in the selection of party candidates in the 
Mid-Twentieth Century; an action which was rewarded by the electoral loyalty of the 
working-class to the party for a number of decades. In subsequent decades, however, the 
significance of union membership on Presidential vote choice has declined due to lower rates 
of affiliation and the collapse in public trust of unions.  
Despite the pervasiveness of working-class narratives in the existing literature on 
Trump’s victory (Gest 2016; Morgan and Lee 2017; Williams 2017), there has been 
relatively little empirical analysis into whether union membership is associated with voting 
for Trump. Clinton had a degree of support among worker unions in the 2016 election. 
Nonetheless, her poor showing in former manufacturing areas of the Industrial Midwest 
which, crucially, have strong ties to organised labour, is indicative of a relative decline in 
support for the Democratic Party in heavily unionised areas (Walley 2017). To account for 
the effect of union membership on vote choice for Trump, the doctoral thesis uses a 
dichotomous variable from the 2016 ANES which asks respondents whether they are a 
member of a labour union. The variable is coded such that 1 = “union member,” 0 = “not a 
union member.”  
 The final socio-demographic covariate accounted for in the baseline model is a 
respondent’s status as an Evangelical or a “born again” Christian.20 It is important to control 
for religion when modelling Presidential vote choice because a robust body of literature 
 
20 Evangelical Protestantism is characterised by its emphasis on salvation. An essential tenet of Evangelism is 
the notion of the conversion or “born again” experience when receiving salvation. The data indicate that 
Evangelical Protestants are the largest religious group in the US, with 25.4 per cent of the population identifying 
as Evangelical (Pew Research Center 2014). Evangelicals are also overwhelmingly likely to be White, with the 





demonstrates that there is a salient relationship between religious identification and voter 
behaviour. When modelling the vote choice of White Americans only, it is especially 
important to account for the effects of Evangelism on vote choice for Republican candidates. 
This is because White Evangelicals have long been a steadfast source of support for 
Republican candidates (Lichtman 2008). In addition, their size as a percentage of the overall 
Republican voter coalition is substantial, with the data indicating that White Evangelicals 
have made up at least 50 per cent of the Republican voter coalition since 1980 (Langer & 
Cohen, 2005).  
Beyond one’s own religious identification, research previously demonstrated that 
voters perceive Evangelical candidates as more conservative than those who are not 
(McDermott, 2009). Such evaluations are thus important because they play a role in whom 
voters decide to support in the polls. As already noted, this is especially the case when it 
comes to voting in Republican primaries and supporting Republican candidates in general 
elections. Trump’s robust levels of support among White Evangelicals is thus notable given 
his apparent irreligiosity.  
However, the literature that has been published since Trump’s victory posits that 
many White Evangelicals saw Trump as the least-worst option in a general election against 
Clinton (Gorski, 2019). Evangelical voters were prepared to disregard Trump’s lack of 
religiosity because his somewhat-apocalyptic rhetoric which contended that America would 
soon cease to be a Christian nation. Such rhetoric appealed to the racialized attitudes of 
Evangelical voters and connected with their fears regarding of the waning influence of the 
Evangelical right in US public life (Whitehead et al. 2018). Therefore, to account for the 
effect of religious identification on White vote choice for Trump, the doctoral thesis uses a 





Christian. The item is coded such that 1 = “born again Christian”, 0 = “not a born-again 
Christian.” 
 
Structural Characteristics  
Beyond these aforenoted socio-demographic covariates, it is also important to account 
for the effects of region in the vote choice models. White vote choice for Republican 
candidates is more likely to be most prevalent in the US South, given the dominance of the 
GOP at the local, state, and federal level in Southern offices since the end of the Civil Rights 
Era (Lublin, 2007). While the Democrats’ electoral advantage among White Southerners had 
already begun to diminish during the Civil Rights Era, Nixon’s Southern Strategy accelerated 
the partisan transformation of the US into a bastion of White support for the GOP (Aistrup, 
2015).  
Indeed, and with the exception of Carter in 1976 and Clinton’s first election in 1992,21 
Republican candidates have dominated the US South in the Electoral College since Nixon’s 
landslide win in the 1972 election. Trump’s victory in 2016 was, likewise, a continuation of 
this trend, winning every Southern state with the exception of Virginia. To assess whether 
White vote choice for Trump is indeed the strongest in the US South, I use data from the 
2016 ANES and detail the two-party vote choice of White Americans by region. The results 
of the cross-tabulation are presented below in Table 2.1. Looking at Table 2.1, we can see 
that 68 per cent of Whites who reported living in the South in the 2016 ANES voted for 
Trump compared to only 32 per cent who voted for Trump. Indeed, this margin of 36 points 
is greater than that for any other region; reflective of Trump’s strong performance in the 
industrial states of the Great Lakes (McQuarrie 2017), Trump enjoys an advantage of 14 
 
21 Notably, both Carter and Clinton had been popular Governors from Southern states immediately before they 





points over Clinton in the Midwest. By contrast, Clinton has an advantage over Trump of 2 
points in the West, and 10 in the Northeast. Given these trends in voter behaviour presented 
below in Table 2.1, the doctoral thesis thus accounts for the effect of Southern residence on 
vote choice for Trump. The item for Southern residency is coded such that a score of 1 
indicates that a White respondent lives in the South, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Table 3.1: Two-Party Vote Choice of Whites in 2016, by Region 
 Percent Trump Percent Clinton N 
Northeast 
 
45 55 362 
Midwest 
 
57 43 493 
South 
 
68 32 626 
West 
 
49 51 372 
Notes: Table entries are rounded percentages. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
 
Despite the inclusion of the item for Southern residency, it is important to note that 
there are limitations to this specification strategy. A limitation of the survey data is that the 
ANES item for region does not distinguish between those who have only recently moved to 
the South and those who have lived there for a longer period of time. This is an important 
lacuna because Whites who have been raised and socialized in the South are more likely to 
express racialised attitudes and, critically, identify with the Republican Party (Oliver & 
Mendleberg, 2000). Thus, it is necessary to qualify that controlling for Southern residence 
may not be accounting for these more granular patterns of White political behaviour.  
Having delineated all of the covariates that are employed in multivariate regression, 






𝑃𝑟⁡(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑝) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 Party ID 𝛽2 Ideology 𝛽3 Age 𝛽4 Gender 𝛽5 Marital Status 𝛽6 
Education 𝛽7 Family Income 𝛽8 Union membership 𝛽9 Born Again 𝛽10 South 
 
Correlational and Multivariate Analysis 
 To what degree are these socio-demographic and structural characteristics associated 
with vote choice for Trump? To get a more substantive approximation of the degree of 
association between the predictors and vote choice, the chapter performed a series of 
Pearson’s pairwise correlation tests. The results of the correlation analysis are presented 
below in Table 3.2. The first column in Table 3.2 represents the magnitude (or effect size) of 
the correlation between a given covariate and vote choice for Trump (operationalized as a 
dichotomous variable where 1 = “voted for Trump,” 0 = “voted for Clinton.”22 The second 
column in Table 3.2 provides an indication of the significance level of a given association.  
As indicated by Table 3.2, party ID and ideology exhibit by far the strongest 
correlations with vote choice for Trump. Reflective of the observation that partisanship and 
ideology are becoming increasingly difficult concepts to disentangle (Barber & Pope, 
2019),23 the degree of association between partisanship (𝑟 = .77) and ideology 𝑟 = .74) and 
voting for Trump are remarkably similar. In both cases, the association is likewise significant 
at the p <.001 level. Table 3.2 also reveals a number of modest associations between the 
covariates and vote choice; one’s status as a “born again” Christian is associated with having 
voted for Trump, though the effect size is less half that for either partisanship or ideology at 𝑟 
 
22 To aid interpretability, a score of 1 on the Pearson’s scale would indicate a perfect positive correlation. By 
contrast, a score of -1 would indicate a perfect negative correlation.  
23 The inter-item correlation between partisanship and ideology in the 2016 ANES among the White subsample 





= .31, p <.001. Southern residence is likewise correlated with vote choice for Trump, but the 
effect is even smaller than that for religious identification at 𝑟 = .15, p <.001.  
 
 




Party ID .77 *** 
Ideology .74 *** 
Age .09 ** 
Female -.07 ** 
Married .07 ** 
Education -.23 *** 
Income -.09 ** 
Union -.07 ** 
Born again .31 *** 
South .16 *** 
Notes: Sample limited to Whites only. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
   
 A number of covariates are also negatively associated with vote choice for Trump. 
Despite validated voter results which demonstrate that White women voted for Trump by a 
margin of 2 points over Clinton (Pew Research Center, 2018), the dummy variable for gender 
is negatively associated with vote choice - albeit only marginally at 𝑟 = -.07, p <.01. 
Reflective of the longstanding association between organised labour and the Democratic 
Party, the coefficient for union affiliation is also negatively associated with having voted for 
Trump. The coefficient for education is also modestly negative (𝑟 = -.23, p <.001). It is 
important to note that, because the item for education is coded such that higher values 





indicative of high educational attainment being negatively associated with vote choice for 
Trump.   
 I also estimate a baseline vote choice model using probit regression. The specification 
of a vote choice model here is useful because it allows us to model vote choice as function of 
these socio-demographic and structural factors in a simultaneous fashion. Figure 3.1 is 
coefficient plot of a model assessing vote choice in which the dependent variable is regressed 
against party ID, ideology, age, gender, marital status, education, income, union affiliation, 
one’s status as a “born again” Christian, and Southern residency. All variables in the model 
are also coded to range between 0 and 1 so that effect sizes are somewhat comparable. 
Coefficients to the right of zero on the 𝑥 axis in Figure 3.1 indicate a positive association 
between a given covariate and voting for Trump. Contrastingly, coefficients to the right of 
zero are indicative of a negative association between a given predictor and vote choice. 
As was the case with the correlation analysis, Figure 3.1 suggests that party ID and 
ideology are, by some margin, the covariates that are the most predictive of vote choice. The 
probit model also finds that there is a significant effect on vote choice through gender and 
Southern residency, though the sizes of the coefficients are somewhat smaller relative to 
those of partisanship and ideology. Interestingly, the probit model indicates that there is no 
significant effect on vote choice for Trump through age, marital status, education, family 
income, union membership and one’s status as an Evangelical Christian. In sum, the baseline 
vote choice model points to party ID and ideology being strong predictors of vote choice in 
2016. However, it is important not to overstate the relative influence of other covariates on 








Figure 3.1: Coefficient Plot of Baseline Vote Choice Model  
 
Notes: The points represent the size of the probit coefficient for each covariate on vote choice. 
The lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are weighted.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES  
 
Additional Factors 
 The previous section has given us a substantive approximation of the socio-
demographic and structural covariates that are significantly associated with vote choice in US 
Presidential elections, as well as vote choice for Trump in 2016 specifically. While the vote 
choice model employed in the doctoral thesis can be conceptualized as a “standard” model of 
Presidential vote choice, it is important to note that there are likely to be a plethora of 
additional factors that were associated with vote choice of White Americans in 2016. Before 
the methodology chapter considers these additional factors, it is important to qualify that 
there are many additional variables that are likely to be associated with voting for Trump, 





For reasons already noted, it is easy to overfit a regression model by estimating with too 
many parameters; overestimation is problematic because, in doing so, we may extract 
residual variation (or noise) that represents the underlying structure of models that gauge vote 
choice for Trump (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).  
Another equally important factor to be aware of is the use of multiple sources of data 
to analyse the salient predictors of vote choice for Trump. While many of the national survey 
datasets contain the same items for a respondents’ socio-demographic information and 
structural characteristics, additional items of interest to the analysis are not available across 
all surveys. However, it is critically important that regression models adjust on the same 
socio-demographic and structural covariates across surveys. This is so that effect sizes are 
comparable as possible given the use of multiple sources of survey data to examine vote 
choice for Trump. Thus, one consequence of this estimation strategy is that models may not 
be robust to the effects of omitted variable bias.24 Nonetheless, as scholars have noted, it is 
important that researchers are aware of the effects of potentially omitted variables when 
estimating regression models. This is so that researchers are able to ‘conduct an imperfect 
investigation, while transparently revealing how susceptible our results are to confounding’ 
(Cinelli & Hazlett, 2020, p. 3).  
 What then, are the additional factors that might have influenced vote choice for 
Trump but are nonetheless excluded for the reasons outlined above? The literature that has 
been published since Trump’s victory points to a number of factors that are closely associated 
with Trump’s unique synthesis of radical right populist ideology. One factor that is likely to 
be significantly associated with support for Trump given his radical right populist bent is 
authoritarian attitudes. Authoritarian attitudes have long been associated with support for the 
radical right (Rooduijn, 2014; Dunn, 2015). In the aftermath of the Second World War, 
 





Adorno’s (2019) notion of the “authoritarian personality” referred to an underlying feeling of 
anger and fear in response to harsh parenting and economic hardship.  
Scholars of the psychology literature refined Adorno’s (2019) theory with the 
development of the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale, which posits that individuals 
should respect authority, abide by social norms, and be supportive to the idea of punishing 
those who violate such norms (Altemeyer, 1998). Another, recent development by the 
psychology literature to buttress the RWA construct is social dominance orientation (SDO). 
SDO is substantively distinct from RWA in that the former refers to the belief that the state of 
intergroup relations should be reflective of hierarchies in which some groups are more 
powerful than others (Pratto et al., 1994).  
 Indeed, evidence from the political psychology literature demonstrates a degree of 
association between authoritarian personality traits and support for Trump. Multiple studies 
find that individuals with salient levels of RWA and SDO were likely to be supportive of 
Trump in 2016 (Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Pettigrew, 2017; Womick et al. 2019). Generally 
speaking, Trump resonated with individuals high in RWA because of their fear of out-groups 
that are perceived as threatening. By contrast, those high in SDO were supportive of Trump 
because he appealed to their contempt for groups perceived as inferior.  
 Beyond authoritarian attitudes, another antecedent of support for right-wing populist 
actors is anti-elitism. Radical-right populist ideology is inherently anti-elitist. A common 
motif is that radical-right populists defer to the “common wisdom” of the people instead of 
those in positions of power, who are framed as distant and their interests in opposition to 
those of “the people” (Betz & Johnson, 2004; Mudde, 2004). While strains of anti-elite 
discourse are evident in the rhetoric of past Republican Presidents (Shogan 2007), the 
victories of Bush in 2000 and 2004 were not classified as populist insurrections in the same 





Oliver and Rahn (2016) demonstrate that Trump primary voters had a distinct mistrust of 
experts and disdain towards elites. Moreover, these attitudes were less prevalent among 
supporters of other primary candidates including Clinton, Sanders, and Cruz.  
 Despite the evidence above which demonstrates that authoritarian attitudes and anti-
elite sentiment are closely related to vote choice for Trump, there is a notable lack of similar 
items in the national survey datasets used as the sources of data to investigate the research 
aims of the doctoral thesis. The ANES is perhaps the most comprehensive national 
benchmark dataset that gauges the political and electoral behaviour of 2016 voters. The 
dataset, for instance, contains items that gauge authoritarian attitudes (measured on the SDO 
scale), as well as measures of anti-elitist sentiment. However, these items are not available in 
the other two benchmark datasets used to examine vote choice in the doctoral thesis (these 
are the 2016 CCES and the 2016 Voter Study, respectively). Thus, while the existing 
constraints of the data mean it is not possible to account for these factors across all models, 
we should nonetheless be aware of the potential impact of these factors on the vote choice of 
White Americans in 2016.   
 
Model Robustness 
 Given the exclusion of many of these variables, how can we be sure that the baseline 
multivariate model specified to examine White vote choice is robust? A reflection on the 
robustness of the vote choice model is critical because of concerns related to model 
uncertainty. Model uncertainty is pervasive and inherent in the study of Presidential vote 
choice. As aforenoted, while there is a relative degree of concurrence in the vote choice 
literature as to which variables are significantly associated with vote choice in Presidential 
elections over time, there is no definitive framework outlining what specific control variables 





not known, therefore, it is difficult to approximate which imperfect model is best to test the 
hypotheses guiding the doctoral thesis. Consequently, modest differences in model 
specifications may produce vastly different results.  
Empirical findings are a function of both the data and the model applied to the data 
(Heckman 2005). The data does not speak for itself, per se, since different methods and 
models applied to the same dataset will lead to different conclusions. As scholars have 
observed, choosing which model to report is ‘fraught with ethical and methodological 
dilemmas, and [is] not covered in… classical statistical texts’ (Ho et al. 2007: 232). Thus, a 
growing challenge in the study of Presidential vote is evaluating and demonstrating the 
robustness of vote choice models.  
Given that the research methodology guiding the thesis is underpinned by a positivist 
approach, model robustness is assessed in a quantitative fashion. One of the ways in which 
the doctoral thesis evaluates model robustness is with goodness of fit testing. The goodness 
of fit of a statistical model is a description of how well the model fits the data (D’Agostino 
1986). Measures of goodness of fit are typically summary statistics that represent the 
difference between observed values and the values expected under the model in question. In 
regression analyses, models are typically assessed on their goodness of fit via the coefficient 
of determination, or the R-square (𝑅2) measure. The 𝑅2 measure is the proportion of variance 
in the dependent variable (vote choice for Trump where 1 = “Trump,” 0 = “Clinton”).  
It is important to note that the 𝑅2 measure for binary outcomes – such as those 
assessed in the doctoral thesis - is different for the summary statistic for linear outcomes.  In 
linear regression, the 𝑅2 value represents the square of the correlation between the predicted 
and actual values of the model. This correlation ranges between -1 and 1, meaning that the 
square of the correlation ranges between 0 and 1. The greater the magnitude of the correlation 





binary regression, however, the 𝑅2 statistic does not exist. This is because the model 
estimates from binary regression (for instance, probit and logit) are estimated via maximum 
likelihood (ML) via an iterative process. To evaluate the goodness of fit of binary models, a 
number of “pseudo” 𝑅2 measures have been developed by statisticians (Veall & 
Zimmermann 1996). These measures are referred to as “pseudo” measures because they 
appear to be similar 𝑅2 measures for linear outcomes in that they are measured on a 0 to 1 
scale. However, they cannot be interpreted as substantively similar measures because of the 
different estimators used to fit linear and binary models. To assess model fit, therefore, the 
doctoral thesis refers to the pseudo 𝑅2 measure generated via the estimation of the vote 
choice models.  
The doctoral thesis makes no claims as to what pseudo 𝑅2  value accounts for an 
“acceptable” level of variance explained in the two-party vote choice of White Americans. 
Nonetheless, it is useful to note that McFadden (1974) considers any value greater than .2 as 
being indicative of well-fitted model. A pseudo 𝑅2 value <.2 would not necessarily be 
indicative of a given model being a poor approximation of White vote choice, but - at least 
based on McFadden’s benchmark - it would not be particularly strong, either.  
 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to provide a comprehensive account of the 
methodological approach underpinning the doctoral thesis. This involved discussion of the 
onto-epistemological approach informing decisions about the most appropriate methodology 
for investigating the research aims, the sample and sources of data, the modelling strategy to 
test the Presidential vote choice of Whites, and considerations of model robustness. 
Positivism was chosen as the most appropriate onto-epistemological approach because the 





Trump’s election best represents (the left behind thesis, the cultural decline thesis, and the 
changing America thesis).  
Consistent with the positivist research paradigm underpinning the doctoral thesis, a 
quantitative research methodology was adopted as the principal instrumental approach to 
understand why 54 per cent of Whites voted for Trump. The quantitative research design 
functions as way of empirically investigating the research objectives of the doctoral thesis. 
Using cross-sectional, national benchmark survey datasets as the various sources of data, the 
doctoral thesis uses multivariate regression as a means of gauging why so many Whites voted 
for Trump in 2016 US Presidential election. The vote choice models control for a number of 
political-behavioural, socio-demographic, and structural covariates. This is so that we able to 
discern the relative independence of a given predictor of vote choice relative to a number of 
variables that are known correlates of voter behaviour.  
 Having delineated the methodological approach guiding the doctoral thesis, the next 
chapter will test the robustness of the first significant explanatory context that functions as a 
frame for better understanding White vote choice for Trump – namely, the “left behind” 
thesis. The upcoming chapter will do this by testing a set of competing hypotheses 
underpinning the first explanatory context. The first principal hypothesis (H1) posits that 
Trump’s victory was a “revolt” on the part of White voters. Proponents of this hypothesis 
content that Whites, and particularly those without a university education, were mobilised to 
vote for Trump because of salient levels of economic dissatisfaction. By contrast, the second 
and competing hypothesis (H2) contends that the salient economic grievances of many White 
voters are increasingly becoming entangled with a number of complex cultural grievances 
(Bhambra 2017; Hochschild 2018). Crucially, it is the perceived “failure” of mainstream 
political parties and politicians to understand these complex grievances that explain White 





Beyond chapter 4, this methodological approach will also be used to test the 
robustness of the other two explanatory contexts in chapters 5 (the cultural decline thesis) and 
6 (the changing America thesis). In sum, testing the robustness of these three explanatory 
contexts will allow us to better understand which particular dimension of White estrangement 
Trump’s victory in the general election best represents; it could be the case that economic 
grievances explain why so many Whites voted for Trump. Equally, however, it could be the 
case that a number of in-group identities and White voters’ fears about the impact of 
demographic change were likewise salient factors that were significantly associated with vote 
choice. The next three chapters will therefore present the findings from the series of 
multivariate regression models in order to further our understanding of Presidential vote 






Chapter 4: The “Left Behind” 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter provided an outline of the methodological approach 
underpinning the doctoral thesis. This included key sociodemographic and structural 
covariates that are hypothesized as being strongly related to Presidential vote choice. 
Crucially, this methodological approach will allow us to directly test the robustness of the 
three principal explanatory contexts (left behind thesis, cultural decline thesis, and the 
changing America thesis) in Chapters 4 through 6. Having delineated the methodological 
approach and analytical strategy by which the robustness of these explanatory contexts will 
be empirically tested, the thesis now turns to analyse the first explanatory context for 
understanding White vote choice for Trump. This first explanatory context is the “left 
behind” thesis.  
 There are two competing hypotheses that contribute to our understanding of the “left 
behind” thesis. The first hypothesis frames Trump’s victory as a” revolt” on the part of the 
economically dissatisfied American White working class. The critical argument underpinning 
this hypothesis is that Whites – and especially Whites without a college education - were 
primarily motived by “pocketbook” voting when casting their ballot in the 2016 election. 
Contrastingly, the second hypothesis presents a more nuanced approach to understanding 
why 54 per cent of Whites voted for Trump (Pew Research Center 2018). As Eatwell and 
Goodwin (2018) have noted, classifying phenomena such as Brexit and Trump as “White 
working-class backlash[es]” are not supported by a more nuanced analysis of the evidence (p. 
xviii). Indeed, many additional analyses of the “left behind” literature note that the economic 
anxieties of White voters are often intersected with a number of nuanced cultural grievances 





most critically, it is the perceived failures of elites and mainstream politicians to understand 
these complex grievances that help explain why so many Whites voted for Trump in 2016.   
Therefore, the objective of the current chapter is to test the validity of these two 
hypotheses as frames through which we might better understand why 54 per cent of Whites 
voted for Trump in the 2016 presidential election (Pew Research Center 2018). Meeting this 
objective is critical to meeting the wider research objective underpinning the thesis. This is to 
understand which dimension of White estrangement is best represented by Trump’s victory. 
Importantly, the findings presented in this chapter concerning White Americans’ complex 
economic and cultural grievances will also be comparable to those of the two chapters 
upcoming because of the standardized coefficients and similar baseline covariates controlled 
for in regression. In the upcoming discussion chapter, this will allow us to assess the 
comparative salience of the “left behind” thesis relative to explanations grounded in the 
salience of dominant in-group identities (cultural decline thesis) and the ways in which 
diversity and demographic changes affects Whites’ political behaviour (changing America 
thesis).  Thus, to meet the specific objective of the current chapter, as well as the overarching 
objective underpinning the thesis, this chapter poses the following questions:  
In what ways does the “left behind” thesis help us to better understand why 54 per 
cent of White Americans voted for Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election (Pew 
Research Center, 2018)?  
 
i) Is vote choice for Trump 2016 primarily shaped by the economic grievances of 
the White working-class? 
ii) Or, is Trump’s victory on the part of White voters better explained by the 
confluence of a number of economic and cultural factors that are becoming 






First, the chapter analyses whether Trump’s victory can be conceptualized as a White 
working-class “revolt” as has been done in scholarly analysis. In a further exploration of the 
extent to which Trump’s victory is a working-class victory, the chapter also analyses affect 
for Trump in the Industrial Midwest – a region of the US that has experienced that effects of 
deindustrialization and resulting job losses in manufacturing over the years. Additionally, the 
chapter analyses whether Whites opposition to free trade and outsourcing is associated with 
voting for Trump. This is important because protectionism was a key element of Trump’s 
messaging to his working-class base in the 2016 election. The chapter then estimates a series 
of models testing whether White voters’ short-term economic assessments are associated with 
voting for Trump. The chapter also examines trends in downward economic mobility to test 
whether these longer-term trends are likewise associated with vote choice for Trump.  
Next, the chapter explores whether Whites’ perceptions of the relative speed of the 
economic recovery from the 2008 recession feeds into feelings towards Obama. As will 
become clear, analysis of the relationship between evaluations of the economic recovery and 
affect for Obama is important in the context of the second research question asked in this 
chapter. This is because we begin to see the ways in which the economic assessments of 
White voters often intersect with their attitudes towards racial minorities. To further explore 
these complex economic and cultural relationships, the chapter also analyses whether White 
voters’ economic assessments are moderated by perceptions of the effect of immigration on 
the US labor market and economy.  
In a final test of the second research question, the chapter explores why White 
Americans are perceived as voting for Trump largely at the behest of their own economic 
interests (Frank, 2004; Hochschild 2018). Specifically, the chapter analyses whether Whites 





increased state spending and government intervention, voted for Trump in 2016. The chapter 
then concludes by reflecting on the significance of the findings and lays the groundwork for 
the second explanatory context (the cultural decline thesis) in the second principal findings 
chapter. 
 
Trump’s Victory as a White Working-Class Revolt 
 This subsection tests the hypothesis that Trump’s victory in 2016 was a “White 
working-class revolt” (Gest 2016; Morgan and Lee, 2018). To do this, the chapter employs an 
analytical strategy that works in two ways. First, the chapter assesses whether levels of affect 
for Trump are different by social class. This is to establish whether Whites who identify as 
working-class view Trump more favourably than Whites who might belong to another social 
class. Next, the sub-section turns to analyse patterns of voter turnout and voter migration 
between the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. This is to gauge (i) if the 2016 election 
cycle was marked by an increased turnout of White working-class voters, and (ii) whether 
these voters migrated to Trump specifically.  
 First, an important hypothesis to test is whether affect for Trump25 is different across 
categories of social class among White Americans. To assess whether this is indeed the case, 
I conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA works by assessing 
whether there are significant mean differences in levels of affect for Trump by differences in 
social class identity. By running the ANOVA, we will thus be able to better understand 
whether Whites with working-class identities exhibit estimates of Trump’s that are 
substantively different from those with other class identities. Affect for Trump is gauged on 
 





the standard thermometer scale from the 2016 ANES.26 To measure social class, the sub-
section relies on a 4-point categorical item that asks White respondents which social class 
they belong to.27 If working-class Whites have favourable estimations of Trump, de minimis, 
then we should expect to observe relatively high levels of mean affect for Trump among that 
group in particular.  
The results of the ANOVA indicated that there were significant mean differences in 
affect for Trump by categories of social class identity among Whites (F [(3, 1612) = 4.82, p 
<.05). Additionally, Tukey’s post-hoc analysis indicated that Whites who identified as lower-
class (mean = 50.114, standard deviation = 34.632) or working-class (mean = 45.882, 
standard deviation = 35.113) exhibited markedly warmer and more favorable estimations of 
Trump than Whites who identified as middle class (mean  = 38.378, standard deviation = 
34.938) or upper class (mean = 29.415, standard deviation = 32.316). The results of the 
ANOVA thus lend weight to the expectation that working-class Whites exhibit relatively 
favorable estimations of Trump relative to Whites with other social class identities – and 
especially those with middle- or high-class social identities.  
The results of the ANOVA offer a useful insight of how affect for Trump is shaped by 
social class identity. However, they do not tell us whether Trump was able to mobilize White 
working-class non-voters in 2016. Addressing this lacuna is a critically important aspect of 
testing the robustness of the “left behind” thesis. This is because the “left behind” literature 
consistently notes that Trump’s victory was a White working-class “revolt” (McQuarrie 
2017) However, the literature does analyse patterns in voter turnout to analyse whether more 
working-class Whites voted in 2016 relative to 2012, and whether these voters cast their 
 
26 A score of 0 on the thermometer indicates that a respondent has “very cool or unfavorable feelings” towards 
Trump. Conversely, a score of 100 indicates that a respondent exhibits “very warm or favourable feelings” 
towards Trump.  





ballots for Trump specifically. Consequently, the sub-section now turns to analyse patterns of 
voter turnout and voter migration between 2012 and 2016. 
To analyse patterns of voter turnout among working-class Whites between 2012 and 
2016, the chapter uses the Current Population Survey (CPS) as its source of data.28 Estimates 
of voter turnout among Whites without a college education are reported below in Table 4.1. 
As evidenced by Table 4.1, voter turnout among the socio-demographic group increased by 
3.2 per cent between 2012 and 2016. While it is important to note that turnout increased 
relative to the 2012 election, the data also indicate that 42.4 per cent of Whites without a 
college education did not cast a ballot at all in 2016.  
 




Notes: Self-reported turnout of voting eligible citizens computed from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). estimates for non-college educated Whites are adjusted 
for vote over-report and non-response bias (McDonald 2020). Source: CPS 
 
Nonetheless, a limitation of the CPS Voter Supplement is that the dataset does not ask 
which candidate a respondent has voted for. This is problematic because we need to able to 
quantify the extent to which working-class Whites coalesced around Trump specifically. 
Therefore, to assess whether Trump was able to successfully mobilize working-class Whites 
around his candidacy in 2016, the sub-section now turns back to the 2016 ANES. A benefit 
of the 2016 ANES is that the dataset contains an item that asked White respondents their 
 
28 A major benefit of the CPS is that the survey generally has low rates of overreport bias relative to other 
national survey datasets (Hur and Achen, 2013). This is an important factor when calculating turnout rates 





recall of 2012 vote choice in addition to who they voted for in the 2016 election.2930 This is 
useful because it allows us to compare a respondent’s vote choice between elections. 
Moreover, we are also able to track voter migration by social class using the 4-point 
categorical item for subjective class identification.  
 Figure 4.1 is a Sankey diagram that compares the vote choice of White working-class 
respondents in 2012 relative to 2016. The left-hand column denotes a respondent’s vote 
choice in the 2012 election, and the right-hand column denotes vote choice in 2016. The 
width of the arrows in Figure 4.1 is proportional to the rate of change for each of the possible 
categories in the items for 2012 and 2016 vote choice. For interpretability, two party vote 
choice is coded to the respective colours of the two major parties (that is, blue for Democrats 
and Red for Republicans), while non-voters and third-party voters are coloured grey.  
 Figure 4.1 indicates that 34 per cent of Whites who self-identify as working-class in 
the 2016 ANES did not vote at all in the 2012 election. Of those who did vote, 50 per cent of 
working-class Whites voted for Obama, 48 per cent voted for Romney, and 2 per cent voted 
for the third-party candidate. Moving from 2012 to 2016, we see only 30 per cent of working-
class Whites reported non-voting in 2016 (an increase in turnout of 4 per cent relative to 
2012). Of those who did vote in 2016, a remarkable 67 per cent of working-class Whites 
voted for Trump,31 30 per cent voted for Clinton, and 3 per cent voted for a third-party 
candidate.  
   
 
29 Possible categories for the items for 2012 and 2016 vote choice were 1 = “the Democratic candidate,” 2 = 
“The Republican candidate,” 3 = “other,” and 4 = “did not vote.” 
30 Still, it is important to be aware that voters can fail to accurately recall their vote choice (Wright 1993).   
31 This figure closely matches the figure 64 per cent of non-college educated Whites who reported voting for 





Figure 4.1 White Working-Class Voter Migration Between 2012 and 2016 
 
 
Notes: Patterns of voter migration limited to Whites who self-identify as working-class. 
Left hand column denotes recall of 2012 presidential election vote choice. Right hand 
column denotes vote choice in the 2016 presidential election.  
 
 
Source: 2016 ANES  
 
In contextualizing these trends in White working-class voter migration between 2012 
and 2016, it is important to note two things. First, the data indicate that Trump was able to 
expand the Republican base of White working-class voters in 2016 by (i) activating 28 per 
cent of 2012 non-voters, and (ii) by converting 18 per cent of working-class Whites who had 
previously voted for Obama in 2012. Second, Clinton in 2016 was not able to hold together 
the coalition of working-class Whites that had voted for Obama in 2012. Tellingly, of the 
working-class Whites who voted for Obama in 2012, only 62 per cent voted for Clinton in 





all, 18 per cent voted for Trump, and the remaining 5 per cent voted for a third-party 
candidate.  
The data presented thus far provide some evidence in favor of the hypothesis that 
Trump’s victory in 2016 can be conceptualized as a White working-class revolt. First, we 
know from analysis of the CPS data that turnout among working-class Whites increased 
between 2012 and 2016. Second, it is also apparent from the analysis of the ANES data 
concerning the migration of working-class White voters between elections, that Trump was 
able to activate non-voters and convert a significant amount of 2012 Obama voters. In further 
testing the hypothesis of whether Trump’s victory can be conceptualized as “revolt” on the 
part of White working-class voters, it is useful to look at the places that performed well 
relative to Mitt Romney in the 2012 election. Critically, an area of the US that Trump 
performed better than Romney did in 2012 was the industrial Midwest (colloquially known as 
the US “Rust Belt”). As will be clear, Trump’s performance in the Industrial Midwest 
relative to Romney in 2012 makes sense given that such are both Whiter and less educated 
than the rest of the nation. Consequently, the next sub-section turns to examine working-
working-class support for Trump in the industrial Midwest.  
 
Support for Trump in the Industrial Midwest 
This sub-section assesses the extent of White working-class support for Trump in the 
Industrial Midwest. The sub-section begins by noting how the Industrial Midwest has long 
been a baston of White working-class electoral support for the Democratic Party. Next, the 
sub-section traces patterns of White working-class voter alignment from FDR to Trump, 
noting how rates of support for the Democratic Party among working-class Whites in the 
industrial Midwest have begun to decline in recent decades. Lastly, the sub-section explores 





communities to vote for Trump in 2016. Specifically, I test the relationship between declining 
manufacturing employment and the relative strength of Trump’s performance in 2016 relative 
to that of Mitt Romney in 2012 in Rust Belt counties. This is because macroeconomic trends 
related to deindustrialization are hypothesized as being related to increased support for 
populist actors in advanced Western democracies (Mughan et al 2003).  
Once the centre of America’s industrial might, the closure of steel mills in cities like 
Youngstown, Ohio during the Seventies heralded deindustrialisation and significant job 
losses in Midwest communities whose economies were once centered around heavy industry 
(Fuechtmann 2009). Along with factory closures and declines in manufacturing employment 
came a new name for the Industrial Midwest - the US “Rust Belt.” Given the prevalence of 
heavy industry in Rust Belt communities, it is perhaps unsurprising that the region has strong 
ties to organised labour and the Democratic Party (Buffa 1984). Critically, even union 
membership declined during the latter half of the Twentieth Century (Goldfield 1989), the 
Industrial Midwest remained a Democratic electoral stronghold.  
While unions have come to represent increasingly diverse workforces in recent 
decades, it is important to note that there is a long association between union membership 
and the White-working-class. This is an important observation if we consider the link 
between the demographics of the industrial Midwest and the region’s historical support for 
the Democratic Party; As Figure 4.2 indicates, there are large concentrations of working-
class Whites throughout the states of the Industrial Midwest.  
Indeed, the link between the White working-class and electoral support for the 
Democratic Party goes back decades. In 1932, the socio-demographic group formed part of 
FDR’s New Deal Coalition. This alignment lasted until the 1960s with the shattering of the 
New Deal Coalition along racial lines during the Civil Rights Era. Afterward, working-class 





Nixon and Reagan in 1972 and 1984. While, this exodus was partly halted when President 
Bill Clinton brought them back into the fold in 1992, the data indicate that support for the 
Democratic Party among the White working-class has continued to decline in subsequent 
decades (Carnes and Lupu 2020).   
 











Notes: Blue areas of the choropleth map are indicative of a higher concentration of working-class 
Whites in a given county. Shading represents the number of non-Hispanic white Americans aged 
25 or over without a college education as a percentage of the total county population.  
 
Source: US Census Bureau/IPUMS NHGIS University of Minnesota (2020) 
 
  
By 2016, political scientists began to question whether the Rust Belt would continue 
to be a source of robust electoral support for the Democrat in the 2016 election (Silver 2015). 
Since the 2016 election, scholars have noted that Trump had particular appeal to disaffected 
White working-class voters in the Rust Belt because of his messaging on the decline on 
American manufacturing (McQuarrie 2017). The literature reveals an important relationship 





between voters’ economic insecurity and their resentment towards elites for their perceived 
failure to address their economic plights (Mughan et al. 2003). This is a critical observation, 
given that we observe similar across of a host advanced Western democracies. For example, 
Goodwin and Heath (2016) have shown that areas that voted strongly to leave in the 2016 
“Brexit” referendum have been disproportionately affected by deindustrialization relative to 
other areas of the UK. Given these developments, then, it might be the case that Rust Belt 
voters who are especially affected by declines in manufacturing employment voted for 
Trump because of his emphasis on bringing back manufacturing and preventing further 
offshoring of jobs.  
 However, I am not aware of any studies that directly test the relationship between 
declines in manufacturing employment and increased support for Trump in Rust Belt 
communities. The sub-section now turns to address this important lacuna by estimating a 
regression model. Specifically, I assess whether long-term declines in manufacturing 
employment are significantly associated with increased support for Trump in the Rust Belt. 
To test this expectation, I use OLS regression. 32 The dependent measure, the level of 
Trump’s overperformance in 2016, is calculated by estimating the difference in vote share for 
the Republican Presidential candidate between 2012 and 2016 (Dave Leip’s Election Atlas, 
2020). The explanatory measure, declining manufacturing employment, is calculated by 
estimating the difference in percentage of workers employed in the manufacturing sector at 
the county level between 2012 and 2016 (ACS/IPUMS NHGIS, 2020). 
 
32 Models are estimated with a number of additional controls for county level vote choice. These are percentage of 
the county population that is non-Hispanic White (ACS/IPUMS NHGIS, 2020); median county age (ACS/NHGIS, 
2020); the percentage of the county population that is female (ACS/IPUMS NHGIS, 2020); the percentage of the 
county population without a college degree (ACS/IPUMS NHGIS, 2020), the percentage of housing units in a 
county that are owner occupied (ACS/IPIMS NHGIS, 2020); the employment rate as a percentage of the total 
county labour force (BLS, 2020), median household income in adjusted in 2016 dollars (ACS/IPUMS NHGIS, 
2020; the percentage of the county population under 65 without health insurance, and county population density 






 Table 4.2 reveals the relationship between declining manufacturing employment and 
change in Republican vote share between 2012 and 2016 in Rust Belt counties. If declining 
manufacturing employment is significantly related to vote choice, we should expect to 
observe a positive coefficient the explanatory variable. Table 4.2 indeed indicates that 
declines in manufacturing employment between 2000 and 2016 are positively related to the 
rate of overperformance in the Republican vote share between elections, 𝛽 = .080. However, 
the effect is not significant at the accepted p <.05 benchmark.   
 Overall, the results of the OLS model point to declines in manufacturing employment 
not being a significant predictor of increased vote share for Trump in 2016 relative to 2012 
when we account for a host of standard county-level sociodemographic and structural 
controls. However, this does not necessarily mean that declining manufacturing employment 
is not related to increased vote share for Trump at all. Rather, it could be the case that 
declining manufacturing employment is simply acting as a proxy for another variable that is 
accounted for in the OLS model. To test this hypothesis further, I also performed a simple 
linear regression without the socio-demographic and structural covariates. When we specify 
this linear model, declining manufacturing employment becomes a significant predictor of 
increased Republican vote share between 2012 and 2016 at  𝛽 .337, p <.001. Consequently, 
while there is a case to be made that declining manufacturing employment in the Rust Belt is 
associated with increased support for Trump relative to Mitt Romney in 2012, it is important 
to qualify that such declines are acting as a proxy for other variables that are more 
significantly related to Trump’s rate of over-performance in Rust Belt counties.33 
 
 
33 A series of Pearson pairwise tests indicated that declines in manufacturing employment were 
strongly and negatively associated with the percentage of the civilian labour force in full time 
employment in a given county 𝑟 = -.52. A more substantive way of understanding this correlation is to 
look at the inverse – i.e., that declining manufacturing employment is positively associated with non-





Table 4.2: OLS Models of The Effect of Decline in Manufacturing Employment on the 
Vote Share for Trump in the Rust Belt 
 (1) 
Manufacturing employment decline .080 
(.049) 










Percent without a college degree  .314*** 
(.029) 
Owner occupied housing unit rate .054** 
(.021) 
Labor force participation rate -.120*** 
(.034) 
Adjusted 2016 Household income -.051** 
(.026) 













Notes: Dependent variable is change in the Republican vote share between 2012 
and 2016. Table entries are standardized coefficients. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Sample limited to counties in Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
and Wisconsin.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
  
While this sub-section has found that declines in manufacturing employment are not 
significantly related with voting for Trump in Rust Belt counties with large numbers of 
working-class Whites, another factor to consider are the views of White workers on trade and 
outsourcing in such communities. This is important because populist actors such as Ross 
Perot found strong electoral support among Whites without a college education in the 1992 





Consequently, the next-sub-section provides an individual-level analysis on protectionist 
views and White-working class support for Trump. 
 
White Working-Class Voters, Protectionism, and Support for Trump 
The previous subsection demonstrated that the macroeconomic effects of 
globalization34 on areas of “heavy industry” are positively (though, not significantly) 
associated with the 2016 Republican vote share in Rust Belt counties. While these spatial 
effects are important, it could also be the case that these effects feed into individual views 
towards trade and the outsourcing of jobs in such areas. Consequently, the chapter now turns 
to test the relationship between the protectionist views of working-class voters and vote 
choice for Trump in the Rust Belt.  
Similar to the ways in which Ross Perot railed against the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the outsourcing of jobs to Mexico and emerging Asian markets in 
the 1992 Presidential election,35 the focal point of Trump’s economic message to disaffected 
working-class voters was one of protectionism. For instance, Trump consistently argued that 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) was a “terrible” deal and threatened to impose imports 
tariffs on companies thinking about offshoring their US-based operations (Calmes 2015; 
Epstein and Nelson 2016). It is important to draw attention to these trends because there is 
also reason to expect that political candidates who emphasize the importance of certain policy 
positions should garner greater support among voters who share similar positions themselves 
(Reher 2014). Indeed, and consistent with this observation, research indicates that voters with 
protectionist views on trade were drawn to Perot’s candidacy in 1992 (McCann et al. 1999). 
 
34 Specifically, plant closures and the declining manufacturing employment share in Rust Belt counties.  
35 In a 1992 Presidential debate, Perot famously asserted that NAFTA would lead to a “giant sucking sound” 
headed south of the US border (The New York Times Archives, 1992). Here, Perot was referring to the 
hypothesized decline in manufacturing jobs to markets where the cost of labor was substantively lower than that 





While some attention has been paid to the effect of Trump’s trade positions on White 
vote choice (Sides et al. 2018), I am not aware of any significant studies that analyse whether 
these effects were especially salient among White voters without a college education. Neither 
am I aware of any studies that analyse the interaction between the protectionist views of 
working-class White voters and Rust Belt residency. However, this is a critically important 
omission; there is reason to suspect that protectionist views on trade and outsourcing are 
more salient among workers in blue-collar occupations, since such jobs are more exposed to 
the effects of cheap imports and offshoring than white-collar occupations (Mayda and Rodrik 
2005; Owen and Johnson 2017). Consistent with these observations, it is thus reasonable to 
expect that vote choice for Trump among working-class Whites is likely to be associated with 
their positions on trade and the outsourcing of jobs. Moreover, given the positive association 
between declining manufacturing employment and the 2016 Republican vote share in Rust 
Belt counties, there is further reason to expect that these issues will have been especially 
salient to White working-class Rust Belt residents.  
To explore this hypothesis, I turn again to the 2016 ANES. Specifically, I test the 
expectation that the working-class Whites with protectionist views have a high probability of 
voting for Trump. Further, we should also expect to observe a substantive interaction 
between protectionist views and Rust Belt residency on voting for Trump. I operationalize 
two items from the 2016 ANES as my measures of protectionist views. The first is an item 
that asks whether government should encourage or discourage the outsourcing of jobs. And 
the second is a 7-point ordinal item that asks to what extent a White respondent favours or 
opposes free trade agreements.   
In my analysis, I control for my baseline socio-demographic covariates that are 
hypothesized as being robust predictors of Presidential vote choice. I also construct a dummy 





the 2016 ANES that asks White respondents in which state they reside.36 Because 
protectionist views are also likely to be associated with one’s occupation, I include an 
additional dummy variable accounting for whether a respondent is in full time employment (1 
= “employed full time,” 0 = “not employed full time.’ Lastly, to get a better picture of the 
vote choice of working-class Whites, I limit my sample to Whites without a college 
education.  
 What, then, is the nature of the association between protectionist views and Rust Belt 
residency - as well as their substantive interaction - on vote choice for Trump? Table 4.3 
presents a series of vote choice models that depict the main effects of White working-class 
voters’ views on outsourcing and free trade, as well as Rust Belt residency, on vote choice. 
Table 4.3 also depicts the coefficient for the interaction term between working-class White 
voter’s protectionist views and Rust Belt residency.  
The results of the probit models indicate that preferences for discouraging the 
outsourcing of jobs and opposition to free trade agreements are significantly associated with 
voting for Trump. The main effect for Rust Belt residency is also positive and significant in 
the model for working-class White voters’ views on outsourcing. However, the main effect 
for Rust Belt residency falls short of the p <.05 level of significance in the model for voters’ 
opposition to free trade deals. Importantly, both of the vote choice models indicate a positive 
and significant interaction effect between Rust Belt residency and protectionist views on 





36 As was the case in the previous section, these are the states of the Industrial Midwest won at least once by 





Table 4.3: Probit Models of the Effect of Working-Class White Voters’ Protectionist 
Views 
Table entries are probit coefficients. Robust standard errors given in parentheses. Dependent 
variable is vote choice for Trump where 1 = “Trump,” 0 = “Clinton.” Data are weighted. 
Sample limited to non-Hispanic Whites without a college education who voted for Trump or 
Clinton. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
 
 Overall, the results of the vote choice models are important because they demonstrate 
that protectionist views among working-class Whites are significantly associated with voting 
for Trump. In addition, we find that these effects are intensified when we specify an 
interaction term for Rust Belt residency. While previous studies had established a degree of 
association between protectionist views and voting for Trump (Mutz 2018), an important 


















Oppose free trade deals . .167*** 
(.059) 


































































limitation of these studies is that they do not account for how such views might be shaped by 
educational differences between Whites. Thus, by focussing on a subset of working-class 
Whites only, the analysis here offers a useful contribution to the existing literature on the 
relationship between protectionist views and support for Trump.  
However, in contextualising these results in light of the broader hypothesis that 
Trump’s victory can be explained by the economic grievances of the White working-class, it 
is important to note that these effects are likely to be limited to those places that are 
disproportionately affected by deindustrialization.37 In this respect, it is also necessary to look 
at how White voters’ economic assessments across the nation as a whole fed into vote choice 
in 2016. Therefore, the chapter now turns to test whether voters’ economic assessments 
concerning the state of the national economy and their personal financial situation were 
significant predictors of vote choice beyond the US Rust Belt.  
 
“It’s the Economy, Stupid”: Pocketbook Voting and Support for Trump 
The salient economic factors behind Trump’s victory in 2016 fit broadly within the 
rational choice model of “pocketbook” voting (Lewis Beck 1985). Pocketbook voting posits 
that voters will usually elect parties that have benefitted them financially and punish those 
that have made them worse off.  Information about voter assessments of the national 
economy (sociotropic evaluations) and one’s personal financial wellbeing (egotropic 
evaluations) have long been assumed to be important variables in the study of vote choice 
(MacKuen et al. 1992; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Political actors have likewise 
recognised the importance of voters’ economic assessments over and above other concerns 
come election time. Most notably in the 1992 election, Democratic strategists devised the 
 





phrase “its’s the economy, stupid” to keep Bill Clinton on message in highlighting the poor 
economic record of then President George H.W. Bush (Carville 1992).  
 Proponents of the “pocketbook” voting model frame Trump’s victory through the 
assertation that voters perceived a slow economic recovery under Obama and sought to 
punish the Democratic Party by deciding not to elect Hillary Clinton, whose victory was 
framed as a “3rd term” for Obama. In testing the robustness of this model, scholars have 
found limited evidence for the idea of “pocketbook” voting being a salient explanation for 
understanding why Trump won in 2016 (Mutz 2018). These studies are also largely 
constituent with extant literature on the weak relationships between economic insecurity and 
voting for populist actors (Margalit 2019). However, it is important to note that such studies 
have not probed whether we might observe any heterogenous effects in White voters’ 
economic assessments by education. This is a critical omission, given that perceptions of 
national economic conditions vary according to a host of socio-demographic indicators, 
including educational attainment (Duch et al. 2000). Given the nature of White voter 
polarization by educational attainment in 2016, it could therefore be the case that negative 
sociotropic and egotropic assessments were more salient among Whites without a college 
education, and that these assessments were associated with an increased probability of voting 
for Trump.  
 To assess whether negative sociotropic and egotropic assessments were more salient 
among White working-class voters than they were for higher-educated voters, I again turn to 
the 2016 ANES. The 2016 ANES dataset contains two items that are standard measures of 
voters’ sociotropic and egotropic assessments. The item for sociotropic assessments is five-
point ordinal item that asks whether they thought the national economy had gotten better or 
worse in the past year. The item for egotropic assessments, by contrast, is a five-point ordinal 





whether higher rates of economic dissatisfaction are associated with voting for Trump, the 
items are coded such that higher values correspond to negative assessments of the national 
economy and one’s personal finances.  
Next, to see if sociotropic and egotropic economic assessments differ by White 
voters’ levels of educational attainment, I estimate two separate probit models for White 
voters without a college education and for those with a college degree. If individual 
assessments of the national economy and one’s personal financial situation were more salient 
among White working-class voters, de minimis, then we should expect to observe a larger 
coefficient size for both economic variables in the non-college educated sample. The results 
of the two probit models for vote choice are presented below in Table 4.2.  
 The first column of Table 4.2 presents the results for the non-college educated 
subsample of White voters. Looking at this column, we see that White working-class voters’ 
concerns about the national state of the economy are not significantly related to vote choice 
for Trump. Next, the coefficient for White working-class voters’ concerns about their 
personal financial situation is substantially less than that for assessments of national 
economic trends. Nonetheless, we see that such concerns are significantly related to voting 
for Trump at p <.05. Therefore, the results of the first model point to working-class White 
voters being more concerned about their personal finances than the national outlook when 
casting their ballot in 2016, and that such assessments were associated with an increased 
probability of voting for Trump.  
 Next, the second column in Table 4.2 presents the results for the college-educated 
subsample of White 2016 voters. In this column, we see that college educated voters’ 
assessments of their personal financial situation are not significantly related to vote choice, 
but their assessments of the state of the national economy are. Indeed, the coefficient for 





larger than that for their personal financial situation (𝛽 = .350). This order of magnitude is 
equal to that of ideology and is surpassed only by strong partisan affiliation to the Republican 
Party. In contrast to the results of the model for non-college educated Whites, therefore, the 
findings from the second model indicate that White voters with a college education were far 
more concerned about the national economy than their personal finances, and that these 
concerns were strongly associated with a higher probability of voting for Trump.  
  
Table 4.4: Probit Models of the Effect of White Voters’ Economic Assessments, by 
Education 
 No college degree College degree 
 










































































Table entries are probit coefficients. Robust standard errors given in parentheses. Dependent 
variable is vote choice for Trump where 1 = “Trump,” 0 = “Clinton.” Data are weighted. Sample 
limited to non-Hispanic Whites who voted for Trump or Clinton. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001.  
 






Overall, the results of the models for the effect of voters’ economic assessments on 
vote choice point to some noteworthy differences by education. We already know that White 
voters were highly polarized by education when it came to vote for Trump in 2016 as it 
related to their racial attitudes and attitudes towards women (Schaffner et al. 2018). However, 
the results presented here demonstrate that college/non-college educated voters were also 
polarized by their economic assessments. College educated White voters seemed minimally 
concerned with their own finances and expressed greater concern about macroeconomic 
trends. Contrastingly, Whites without a college education were less concerned with 
macroeconomic trends and much more concerned about their personal finances. The results 
are important because they demonstrate that Trump was able to speak to the economic 
concerns of both sets of White voters.  
 Having explored the extent to which the short-term economic assessments of White 
voters were significantly related to voting for Trump in the 2016 election, the chapter now 
turns to examine whether longer-term trends related to downward economic mobility are also 
associated with vote choice.   
 
Economic Mobility and the Collapse of the American Dream 
 This sub-section explores the extent to which trends related to downward economic 
mobility fed into the vote choice of White Americans when casting their ballot for President 
in 2016. The sub-section first unpacks the link between the idea of the “American dream” 
and economic mobility, noting how generations of Americans have long expressed robust 
belief in the view that they will be better off than their parents in survey data. However, 
trends in the post-Great Recession attitudinal data reveal that an increasing number of 





Given these developments, I specify a series of vote choice models to test whether White 
voters’ perceptions of opportunity in America and their assessments of mobility relative to 
previous decades were associated with voting for Trump.  
The belief that economic mobility is possible is the essential underpinning of a 
temporal abstraction known as the “American dream” (Isaacs et al. 2008; Urahn et al. 2012). 
The American dream was coined by Adams (1931). Here, the author defined the American 
dream as that idea ‘of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone’ 
(Adams 2017: 308). At a more specific level, however, this belief is underpinned by the hope 
that children will be better off than their parents (Cullen 2003; Samuel 2012).  The literature 
on economic mobility has used this hope as a baseline in surveys as a way of gauging 
attitudes on intergenerational differences in economic prosperity. When younger generations 
are asked to assess their economic situation, often they compare their own standard of living 
to that of their parents at the same age (Goldthorpe 1987). Historically, the literature has 
focused on the economic prosperity of the Baby Boomer generation born between 1946 and 
1964.38 Cohort comparisons have shown that Boomers accumulated greater levels of wealth 
relative to the Silent Generation born between 1928 and 1945 at the same points during their 
life courses (Keister and Deeb-Sossa 2004). The Boomer generation have been an important 
cohort to study because they were the last generation for which rates of mobility increased 
relative to their parents’ generation (Chetty et al. 2016).  
As rates of mobility have slowed (and in some cases declined) for contemporary 
generations, scholars have debated about the extent to which mobility is now possible (Isaacs 
et al., 2008; Putnam 2012). The newfound importance of such debates in academic circles has 
likewise been reflected in the addition of items to national benchmark surveys that gauge 
 
38 There is disagreement among scholars as to where precisely each generation ends and another begins. For the 





Americans attitudes towards intergenerational mobility. For instance, from 1988 onwards, the 
General Social Survey (GSS) assessed Americans’ attitudes towards intergenerational 
mobility by asking Americans whether they agreed with the statement: “The way things are 
in America, people like me and my family have a good chance of improving our standard of 
living”. Figure 4.3 uses data from the GSS to plot these trends for White Americans over 
time.  
 























Notes: Graph created using attitudinal data on economic wellbeing from the General Social 
Survey (GSS). Sample limited to White Americans aged 18 or over. Y-axis value represents the 
percentage of White Americans responding to the question: The way things are in America, 
people like me and my family have a good chance of improving our standard of living. Do you 
agree or disagree?  
 
 
Source: GSS, 1972-2018  
 
Figure 4.3 indicates that the percentage of Whites who believed that their families 
stood a good chance of improving their standard of living remained relatively stable between 





cent between this time. After 2000, however, this belief began to decline markedly. Between 
2004 and 2010, the percentage of Whites who believed that their families stood a good 
chance of improving their standard of living decreased from 67 percent to 49 percent. This 
latter figure represented the lowest percentage of White Americans in agreement since the 
inception of the intergenerational mobility items since 1988. This figure began to uptick 
between 2012 and 2016, increasing from 46 to 61 per cent. Nonetheless, this figure of 61 per 
cent in 2016 still represented the lowest percentage of Whites who expressed agreement to 
the statement in over 12 years.  
Given these trends in the attitudinal data, to what extent were such sentiments on the 
mind of White voters when casting their ballot in 2016? To test whether White voters’ views 
towards economic mobility were associated with a significant probability of voting for 
Trump in the 2016 US presidential election, I turn once more to the 2016 ANES as my source 
of data. The 2016 ANES contains two items that I operationalize into measures of voter 
attitudes towards economic mobility in the US. The first is a five-point ordinal item that asks 
respondents how much opportunity there is in America to get ahead. Contrastingly, the 
second is a 7-point ordinal item that asks respondents how difficult economic mobility is in 
the US compared to 20 years ago. I code the items such that higher values correspond to 
negative perceptions.  
 It is also useful to assess whether there are significant differences in White mobility 
attitudes by education on vote choice, given the polarization between White voters’ short-
term economic assessments in the previous sub-section. Thus, I specify two separate vote 
choice model using a probit estimator for White voters with and without a college degree. If 
White voters’ attitudes towards economic mobility are associated with vote choice in either 





for either of the mobility items. The results of the two probit models for vote choice are 
presented below in Table 4.5.   
 
Table 4.5: Probit Models of the Effect of White Voters’ Views Towards Economic 
Mobility, by Education 
 No college College degree 






Economic mobility compared 







































































Table entries are probit coefficients. Robust standard errors given in parentheses. Dependent 
variable is vote choice for Trump where 1 = “Trump,” 0 = “Clinton.” Data are weighted. Sample 
limited to non-Hispanic Whites who voted for Trump or Clinton. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001.  
 
Source 2016 ANES 
 
The first column in Table 4.5 represents the results for the sample of White voters 
without a college education. Table 4.5 indicates that neither concerns about the opportunity 





relative to the previous 20 years, are significantly related to voting for Trump. The coefficient 
for the economic opportunity item is weakly positive at 𝛽 = .019, but does begin to approach 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Contrastingly, the coefficient for voter 
perceptions of the relative ease of economic mobility in America today relative to 20 years 
ago is negative at 𝛽 = -.005. This finding would seem to indicate, therefore, that non-college 
educated White voters who thought that economic mobility in 2016 was worse compared to 
20 years were less likely to vote for Trump. In sum, the results of the first model indicate that 
White working-class voters’ concerns about economic mobility were not significant factors in 
casting their vote for President.  
Given this pattern of null results for the sub-sample of non-college educated White 
voters, do we observe any significant effects on vote choice among White voters with a 
college degree? The second column in Table 4.5 presents the results for the sub-sample of 
college-educated Whites.  The coefficient for voter perceptions about how much opportunity 
there is in America to get ahead is twice the size of the coefficient in the first model, and 
approaches accepted levels of significance at p =.062. Notably, the coefficient for voter 
perceptions of economic mobility in 2016 relative to 20 years ago is strongly positive and 
significant at 𝛽 = .130, p <.05. In other words, White voters with a college degree who 
perceived that economic mobility was worse compared to 20 years ago had a high probability 
of voting for Trump. Overall, then, the results of the second model point to White voters with 
a college degree being more concerned about economic mobility than voters without a 
college education, and that such estimations played a relatively salient role in vote choice for 
Trump.   
 Therefore, the findings here as they relate to the broader hypothesis that Trump’s 
victory was a “revolt” on the part of the White working-class are somewhat mixed. Indeed, 





those without a college degree about low levels of opportunity and downward economic 
mobility when casting their vote for President. In addition, when we compare the size of the 
coefficients for the items that represent White attitudes towards mobility to those in the 
previous sub-section concerning short-term economic assessments, we find that the latter 
constructs are the more robust predictors of vote choice for Trump.  
Having assessed whether the short and long-term economic evaluations of White 
voters are significantly related to vote choice for Trump, the next sub-section turns to 
examine the ways in which anger towards Obama shaped voter perceptions of the relative 
pace of the economic recovery from the Great Recession. As will be clear, exploring the 
intersection between White’s racial attitudes and their economic grievances is of critical 
importance in gauging whether the “left behind” thesis is a robust explanatory context for 
understanding White for choice in 2016. This is because the link between culture and 
economics is an important relationship that helps understand other right-wing populist 
movements and victories in a number of advanced Western democracies beyond the US 
(Eatwell and Goodwin 2018).  
 
A Slow Recovery and Affect for Obama 
 In this sub-section, the chapter assess the robustness of the “left behind” thesis by 
quantifying the extent to which White racial attitudes interacted with the medium-term39 
economic assessments of White voters in 2016. These medium-term economic evaluations 
are useful to analyse in the context of the current chapter. This is because the recovery from 
the Great Recession was the slowest since the Second World War (Long and Luhby 2016) 
and was also overseen by the nation’s first non-White President, Barack Obama. Refrains of 
working-class “anger” at elites for their perceived failure to address the economic grievances 
 





are common in works of the left behind literature (McKenzie, 2017; Schrock et al. 2017). 
Importantly, however, the literature indicates that anger is an important substrate of Whites’ 
racial attitudes (Banks and Valentino, 2012). If White voters were angry at elites (i.e. Obama) 
in 2016 because of the slow economic recovery, then, it is possible that that this anger was 
shaped by their racial attitudes.  
This is an especially important expectation to test; scholars have observed a 
“spillover” effect by which White racial attitudes have begun to feed into policy evaluations. 
Most notably, Tesler (2012), demonstrates that racial resentment fed into White Americans’ 
opposition to the Affordable Care Act. Given this “spillover” effect, it could be the case that 
racial resentment is closely tied to anger felt towards Obama for overseeing a slow economic 
recovery, and that these evaluations were on the minds of White voters when casting their 
ballot for President in 2016.  
First, it is necessary to quantify whether evaluations of the relative pace of the 
economic recovery since the 2008 recession were closely associated with vote choice in 
2016. There is reason to expect that this may not be the case; consistent with the literature on 
“pocketbook voting”, short-term economic assessments (that is, those within the past twelve 
months) are usually the most salient for voters (Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001). To test 
whether medium term economic assessments were indeed associated with White vote choice 
in 2016, I re-estimate my baseline vote choice model. I use a five-point ordinal item from the 
2016 ANES as my measure of medium-term economic assessments. The item asks whether 
the US economy was better or worse since 2008. After estimating the baseline model, I use 
postestimation and plot the predicted probability that a White voter will cast their ballot for 
Trump across levels of the key explanatory measure. The results are presented below in 





 As Figure 4.4 demonstrates, increasingly dire evaluations of the robustness of the US 
economy since 2008 are associated with an increased probability of having voted for Trump 
in 2016. A White voter who believes that the US economy was “much better” in 2016 than it 
was in 2008 has just a .18 predicted probability of voting for Trump. By contrast, the same 
voter who believes that the US economy was “much worse” in 2008 than it was in 2016 has a 
.48 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Therefore, moving from positive to negative 
evaluations concerning the robustness of the economic recovery from the 2008 recession 
under Obama is associated with an increased probability of voting for Trump of 40 points.  
 While the results of Figure 4.4 evidence a degree of association between evaluations 
of the US economy during the previous eight years of the Obama Presidency and voting for 
Trump, they do not help us uncover whether this association is a consequence of the 
interaction between anger towards Obama and White Americans’ racial attitudes. One way to 
test the nature of this interaction is to examine the relationship between anger towards Obama 
and moderating effect of White racial attitudes on the probability of a White voter perceiving 
that the US economy in 2016 was worse than it was in 2008. To test this hypothesis, I use the 
2016 ANES, which contains a number of items that gauge White Americans’ emotions 
towards a host of political figures, as well as their racial attitudes. Consistent with the 
literature on the emotional substrates of Whites’ racial attitudes (Banks and Valentino 2012), 
the effect of anger for Obama on the probability of believing that the US economy in 2016 
was worse than 2008 should become more potent as we move from low resentment to high 






Figure 4.4: Vote Choice for Trump as a Function of White Voters’ Evaluations of the 










Notes: Lines represent the predicted probability of voting for Trump by evaluations of the 
robustness of the US economy since 2008. Predicted values are calculated by holding gender, 
marital status, union membership, and region constant at female, married, union household, and 
South, while holding all other variables in model at their mean values. Model also controls for 
party ID, ideology, education, income.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
 
 Obama affect is a 5-point ordinal item that asks respondents how often they feel angry 
towards Obama. Racial resentment is an additive index of four items from Henry and Sears’ 
(2010) seminal index of symbolic racism. The additive index ranges from 4 to 20 with a 
Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .92. The first item asks respondents whether they thought Blacks have gotten 
less than they deserve. The second item asked respondents whether they thought past slavery 
makes life more difficult for Blacks today. The third item asked whether Blacks should work 
their way up without any special favors. And the fourth item asked respondents whether they 
thought that Blacks must try harder to get ahead. Items three and four were reverse coded so 





estimated an ordered probit model with the five-point ordinal item for evaluations of the US 
economy relative to 2008 as the dependent measure. I also specified an interaction term 
between the racial resentment scale and the Obama affect item.  
 Figure 4.5 plots the marginal effect of White voters’ level of anger towards Obama 
by their levels of racial resentment. This figure begins to clarify whether affect towards 
Obama on the probability of evaluating that the US economy was worse in 2016 than in was 
in 2008 becomes more salient as Whites increasingly skew racially resentful. Figure 4.5 
demonstrates that, as one moves from low to high resentment on the racial resentment scale, 
anger towards Obama is associated with an increased probability of evaluating that the US 
economy was “much worse” in 2016 than it was in 2008. In sum, the results of the interactive 
model as graphed lend empirical weight to the hypothesis that voters’ anger towards Obama 
was shaped by their racial attitudes.   
This sub-section has found that voter evaluations of the robustness of the US 
economy in 2016 relative to 2008 was associated with voting choice for Trump in the 
election. Critically, however, we have seen that these evaluations are largely driven by anger 
towards Obama, and that this affect becomes more potent as Whites exhibit higher levels of 
racial resentment. The findings here are largely consistent with the “spillover” of White 
Americans’ racial attitudes into policy evaluations (Tesler, 2012). However, they also build 
on such developments by demonstrating that racial attitudes which are specifically tied to 
affect towards Obama are an important moderator of voters’ medium-term economic 
evaluations. These results thus begin to answer the second major research question posed in 
this chapter, which asks whether the “left behind” thesis is best understood as the interaction 
between a number of complex cultural and economic greviences. In the case of voters’ 
economic evaluations during the time of the nation’s first Black President, and whether these 





Figure 4.5: Evaluations of the State of the US Economy in 2016 Relative to 2008 as a 



















Notes: Lines represent the marginal effect of anger towards Obama by White respondents’ levels 
of racial resentment. Predicted values are calculated by holding gender, marital status, union 
membership, and region constant at female, married, union household, and South, while holding 
all other variables in model at their mean values. Model also controls for party ID, ideology, 
education, income. Sample limited to non-Hispanic Whites only.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES  
 
The Spillover of Cultural Anxieties into Whites’ Economic Assessments 
Another critical dimension of the spillover of cultural cleavages into the economic 
assessments of 2016 White voters was the issue of immigration. As is the case with the 
salience of protectionist views among White working-class voters, those who tend to have 
salient views on the impact of immigration to the economy are those who perceive that that 
they have the most to lose economically from greater competition (Mayda, 2006). 
Specifically, concerns about the economic impact of immigration can be grounded in native-






The relationship between economic concerns and immigration has long been tested. 
High levels of immigration tend to coincide with concerns related to unemployment and 
economic decline (Pomper 1993). Recent evidence lends some weight to this observation. 
For instance, Kiguchi and Mountford (2019) find that an immigration “shock” (that is, a large 
influx of immigrants over a relatively short period) may lead to a temporary increase in 
unemployment. The literature also demonstrates that in-group beliefs about the state of the 
national economy, and individuals’ personal economic assessments are closely related to 
negative beliefs about immigrants (Citrin et al. 1997). Critically, these concerns are 
articulated by elites with a preference for immigration restriction. Consistent with the 
literature on elite cues, elite messages about immigration may have a “priming” effect on the 
views of the American public, whereby some individuals may use economic criteria when 
thinking about immigration (Zaller 1992). Despite these important developments, however, 
relatively few studies have assessed whether these cues deployed by restrictionist actors have 
a salient effect on the vote choice among the economically anxious. 
To highlight the important relationships between economic anxiety, immigration, and 
support for populist actors and initiatives, it is useful to consider the salient factors that 
created the conditions for Brexit in 2016. Using data from the 2014-2017 British Election 
Study, Goodwin and Milazzo (2017) found that economic pessimism and more specific 
concerns that immigration was bad for the UK economy were both significant predictors of 
the “leave vote” in the 2016 UK “Brexit” referendum. Similar to the ways in which the 
“Brexit” vote was shaped by specific concerns about the economic impact of immigration on 
the job prospects and economic security of native workers, some attention has been paid to 
the immigration views of the economic “have nots” that made up a significant proportion of 





not assessed whether immigration is an important moderator of the economic concerns of 
White voters.  
 Here, however, I can test this relationship directly. This is important because it will 
allow me to assess whether White voters’ concerns about the impact of immigration to the 
US labor market and economy are indeed an important moderator of voters’ economic 
assessments. Specifically, I ask whether economic assessments are more associated with a 
higher probability of voting for Trump among White voters who believe that immigration is 
bad for the US economy and labour market. To assess this relationship, I again turn to the 
2016 ANES, which includes a number of useful items that ask respondents about the 
economic impact of immigration. Here, I want to know if the effect of national and personal 
economic assessments on vote choice for Trump is more salient among Whites who view 
immigration as a detriment to the US economy and labour market.  
Perceptions of the impact of immigration on the US labor market and economy are 
measured with an additive measure of two items from the 2016 ANES (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .63). 
The first item is a 5-point ordinal item that asks whether immigrants are generally good or 
bad for the US economy. And the second item is a 5-point ordinal item that asks respondent’s 
how likely it is that immigrants will take away jobs. The additive measure is coded such that 
a higher score corresponds to negative perceptions concerning the economic impact of 
immigration to the US. With this measure, I again re-estimate my baseline vote choice model 
with the addition of controls for White voters’ assessments of the robustness of the national 
economy, and their degree of worry regarding their personal financial situation. 
Does the effect of voters’ economic assessments on the probability of voting for 
Trump become more salient as Whites increasingly perceive that immigration is bad for the 
US labor market and economy? Figure 4.6 provides some evidence that this is the case. The 





by their perceptions of whether immigration is good or bad for the US labor market and 
economy. Figure 4.6 indicates that, as White voters increasingly believe that immigration is 
a bad thing for the job market and economy, their national and personal economic 
assessments are associated with a greater probability of voting for Trump. Overall, then, the 
results provide some evidence for the hypothesis that voters’ economic assessments are 
shaped by concern over the economic impact of immigration.  
 
Figure 4.6: Vote Choice for Trump as a Function of Voters’ Economic Assessments by 
Their Perceptions of the Effect of Immigration on the US Labor Market and Economy 
 
Notes: Lines represent the marginal effect of White voters’ economic assessments by their 
perceptions of the effect of immigration on the US labor market and economy. Predicted values 
are calculated by holding gender, marital status, union membership, and region constant at female, 
married, union household, and South, while holding all other variables in model at their mean 
values. Model also controls for party ID, ideology, education, income.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES.  
 
 In this subsection, I have explored the nature of the substantive interaction between 
White voters’ economic assessments and views of the impact of immigration of the US 





because they highlight that the economic grievances intersect with cultural concerns of White 
voters about the economic impact of immigrants. More specifically, the evidence presented 
here demonstrates that the effects of White voters’ economic assessments on the probability 
of voting for Trump are made more salient by their views on immigration. In this respect, the 
findings lend weight to the second research question posed in the current chapter. This 
question asks whether the economic concerns of White voters are better understood in light 
of the cultural changes40 that have been taking place in advanced Western democracies such 
as the US in recent years (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018).  
However, exploring the extent to which racial attitudes and immigration views 
intersect with the economic assessments of White voters only partly answers this question. 
This is because another complex cultural factor that often intersects with the economic 
grievances of White voters are debates concerning the role that government should play in 
community life in areas that are “left behind” (Hochschild 2018; Wuthnow 2018). 
Consequently, the final sub-sections analyse the decline of “left behind” communities, White 
attitudes to government intervention in community life, and the vote choice of Whites who 
live in these areas.  
 
The Decline of “Left Behind” Communities 
One of the most important motifs in the ethnographic literature on “left behind” 
communities is a palpable sense of decline expressed by the residents of such areas. This 
sense of decline is made clear in residents’ repeated observations that the main streets of their 
once-thriving communities are now full of empty stores and abandoned properties, and that 
there is a growing exodus of younger Americans from such areas (Cramer 2016; Vance 2017; 
 





Wuthnow 2018). In sum, “left behind” areas are losing the essential precursor to the very idea 
of community itself - and that is people.  
The exodus of younger Americans has serious implications for the robustness of 
community life in “left behind” areas; a sizeable working-age population is critical as local 
areas need a robust tax to pay for community infrastructure. This is a critically important 
observation - in Wuthnow’s (2018) ethnography of the American heartland, White residents 
spoke of an increasing resentment towards mainstream politicians for their perceived failure 
to help address the plights of their communities. Specifically, these plights were associated 
with concerns about declining tax revenues to pay for vital community infrastructure 
(Wuthnow, 2018, p. 165). Collective resentment can also be an important mobilizing force 
that drives White majorities to vote for populist actors (Bonikowski 2017). Therefore, 
assessing the extent to which population decline - and especially the exodus of working-age 
individuals from predominately White communities - is a critically important aspect of 
testing the robustness of the “left behind’ thesis. Consequently, this sub-section analyses the 
extent to which population decline is associated with increased support for Trump in the 2016 
election.  
To assess whether White population decline is associated with increased support for 
Trump, the chapter employs spatial linear regression modelling. Specifically, I test for a 
significant association between higher rates of White population decline and increased 
support for Trump relative to Mitt Romney in 2012 in US counties. To assess whether areas 
in which the non-Hispanic White population is declining are indeed trending more 
Republican over time, I analyse the relative change in the raw count of non-Hispanic Whites 





because analysing the percentage change in White population in a spatial unit is not 
necessarily an accurate indicator of population decline for a given ethnoracial group.41   
 
























Notes: Spatial linear regression graph created by the Author using county-level election data from 
MIT Election Lab and county-level demographic data from the U.S. Census and American 
Community Survey (ACS) accessed via IPUMS NHGIS database. Points represent US counties. 
X-axis denotes rate of non-Hispanic White population loss between 2000 and 2016 by county. Y-
axis denotes percentage change in county-level vote share for the Republican presidential 
candidate between 2012 and 2016.  
 
Data source: MIT Election Lab /IPUMS NHGIS (2020) 
 
The results from Figure 4.7 indicate that counties with declining White populations are 
indeed trending Republican. However, they do not show what is driving this decline. One 
 
41 I adopt this analytical strategy because birth rates for Whites and non-Whites differ. For instance, non-
Hispanic White Americans have lower fertility rates than Hispanics and African Americans (CDC, 2019). Thus, 
in some areas the non-Hispanic White population is increasing, but the non-White population is increasing at a 
faster rate relative to Whites because of the higher rates of fertility for non-White ethnoracial groups. It is 
possible, therefore, for the percentage of non-Hispanic Whites in a given area to be decreasing as a percentage 





important and aforementioned factor is the exodus of younger Americans from “left behind” 
communities in search of better opportunities beyond their hometowns (Vance 2016).42 To 
assess whether the exodus of predominately younger Americans is driving this decline, I also  
regress the net migration rate of prime working-age43 non-Hispanic White Americans against 
the strength of Trump’s performance relative to Romney in 2012 at the county level. The 
results of the spatial linear regression are presented below in Figure 4.8.   
Figure 4.8 indicates a positive relationship between counties with higher rates of 
White outmigration and increased support for Republican presidential candidates between 
2012 and 2016. The coefficient for the declining of prime working-age Whites in US counties 
is both larger and more significant than that for all Whites in the previous model (𝛽 = .026, p 
<.01). This finding is important because it indicates that the relationship between population 
decline and voting for Trump is stronger when we exclude Whites who tend to be less 
geographically mobile (for instance, those who are retired). Once again, the quadrant chart 
imposed on the graph helps to aid clarity on the classification of US counties. As indicated by 
the large number of counties located in the upper quadrants, Trump overperformed in a 
higher number of US counties relative to Mitt Romney. While most counties tend to cluster 
around the center, the densest cluster is located in the upper right quadrant, which represents 
counties with higher rates of White outmigration and where Trump performed stronger 




42 The literature reveals an important tension between a desire to search for better opportunities beyond one’s 
hometown, and the intensity of one’s attachment to place. Immobility creates the conditions for out-migration. 
However, place attachment is a factor that many Americans must weigh against conceptualizations of 
immobility (Barcus & Brunn, 2009).  
43 I look at prime working-age Whites only as this particular cohort are more likely to migrate in search of better 
job opportunities than older Americans. Older Americans (i.e. those aged 55 or over) are less likely to migrate 

















Notes: Spatial linear regression graph created using county-level election data from MIT Election 
Lab and county-level out-migration data from the Applied Population Laboratory’s Net Migration 
dataset. Points represent US counties. Y-axis denotes percentage change in county-level vote 
share for the Republican presidential candidate between 2012 and 2016. X-axis denotes the non-
Hispanic White rate of out-migration for the 2000s decade (ages 25-54 only).  
 
 
Data source: MIT Election Lab/University of Wisconsin (2020).  
 
This relationship indicates a concerning trend for “left behind” areas. It is apparent 
from Figure 4.8 that many counties which voted for Trump are experiencing an exodus of 
their prime working-age populations. In the academic literature, successfully upward 
mobility is highly correlated with one’s ability to migrate to search for better opportunities 
(Herzog & Schlottmann, 1984; Eliasson et al., 2003). In areas with poor rates of upward 
mobility with limited job opportunities, therefore, out-migration among younger cohorts is 
especially prevalent as prime working-age adults leave their communities to search for work. 





across a number of areas. For instance, communities lose a significant proportion of their tax 
base because of the exodus of prime working-age (and therefore taxpaying) adults from those 
areas. Ageing communities with declining working-age populations experience the effects of 
declining tax revenues (Felix & Watkins, 2013). A report from the Economic Research 
Service (ERS) confirms such trends, showing that non-metropolitan counties with higher 
rates of outward migration are, on the whole, less prosperous than counties with lower rates 
of outward migration (McGranahan et al., 2010). As a consequence, town councils have less 
money to pay for local infrastructure such as hospitals and doctors’ clinics that are vital 
resources to the increasingly ageing populations of those communities.  
The results of the spatial regression models are particularly significant in the context 
of the compounding effects of out-migration on “left behind” communities. The reasons for 
why “left behind” areas voted for Trump as a consequence of these changes also become 
clearer in this context. In what was a similar expression of populist sentiment, research has 
shown that areas with lower rates of social mobility were more likely to vote leave in the 
2016 EU referendum (Sensier & Devine, 2017). Tellingly, areas that were among the most 
likely to vote to leave were more likely to be in Coastal areas with older populations 
(Johnston et al., 2016) and where out-migration of younger Britons is especially prevalent 
(Social Mobility Commission, 2019).  
In sum, this sub-section has assessed whether White depopulation in US counties has 
led to such areas trending more Republican between 2012 and 2016. It is apparent from the 
results of the spatial regression models that counties experiencing White population loss as a 
consequence of out-migration are increasingly voting for Republican presidential candidates. 
Such findings confirm with trends observed in other advanced Western democracies such as 
the UK, where similar areas were more likely to vote leave in the 2016 referendum. To test 





live in “left behind” communities, the final sub-section uses individual level data to analyse 
the extent to which poor evaluations of community life are associated with having voted for 
Trump in 2016.   
 
The Tension Between Left Behind Despair and Anti-Government Attitudes 
This final sub-section assesses the nature of the interaction between Whites’ 
preferences for state spending and their evaluations of the quality of their local communities 
on vote choice for Trump. Gauging whether the intersection of preferences for lower 
government and despair at the quality of community life is associated with voting for Trump, 
is critically important if we are to assess whether both the cultural and economic grievances 
of “left behind” Whites help us better understand why 54 per cent of Whites voted for Trump 
in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018).  
Authors of the “left behind” thesis make clear that Whites have poor evaluations of 
their local communities. These include dismay at the quality of local education (Duncan, 
2014), healthcare services (Wuthnow, 2018), and infrastructure such as roads (Cramer, 
2016). However, it is equally clear that, despite the lack of such resources, Whites do not 
trust government to provide an adequate response to the plights of their “left behind” 
communities. Indeed, A common refrain heard by Wuthnow (2018) during his ethnographic 
tour of the American Heartland when it came to government intervention in local community 
issues was the phrase “leave us alone!” (p. 101). White interviewees were dismayed at the 
top-down imposition of regulations from government that threatened to close vital local 
resources such as hospitals, and increase the cost of local infrastructure projects such as 
sewage systems (Wuthnow, 2018, p. 101). Likewise, the blue-collar Whites that Cramer 
(2016) interviewed for her ethnography of rural Wisconsin lamented the fact the Wisconsin 





dearth of accountability when it came to government spending and saw officials as distant 
figures lacking “real world” experience (Cramer, 2016, p. 174).  
 The complex interaction between the desire for less government and dismal 
evaluations of the quality of community life in the American Heartland has been the subject 
of a robust literature in the field of White Americans’ political behaviour. This particular 
body of literature has focussed on why White voters in Trump country are perceived as 
voting for the Republican Party seemingly at the behest of their economic interests (Frank 
2004; Hochschild 2018). On the one hand, these studies show that a significant percentage of 
Whites generally express a desire for less government in their local communities.44 Equally, 
however, government is a vital organ for the very existence of the sorts of communities 
where Trump performed well in the 2016 election (Vance, 2016). This tension is especially 
salient if we consider that preferences for lower state spending are associated with greater 
electoral support for Republican candidates, who emphasise the importance of limited 
government when running for office (Arceneaux and Nicholson, 2012).  
To assess whether Whites with poor evaluations of their local communities and 
preferences for less local government were likely to vote for Trump, the sub-section uses data 
from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) from 2016. The 2016 CCES 
contains a number of useful items related to Whites’ evaluations of the quality of their local 
communities across a range of areas, as well as preferences for less government in 
community life. For community evaluations, I create an additive index out of four items in 
which respondents had to grade their local community across four indices (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = 
..75). These were the quality of local schools; the quality of local police; the quality of local 
roads; and the quality of local zoning and development. To get a better picture of how most 
 
44 Banks and Valentino (2012) posit that preferences for small government among Whites can be explained by 





Whites rate their local communities, Figure 4.9 is a histogram that graphs the distribution of 
responses across the community evaluations index. As indicated here, Whites give their local 
communities a slightly above-average grade across the four indices; the bell-shaped normal 
distribution curve is displaced to the left of centre on the graph, in the direction of more 
positive evaluations of community quality. Lastly, I also create an additive index out of four 
items where respondents were asked whether they wanted state spending increasing or 
decreasing for education, infrastructure, the police, and local hospitals (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .56).    
 
Figure 4.9: The Distribution of Community Evaluations among Whites 
Notes: Sample limited to non-Hispanic Whites only. Data are weighted.  
 
Source: 2016 CCES.  
 
With these items, I estimate a probit model for vote choice with the standard controls 





by Table 4.6, the coefficient for community evaluations in the vote choice model is positive 
and significant at 𝛽 = .022, p <.05. It is important to note that, because the index has been 
scaled so that higher values are associated with poorer evaluations of one’s local community, 
a positive coefficient is indicative of such evaluations being positively related to voting for 
Trump. By contrast, the coefficient for preferences for decreasing state spending is of 
considerably greater magnitude in terms of effect size and statistical significance than that for 
community evaluations (𝛽 = .192, p <.001). In substantive terms, this means that preferences 
for lower state spending was the more salient predictor of vote choice for Trump in 2016 than 
poor evaluations of one’s local community.  
While the vote choice model evidences a degree of association between poor 
community evaluations and preferences for lower state spending on voting for Trump in 
2016, the chapter is also interested in assessing the nature of this interaction on voting for 
Trump. Specifically, it is important to know whether the effect of poor community 
evaluations on the probability that a White voter will cast their ballot for Trump becomes 
more salient as preferences for lower state spending increase. To test this expectation, I used 
postestimation and graphed the marginal effect of community evaluations on the probability 
of voting for Trump across the additive index for voters’ state spending preferences. The 
results are depicted in Figure 4.9. If preferences for lower state spending are indeed a critical 
moderator of community evaluations (Frank 2004; Hochschild 2018), then we should expect 
to see a positive and upwardly-trending marginal effect as Whites increasingly believe that 









Table 4.6: Probit Models of the Effect of Community Evaluations and Preferences for 














































Table entries are probit coefficients. Robust standard errors given in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote choice for Trump where 1 = 
“Trump,” 0 = “Clinton.” Data are weighted. Sample limited to non-Hispanic 
Whites who voted for Trump or Clinton. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001.  
 
Source: 2016 CCES.  
 
 Figure 4.10 indicates that, as a White voter increasingly believes that state spending 
should be reduced, poorer evaluations of one’s local community are associated with an 
increased probability of having voted for Trump in 2016. Overall, then, the results provide 
some evidence in support of the hypothesis that the vote choice of White voters who had 





means of addressing their grievances, were more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton in 
2016.   
 
Figure 4.10: Vote Choice for Trump as a Function of Voters’ Evaluations of Their Local 
Communities, by Preferences for State Spending 
 
Notes: Lines represent the predicted probability of voting for Trump by evaluations of the quality 
of one’s local community. Predicted values are calculated by holding gender, marital status, union 
membership, and region constant at female, married, union household, and South, while holding 
all other variables in model at their mean values. Model also controls for party ID, ideology, 
education, income. 
 
Source: 2016 CCES 
 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4 has concentrated on answering the first research question posed in the 
introductory chapter, namely, is Trump’s victory indicative of a White working-class revolt 
against the political elites in Washington for their perceived failure to adequately address 





robustness and validity of the “left behind” thesis as an explanatory frame for furthering our 
understanding of White Americans’ electoral behaviour in the 2016 election.  
The first test of the empirical robustness of the “left behind” thesis was to examine the extent 
to which Trump’s victory could be characterised as “revolt” on the part of the economically-
anxious White working-class. Here, the chapter found that, far from being representative of a 
successful mobilization of a significant cohort of previously non-voting working-class 
Whites, turnout for the socio-demographic group had increased by only 2 per cent between 
2012 and 2016.  
The chapter also analysed affect for Trump in the Rust Belt region in the Upper 
Midwest. Using spatial linear regression modelling, the chapter found that declines in 
manufacturing employed over time were not significantly related to increased Republican 
vote share in Rust Belt counties. Given this pattern of null results for the spatial models, the 
chapter also examined whether White voters who opposed outsourcing and free trade with 
other countries were significantly associated with vote choice for Trump. Here, the chapter 
found that White voters’ opposition to outsourcing and free trade were significant predictors 
of vote choice. More importantly, however, these effects were intensified when both 
variables were interacted with the variable controlling for Rust Belt residency. I have argued 
that this makes sense, noting that the Rust Belt has experienced the effects of 
deindustrialization in a way that is more profound relative to other areas of the US, given the 
historically strong presence of “heavy industry” in the Upper Midwestern states. In light of 
this somewhat mixed pattern of results in the first three sub-sections, therefore, it is important 
to qualify that Trump’s victory might not be completely representative of the mobilization of 
a cohort of “economically anxious” working-class White voters.  
Next, the chapter explored whether Whites’ perceptions of the relative speed of the 





analysing the relationship between evaluations of the economic recovery and affect for 
Obama was critically important in the context of the second research question that Chapter 4 
sought to answer. This question asked whether Trump’s victory on the part of White voters 
was better explained by the confluence of a number of economic and cultural factors that are 
becoming increasingly difficult to extricate. In support of this second alternative hypothesis, 
the chapter found that White voters who thought that the economy in 2016 was in a worse 
state relative to 2008 were likely to have voted for Trump. Moreover, these medium-term 
economic evaluations were likely to be tied to negative evaluations of Barack Obama, and 
became more potent as White voters’ levels of racial animus increased. We also observed a 
similar effect on vote choice through White voters’ concerns related to the economic impact 
that immigrants would have on the US labour market and economy. Here, Chapter 4 found 
that, as White voters become more concerned about the hypothesised negative impact of 
immigrants on the US economy, their negative national and personal economic assessments 
are associated with an increased probability of voting for Trump 
In a final test of the second research question, the chapter probed why so many White 
Americans were perceived as voting for Trump largely at the behest of their own economic 
interests (Frank 2004; Hochschild 2018). To achieve this, the chapter explored whether 
Whites with poor evaluations of their local communities, but who likewise express an 
opposition to increased state spending and government intervention, were likely to have 
voted for Trump in 2016. Consistent with the extent theorising on the complex interaction 
between Whites’ preferences for lower state spending and poor evaluations of community 
infrastructure (Cramer 2016), the chapter found that, as White voters’ preferences for 
decreasing state spending become more salient, increasingly poor evaluations of community 
infrastructure were associated with a higher probability of a White voter having cast their 





 Having tested the empirical robustness and validity of the “left behind” thesis as a 
frame for understanding why 54 per cent of White voters cast their ballots for Trump in the 
2016 US Presidential election, the doctoral thesis now proceeds to test the robustness of the 
second principal explanatory context (cultural decline thesis) in the next chapter. In contrast 
to explanations rooted in “left behind-ness,” the cultural decline thesis hypothesizes that 
Trump’s victory is representative of the activation of a number of salient forms of White in-
group identities/psychological predispositions (Kam and Kinder 2010; Jardina 2019; 






Chapter 5: Identity, the Other, and White Vote Choice for Trump 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter assessed the robustness of the “left behind” thesis as an 
explanatory context for Trump’s victory in the 2016 election. Having explored this first 
explanatory context, the thesis now considers a second explanatory context for Trump’s 
victory known as the “cultural decline” thesis.45 The specific objective of this chapter is to 
assess whether the salience of a number of forms of White group identity, and forms of out-
group prejudice towards non-Whites affected Whites’ vote choice for US President in 2016. 
Meeting this objective is essential to meeting the broader objective of the doctoral thesis, 
which is to understand the salient predictors of White vote choice for Trump. The findings 
from this chapter will test the robustness of the “cultural decline” thesis as an explanatory 
context for why so many White Americans voted for Trump in 2016. As such, the findings 
will be also be comparable to those of the previous chapter. This will allow us to assess the 
salience of in-group identity and out-group prejudice as predictors of White vote choice 
relative to the proxies that measured White “left-behind-ness” in the upcoming discussion 
chapter. To meet the specific objective of the chapter, and the broader objective underpinning 
the focus of the thesis, therefore, the following questions are posed:  
 
How is Trump’s victory explained by high levels of cultural anxiety among White 
Americans? Is his victory indicative of? 
 
45 The crux of the “cultural decline” thesis is as follows: ethnoracial demographic change has 
engendered a sense of status loss among many White Americans, who feel that their dominant-group 
position is increasingly being threatened by non-White ethnoracial minorities (Norris & Inglehart, 
2019). The literature indicates that perception of threat triggers “defensive” reactions from the 
dominant group (i.e. Whites), who place greater emphasis on the importance of group norms and 






i) The “activation” of salient forms of White in-group identity, including White 
ethnocentrism (Kam & Kinder, 2012), American ethnic identity (Thompson 2020), 
and White racial identity (Jardina, 2019)?  
ii) High levels of resentment and animosity towards non-White ethnoracial groups?  
 
The chapter tests H3 and H4 by using secondary survey data from the 2016 version of the 
Stanford University/University of Michigan American National Study (ANES). To measure 
forms of in-group identity, ethnocentrism, American ethnic identity, and White racial identity 
are operationalised into statistically measurable constructs using a number of items from the 
2016 ANES. To measure forms of non-White out-group prejudice, the chapter relies on an 
additive index of the four items from Sears and Henry’s (2010) seminal scale of racial 
resentment.  
The chapter is structured as follows: the first principal section delineates the salient forms 
of White in-group identity (ethnocentrism, American ethnic identity, and White racial 
identity). It hypothesizes about the “activation” of such identities by radical right populist 
actors such as Trump, and whether Whites in 2016 were mobilized to vote for Trump as a 
consequence of these identities. The hypothesized effect of White in-group identity is 
explored in a series of vote choice models for each respective identity using individual level 
data from the 2016 ANES. Having analysed the salience of in-group identity on White 2016 
vote choice, the chapter next turns to analyse the salience of the racial out-group prejudice on 
2016 vote choice, exploring why racial resentment remained a significant predictor of 
Republican support in 2016 despite Obama not being on the ballot. The chapter concludes by 
reflecting on the significance of the findings concerning the “cultural decline” thesis and lays 






Salient Forms of White In-Group Identity 
The first aspect of testing the robustness of the “cultural decline" involves thesis analyses 
the salience of three forms of White in-group identity. These variations of White in-group 
identity have all been correlated with White vote choice to varying degrees. The first form of 
White in-group identity I analyse is ethnocentrism. As will be clear, ethnocentrism is more of 
a psychological disposition in which Whites favour members of their own group (i.e. other 
Whites). Conversely, the latter two forms of White in-group identity are more robust forms of 
group identity centered around an emphasis on the importance of immutable group traits. The 
first robust form of White in-group identity conceptualises the in-group along the lines of 
ethnicity and emphasises the importance of American ethnic identity. Meanwhile, the second 
robust form of White in-group identity conceptualizes the in-group along the lines of race and 
emphasises the importance of White racial identity. I unpack these forms of White in-group 
identify in three respective subsections by outlining: (i) the ways in which Trump mobilizes 
Whites around each particular form of group identity, and (ii) whether White Americans with 
salient levels of such group identities were predicted to vote for Trump as a consequence of 




Before assessing the hypothesised salience of ethnocentrism as a predictor of White 
vote choice in 2016, it is important to understand what I mean by ethnocentrism. By 
ethnocentrism, I am referring to the act by which an individual or a group of individuals from 
a common ethnocultural group judge another’s culture relative to the preconceptions of the 
values and standards their own ethnic culture. Ethnocentrism was first operationalized as a 





2007), Sumner described ethnocentrism as the name for: ‘the view of things in which one’s 
group in the center of everything, and all others are scaled and made with reference to it’ (p. 
13).  
Sumner’s definition of ethnocentrism was refined by social theorists such as Theodor 
Adorno in The Authoritarian Personality ([1950] 2019). To Adorno, ethnocentrism was a co-
articulation of the positive feelings felt towards one’s ethnocultural group with the negative 
feelings expressed towards ethnocultural out-groups. Ethnocentrism is the result of the 
psychological process of “in-group out-group differentiation”. This process formed the basis 
of psychological models of intergroup conflict (Levine & Campbell, 1972) and social identity 
(Turner & Tajfel, 1986); theories which helped as a means to understand modes of 
ethnocentric behaviour in a variety of contexts, including Americans’ dating preferences, 
(Liu et al., 1995), American consumer behaviour (Lantz & Loeb, 1996), and disease 
avoidance (Navarete & Fessler, 2006).  
The most important work in the ethnocentrism literature is Kinder and Kam’s (2010) 
Us Against Them: The Ethnocentric Foundations of American Public Opinion. In Us Against 
Them, Kinder and Kam (2010) argue that ethnocentrism must be accounted for in research 
American political behaviour. Their analysis relies on a measure of ethnocentrism that 
utilizes measures of out-group hostility towards African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian 
Americans. With this measure of ethnocentrism, Kinder and Kam (2010) demonstrate that 
ethnocentrism is a robust explanatory measure that is independent of authoritarian and 
egalitarian attitudes, as well as political ideology. Importantly, they also find ethnocentrism 
to be a powerful predictor of American political behaviour in a variety of contexts, including 






Indeed, a significant body of literature finds that ethnocentrism drives and reinforces 
American public opinion across a range of salient political issues. Examples of such issues 
include preferences for immigration reduction (Wilson 2001; Banks 2016). Elsewhere, 
research finds that ethnocentrism is a latent trait that can be activated by salient external 
events such as terror attacks perpetrated by non-Whites (Kam and Kinder 2007). Indeed, 
negative ethnocentric stereotypes about Muslims have been shown to reinforce public support 
for the War on Terror (Sides and Gross 2013). Group-based ethnocentric dispositions also 
predict lower public support for public welfare spending during periods of macroeconomic 
decline (Kam and Nam 2008) and shape public opinion towards other areas of government 
spending including healthcare (Maxwell and Shields, 2014). The activation of ethnocentrism 
in all of these political contexts is dependent on resonance between in-group/out-group 
differentiation and a particular issue position (Kam and Kinder 2012). This resonance is 
achieved via rhetorical “frames” (Goffman 1974) that allow Americans to make the 
connection between such ethnocentric views and support for a given policy.  
 
The Activation of Ethnocentrism 
Ethnocentrism not only influences American public opinion towards across a variety 
of contexts. It also shapes American voting behaviour. The activation of ethnocentrism as a 
mobilizing factor in White vote choice in past Presidential elections was dependent on the 
presence of a non-White candidate (i.e. Obama) on the Presidential ticket of one of the major 
US political parties (Kam and Kinder 2012). The salience of such beliefs among Whites was 
evidence of a fear and distrust of the perceived “otherness” of Obama. Such feelings were 
embedded in both racial resentment (i.e. Obama being non-White), and religious intolerance 
because of the ‘mistaken but widespread’ belief that Obama was a Muslim (Kam and Kinder 





the 2016 election could not have been “activated” by the presence of a non-White candidate 
on the Presidential ticket. This observation means that we must consider the possibility that 
ethnocentrism was “activated” by other causes. Since Kam and Kinder’s (2012) study, the 
literature demonstrates that ethnocentric attitudes can also be “activated” by radical political 
actors via the use of ethnic cues. These cues allow Whites to make the connection between 
their latent beliefs and support for a given message (Emerson et al. 2014; Bonikowski 2017).  
Here, I hypothesise that Trump’s negative framing of non-White ethnic groups 
through the use of ethnic stereotyping provided resonance between his rheotic and Whites’ 
beliefs in negative group stereotypes.46 The use of ethnic cues to mobilize political support 
among non-White groups is far from a new tactic (Valenzuela and Michelson 2016; Arora 
and Stout 2019). However, its use by ethno-nationalist actors to mobilise dominant majority 
ethno-racial groups such as Whites is becoming increasingly prevalent (Hassell and 
Visalvanich, 2015). The increased use of such strategies by actors such as Trump has 
important implications for the state of US ethnic intergroup relations (Orbe and Batten, 
2017), which are becoming increasingly important as America becomes more ethno-racially 
diverse. This is to say that Trump’s appeals to ethnocentric dominant-group aptitudes might 
prove salient as a short term-force to mobilize electoral support. However, in the long-term, 
an emphasis on negative stereotyping might only serve to further widen and exploit division 
along ethnic lines.  
To assess this hypothesis, it first was necessary to operationalise ethnocentrism into a 
statistically measurable construct. To measure ethnocentrism, I rely on a series of items 
 
46 There is a litany of stereotyping throughout Trump’s rhetoric for those with Latino origin alone. For 
instance, during his campaign launch in June 2015, Trump said of Mexicans: ‘They’re rapists’ (Burns, 
2015). Elsewhere when discussing the deportation of immigrants during the third Presidential debate 
in October 2015, Trump said: ‘[W]e have some bad hombres here [in the US] and we’re gonna [sic] 
get them out’ (McCann and Engel Bromwic, 2015). Emphasis added. Here, Trump is making a 






concerning group stereotypes from the 2016 ANES.47 Overall, the items measure group 
stereotypes well. Industriousness and temperament are essential features of intergroup racial 
and ethnic stereotyping (Sigelman and Tuch 1997; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997).  A single 
measure of ethnocentrism was computed out of the group stereotype items. The variable was 
constructed as:  
 
Ethnocentrism = in-group favouritism48 + out-group negativity49 
 
Using this computed ethnocentrism50 variable, I next assessed whether ethnocentrism 
was indeed a latent trait among White voters. If this were the case, we would expect White 
 
47 In these items, White respondents were presented with a seven-point scale on which they had to rate 
the characteristics of a given ethnoracial group. The scales were based on a series of paired antonyms. 
The first antonym was hardworking versus lazy. A score of 1 indicated that respondents thought all 
the people in a given ethnoracial group were hardworking. A score of 4 indicated that most people in 
the group were not particularly close to one end or the other. And a score of 7 indicated that most 
people in the group were lazy. White respondents were first asked to rate themselves on this scale. 
Afterward, Whites were presented with the same scale again, but were instead asked to rate African 
Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans. This process was then repeated for the second antonym 
– peaceful versus violent. 
48 In-group favouritism was calculated by summing the scores for the two ANES items in which 
White respondents had to rate their own group on the hardworking/lazy scale and peaceful/violent 
scale. The two items have a Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .76. This summed score was then divided by two to 
create an average score. Responses for the items in which Whites had to rate their own group were 
reverse coded so that a higher score responded to a higher rate of perceived in-group virtuousness. 
The formula for calculating the in-group favouritism score is:  
 
In-group favouritism = (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡1 in-group score + 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡2 in-group score) /2 
 
49 Out-group negativity was calculated by summing the average scores for the six ANES items in 
which White respondents had to rate African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans on the 
hardworking/lazy scale and the peaceful/violent scale. Whites’ ratings of non-White ethnoracial 
groups were averaged to create a single score for all out-groups across both scales. The two average 
scores were then summed and divided by 2 to create an average score that represented out-group 
negativity. Thus, the formula for calculating the out-group negativity score is:  
 
Out-group negativity = (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡1⁡average outgroup score + 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡2⁡⁡average out-group score) /2 
 
50 The score for ethnocentrism ranges between 2 and 13. A maximum score of 13 represents an 
extreme form of White ethnocentrism where all members of the in-group are perceived hardworking 





voters in 2016 to skew more ethnocentric than xenocentric. Figure 5.1 is a frequency plot that 
graphs the distribution of ethnocentrism among White 2016 Trump/Clinton voters. The data 
follow the bell-shaped curve relatively well, and White 2016 voters indeed skewed slightly 
ethnocentric; the curve is displaced away from the middle score of 7.50 to the right, and the 
mean ethnocentrism score was 8.03.  
 











Source: 2016 ANES 
 
Ethnocentrism as a Predictor of White Vote Choice 
Having established that White 2016 voters skewed slightly ethnocentric, the next step 
was to assess whether ethnocentrism was a significant predictor of White vote choice for 
 
score of 2 represents an extreme form of xenocentrism where all members of the in-group are 






President. To do this, I specified a series of binomial probit models that predict vote choice 
for Trump. The probit models are presented in Table 5.1. The first model is a baseline model 
that contains the item for ethnocentrism, as well as a host of standard controls endemic to 
vote choice models including partisan identification, ideology, and sociodemographic 
indicators. Models 2 through 4 contain the addition of controls for salient forms of out-group 
to assess whether racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiment reduce the effect size of 
ethnocentrism. 
Before discussing the results, it is important to highlight the need to control for these 
factors in regression because of the close relationships between ethnocentrism and 
racism/anti-immigrant sentiment in the academic literature. Ethnocentrism is endemic of a 
broader, negative, reaction against putative outsiders. On the other hand, racism is a more 
specific form of group prejudice directed towards a given racial group or groups. 
Ethnocentrism thus functions as a broader framework in which individuals partition the world 
into “us” versus “them” (Kinder and Kam 2012). Viewing the world in this way paves the 
way for more specific variations of out-group resentment centered around race. Empirical 
findings from the literature lend weight to this hypothesis. For instance, when Kam and 
Kinder (2012) controlled for the effect of racial resentment in their regression models, the 
effect of ethnocentrism on Whites’ opposition to Obama’s candidacy was substantially 
reduced (p. 334). Despite Obama not being on the Democratic ticket in 2016, racial 
resentment continued to play a significant role in shaping White vote choice for Trump 
(Schaffner et al., 2018; Abramowitz and McCoy, 2019; Enders and Scott, 2019).  
To get a more substantive approximation of where Whites are situated on the racial 
resentment scale, Figure 5.2 is a histogram that plots the distribution of Kam and Kinder’s 
four-item symbolic racism battery by political ideology. It is helpful to examine how level of 





of why racial resentment is important in the context of the doctoral thesis. Since White racial 
attitudes are known to be conditioned by socio-political orientations such as ideology (Wetts 
and Willer 2019), it is particularly important to understand whether effects of racial 
resentment on vote choice are driven by political conservatives, who tend to exhibit higher 
levels of racial resentment, or whether these effects are driven by political liberals, who 
exhibit lower levels of racial resentment (Enders 2019).  
 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of the Racial Resentment Scale Among Whites, by Ideology 
 






 As evidenced by the top panel in Figure 5.2, White liberals exhibit relatively weak 
levels of racial resentment. This trend is most pronounced for Whites who consider 
themselves to be “extremely” liberal, as the bell-shaped normal distribution curve is 
displaced to the left on the graphs, in the direction of lower resentment. An opposite pattern 
of results can be seen for Whites who consider themselves political conservatives. Here, the 
normal distribution curve is displaced to the right on the graphs, in the direction of higher 
resentment, with this right-sided displacement being most pronounced among Whites who 
consider themselves to be extremely conservative. Among Whites who sit at the extreme 
ends on the 7-point political ideology scale (i.e., those who are either extremely liberal or 
conservative), those who are “extremely” liberal exhibit a mean of just .186 (SD = .251) on 
the normalised racial resentment scale. Conversely, those who are “extremely” conservative 
exhibit a mean of .795 (SD = .178). 
Somewhat distinct from racial resentment, immigrant-based xenophobia and 
ethnocentrism are largely51 hypothesized as being opposite sides of the same coin. 
Xenophobia can be thought of as an articulation of out-group negativity through its emphasis 
on a fear of ethnic outsiders such as immigrants. Since ethnocentrism is a co-articulation of 
both in-group favouritism and out-group negativity, therefore, it could be the case that 
ethnocentrism functions as a proxy for salient forms of immigrant-based xenophobia. Such 
fears are grounded in Americans’ fears of economic competition and/or perceived threats to 
dominant-group culture posed by immigrants (Jaret 1999). Indeed, confirming such findings, 
ethnocentrism has been shown to predict White Americans’ support for immigration 
restriction (Kinder & Kim 2010). Because of the significant relationship between xenophobia 
 
51 The psychology literature shows that in-group favouritism does not necessarily accompany 
outgroup negativity (Struch & Schwartz 1989). Indeed, confirming the independent effects of 
xenophobia and ethnocentrism in a cross-cultural study of 186 societies, Cashdan (2001) finds that 
ethnocentrism and xenophobia are ‘largely uncorrelated’, with the activation of such sentiments being 





and ethnocentrism, therefore, it is expected that anti-immigrant sentiment also reduces the 
effect of ethnocentrism on White vote choice for President when controlled for in regression.  
 
Table 5.1: Probit Models Predicting White Vote Choice for Trump with Ethnocentrism 
Item 












































































































































Notes: Table entries are beta coefficients. Standard errors given in parenthesis. * p < .05 ** p < 
.01 *** p < .001. Dependent variable is vote choice for Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 1 = “Trump”. 
Cases are weighted using ANES post-election weight (full sample). Sample limited to non-
Hispanic White Americans.  
 





As indicated by the first column in Table 5.1, the baseline model performs well. As 
would be expected, Republican partisanship is the strongest predictor of support for Trump 
(𝛽 =⁡ .573). White 2016 voters who identify as ideological conservatives and Evangelical 
Christians are also statistically significantly predicted to vote for Trump - trends that are 
familiar and documented in the academic literature on vote choice for Republican 
presidential candidates in past elections (Patrikios 2008; Jacoby 2009). However, even with 
the addition of standard controls for vote choice, it is clear that ethnocentrism mattered in 
2016; ethnocentrism is positively and statistically significantly associated with vote choice 
for Trump in the baseline model (𝛽 = .573, p < .001).  
Models 2 and 3 control for the respective effects of racial resentment and anti-
immigrant sentiment. Model 4 is a fully specified model that controls for both salient forms 
of out-group prejudice. High levels of racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiment are 
statistically significantly (p < .001) correlated with vote choice for Trump among White 2016 
voters. Both racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiments also substantially reduce the 
effect size for ethnocentrism on White vote choice. Controlling for racial resentment in 
Model 2 reduces the size of the standardized coefficient for ethnocentrism, such that 𝛽 
becomes weakly negative at the -.056 level. Controlling for anti-immigrant sentiment in 
Model 3 has a similar effect on ethnocentrism, reducing the standardized coefficient for 
ethnocentrism to 𝛽 = .330. In the full model, the effect of ethnocentrism is reduced further to 
𝛽 = -.061. Importantly, controlling for racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiment makes 
the effect of ethnocentrism on White vote choice in 2016 disappear statistically.  
To better illustrate the effects of ethnocentrism, Figure 5.3 graphs comparisons across 
categories of partisan identification. As Figure 5.3 indicates, increases in rates of 
ethnocentrism equate to increased probability of voting for Trump among Whites who 





trend, however, ethnocentrism did not affect all White voters in the same way. Comparing 
across party categories, White Independents have greater probability of voting for Trump 
than White Democrats. The predicted probability of a Democrat voting for Trump exceeds 
that of a Republican among Whites with a score of 5 or less on the ethnocentrism scale. 
Interestingly, this means that Democratic xenocentrists are more likely to vote for Trump 
than xenocentrists who identify as Republicans. Nonetheless, the probability that a 
Republican will vote for Trump increases markedly as levels of ethnocentrism increase.  
 





















Notes: Probit model contains the same controls for vote choice and as the baseline model but is 
re-estimated with the categorical variable for partisanship from the 2016 ANES (item V161155) 
instead of the 7-point party ID scale. Probit model contains a categorical-continuous interaction 
term between the partisan categories and the ethnocentrism variable. All covariates in probit 
model set to their means. Dependent variable is vote choice for Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 1 = 
“Trump”. Cases are weighted using ANES post-election weight (full sample). Sample limited to 
non-Hispanic White Americans.  
 






Overall, these findings are consistent with my hypothesis that ethnocentrism was 
“activated” by Trump because of resonance between his rhetoric on minorities and the latent 
beliefs of many White Americans in the salience of negative group stereotypes. In past 
Presidential elections, ethnocentrism was “activated” by circumstantial factors such as the 
presence of a non-White candidate on the Presidential ticket - for instance, Obama in 2008 
(Abramowitz 2018). However, the absence of Obama on the ballot in 2016 means that the 
salience of ethnocentrism in the 2016 election must be explained by other factors. The results 
are therefore important because they lend weight to the “cultural decline” thesis as an 
explanatory context for understanding why 54 per cent of Whites voted for Trump in 2016 
(Pew Research Center, 2018). Mutz (2018) hypothesizes that vote choice in 2016 was 
indicative of a “defensive” reaction on the part of Whites against putative outsiders. Indeed, 
the findings here indicate that Whites placed greater emphasis on the importance of negative 
minorities stereotypes, and that these factors were influential when Whites cast their ballot in 
2016. While ethnocentrism is a salient predictor of White vote choice for Trump, scholars 
have also identified within Trump’s rhetoric, and among many of his White supporters, an 
emphasis on the importance of American ethnic traits. Consequently, the next sub-section 
analyses the salience of American ethnic identity in predicting White support for Trump.  
 
American Ethnic Identity 
In these second of three sub-sections, I hypothesize that American ethnic identity was 
likewise a salient variation of White in-group identity that led Whites to vote for Trump in 
the 2016 Presidential election. Quantifying the extent to whether American ethnic identity is 
a salient form of in-group identity is critically important if we are to gauge whether the 





Trump’s victory in 2016. Norris and Inglehart (2019), posit that White Americans 
increasingly feel as though their dominant-group position is increasingly being threatened by 
non-White ethnoracial minorities. As more Whites become threatened, individuals 
increasingly place an emphasis on the importance of their in-group traits (Mutz 2018). 
Consistent with the “cultural decline” thesis, therefore, it could also be the case that Whites 
who value their identity as Americans placed an emphasis on the importance of such 
conceptualizations when casting their vote in 2016.  
 
What is and What is Not American Ethnic Identity 
Before I test the salience of American ethnic identity as a predictor of White vote 
choice, it is useful to define American ethnic identity. given the close relationships between 
both concepts in the literature. American ethnic identity is the articulation of a specific set of 
beliefs about what it means to be “true” American. Paralleling both ethnocentrism and White 
in-group identities, ethnonationalism is linked with an emphasis on in importance of the in-
group – in this case members of the national ethnos52– at the expense of putative outsiders 
(Alba 1990; Citrin et al. 1990a; Citrin et al. 2001). Unlike variations of White in-group 
identity such as White identity, however, manifestations of American ethnic identity do not 
necessarily emphasise the importance of race. Instead, American ethnic identity considers 
WASP (that is, White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) traits to be important markers of American 
identity. Consistent with ethnosymbolism theory (Smith 2009; Armstrong 2017), Those with 
 
52 Ethnos is interwoven with the notion of the nation-state. The Greek word ethnos embraced a wide 
variety of meanings in Ancient times. While it was translated as “the people”, it also described the 
inhabitants of a “polis (city-state), or even a larger population in which people formed several 
“polies” (Hall 1997: 34). Therefore, the idea of “a people” and that of a state were seen as deeply 
intertwined. Herodotus, the Greek historian, defined Greek ethnos as a form of kinship of ‘blood and 
speech, and the shrines of gods and the sacrifices that we have in common and the likeness of our way 
of life’ (Kohn 1967: 52). In order to exist, therefore, an ethnos ‘must have a name expressing group 
identity and a self-awareness of that identity as a group’ (Smith 2003: 10). National ethnic identity is 





salient levels of American ethnic identity emphasise the importance of their American 
ancestry and nativity, and differentiate themselves from other ethnic groups via the use of 
‘cultural markers’, such as their ability to speak English and their Christian faith (Kaufmann 
2018: 7).  
These criteria outlined by Kaufmann (2018) - specifically, European ancestry, 
speaking English, and being Christian - demonstrate what cultural markers make one a “true” 
American. Manifestations of American ethnic identity draws their roots from the ‘myth’ of 
WASP ethnicity (Kaufmann 1999: 448) WASP Americans trace their ancestry and lineage to 
Northern Europe (Kaufmann 2004). Indeed, as Lind (2010) notes, to be a ‘genuine’ American 
was to be a White of ‘European descent’ (64). Language is another marker that defines 
ethnonationalism. In the case of WASP ethnicity, the ability to speak English is an essential 
marker (Citrin et al. 1990b). The final essential cultural marker concerns religion, with 
WASP Americans being traditionally associated with variations of Mainline Protestant 
Christianity (Davidson et al. 1995). Altogether, these criteria provide a set resilient set of 
symbols that underpin a notion of “true” Americanness conceptualised along the lines of 
WASP ethnicity.  
 
The Activation of American Ethnic Identity 
During his candidacy, Trump explicitly appealed to ethnonationalist sentiments by 
emphasizing the importance of WASP traits. For example, the emphasised the importance of 
speaking English during the 2016 campaign (Rappeport 2015). Trump chided Jeb Bush 
during the primary debates for speaking Spanish during a campaign stop, saying ‘we speak 
English, not Spanish’ (Goldmacher 2016). However, as America has become more diverse, 
the prevalence of non-English languages (most especially Spanish) has increased in everyday 





Americanness thus harks back to past nativist movements such as the official English 
language movement (Tatalovich 2015). An emphasis of the importance of such ethnic traits 
was also evidence that Trump was appealing to voters who believed in the importance of 
living in a predominately Anglophone nation (Stavans 2017).  
Elsewhere, Trump has consistently emphasised the importance of American nativity 
for being a “true” American. For example, despite the US granting or example, despite the 
US granting right of birth within the nation- state (or jus soli) to children born in the US with 
few restrictions, Trump opposed the notion of birthright citizenship during the 2016 
campaign (Giridharadas, 2015). He referred to the children born in the US to parents who 
were in the country illegally as ‘anchor babies’ (Kessler 2015). Trump also used the 
pejorative to refer to his opponent Ted Cruz, born in Canada to a Cuban father and American 
mother. During the primaries Trump questioned Cruz’s Americanness at a campaign stop in 
New Hampshire, stating:  
‘Ted Cruz may not be a U.S. citizen, right? But he’s an anchor baby. No, he’s an 
anchor baby. An anchor baby born in Canada’ (Diamond 2016).  
Trump’s rhetoric on the importance of American ethnic traits also promoted a particular 
eschatology of America’s future by highlighting the threat that putative outsiders and 
demographic change posed to the robustness of national ethnos. Trump’s popular message to 
“Make America Great Again” was a hark to return America to an era of prosperity and global 
standing that had been lost in the intervening years. However, the message also had more 
nefarious undertones; throughout America’s history, among the loudest voices to call for the 
restoration of American greatness have been those from the nativist movement, who have 
highlighted the “threat” that foreigners and ethnic outsiders pose to the perpetuation of 





to preserve national greatness before demographic change meant that “Americanness” was 
lost forever. As former Republican Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann put it, 2016 
presented a ‘math problem of demographics and a changing United States’ (Kirkland, 2016). 
She went further, saying ‘if you look at the numbers of people who vote and who lives in the 
country and who Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton want to bring into the country, this is the 
last election’ (Kirkland, 2016).  
I measure American ethnic identity along these lines with a series of four items from 
the 2016 ANES. The four items asked respondents how important certain historical and 
cultural ethnic traits were to be a “true” American, including asking respondents whether the 
following were important for being truly American: (i) being born in the US; (ii) having 
American ancestry; (iii) one’s ability to speak English;  and (iv) following the customs and 
traditions of the US. All items were asked on a 5-point Likert scale, and possible responses 
ranged from 1 = “extremely important” to 5 = “not at all important”. All items were reverse 
coded so that a higher score corresponded to higher levels of considered importance of a 
given ethnic trait for being a true American. The four items were computed into an additive 
index of ethnic identity (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .805).  
With this computed measure of American ethnic identity, I first analyse the distribution 
of ethnic identity to see if a majority of White 2016 voters considered such traits important 
proxies of “Americanness”. Figure 5.4 depicts the distribution of American ethnic identity 
among 2016 White Trump-Clinton voters. The data follow the bell-shaped normal 
distribution curve well, meaning that they are normally distributed. It is also evident from 
Figure 5.4 that an emphasis on the importance of American ethnicity is a salient trait among 



















Source: 2016 ANES 
 
American Ethnic Identity as a Predictor of White Vote Choice 
Having demonstrated that American ethnic identity is a latent trait among White 2016 
voters, the next step was to run the vote choice models to see if salient levels of American 
ethnic identity predicted vote choice for Trump. The results of the probit models predicting 
White vote choice with the American ethnic identity item are presented in Table 5.2. Model 
1 is a baseline model that contains the American ethnic identity variable, as well as my usual 
sociodemographic controls for vote choice. Model 2 includes a control for racial resentment 
to assess whether anti-Black prejudice reduces the effect size of American ethnic identity. 
Model 3 contains the addition of the ethnocentrism item to see whether controlling for 
ethnocentrism reduces the effect size of American ethnic identity. Model 4 controls for both 





sentiment reduce the effect size of American ethnic identity. Model 5 control for racial 
resentment and anti-immigrant sentiment alone. Lastly, Model 6 is a fully specified model 
that controls for ethnocentrism and both salient forms of out-group prejudice.  
While the effect size of American ethnic identity does not rival that of partisanship, 
ideology, and Evangelical status in the baseline model, the effect of ethnic identity on White 
vote choice in 2016 is important. The baseline model indicates that American ethnic identity 
is a salient predictor of White vote choice; the effect of American ethnic identity on vote 
choice for Trump is positively strong (𝛽 = .355) and is statistically significant at the p <. 001 
level. Nonetheless, it is important to note that, relative to the baseline model for 
ethnocentrism in Table 5.1, ethnocentrism has a stronger effect size (𝛽 = .513) than 
American ethnic identity when the exact same controls are specified in the probit model.  
Directly controlling for ethnocentrism in Model 2 begins to clarify the interaction 
between ethnic identity and ethnocentrism. Controlling for ethnocentrism reduces the effect 
size of American ethnic identity to 𝛽 = .319 relative to the baseline model. However, the 
effect size of ethnocentrism is greater than that of American ethnic identity in Model 2 (𝛽 = 
.360). Nonetheless, American ethnic identity is robust against the effect of ethnocentrism 
when it comes to levels of statistical significance; American ethnic identity remains 
statistically significant at the p <.001 relative to the baseline model. This suggests that ethnic 
identity is a predictor of vote choice that is relatively independent of the effects of 
ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism, conversely, remains a statistically significant predictor of 
White vote choice, although its level of significance is reduced to the p < .05 level. Model 2 
thus indicates that American ethnic identity and ethnocentrism are both significant predictors 
of White vote choice.   
Model 3 includes the additional control for racial resentment. As indicated by the 





probit coefficient for American ethnic identity (𝛽 = ..264). Nonetheless, the coefficient 
retains its statistical significance (p <.01). This finding is interesting because it suggests that 
racial resentment is not significantly mediating the effect of ethnic identity on vote choice for 
Trump. Given this finding, does including an additional control for anti-immigrant sentiment 
render the effect of American ethnic identity on vote choice insignificant? This test can be 
seen more clearly in Model 4, which controls for both salient forms of out-group prejudice. 
As indicated here, racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiment reduces the effect of 
American ethnic identity, such that ethnic identity becomes only weakly positive at the 𝛽 = 
.082 level. More notable however, is that controlling for racial resentment and anti-immigrant 
sentiment makes the effect of American ethnic identity on White vote choice disappear 
statistically. This finding indicates that the relationship between American ethnic identity and 
vote choice for Trump among Whites is more likely to run through anti-immigrant attitudes 
as opposed to racial resentment, thus lending weight to my theoretical expectations.   
Model 5 controls for the effects of racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiment 
only. As indicated here, the probit coefficient for racial resentment a positive predictor of 
vote choice (𝛽 = .694, p <001). Anti-immigrant is likewise a positive predictor of vote choice 
for Trump among Whites (𝛽 = .448, p <.001). However, its effect size is somewhat smaller 
than that of racial resentment, meaning that the former variable is the more robust predictor 
of vote choice for Trump. Finally, in Model 6, controlling for the effects of ethnocentrism 
and out-group prejudice does not substantially reduce the effect size of ethnic identity any 
further relative to Model 4; while American ethnic identity remains statistically insignificant, 





Table 5.2: Probit Models Predicting White Vote Choice for Trump with American Ethnic Identity Item 
 Baseline + ethnocentrism + racial resentment + racial resentment 
and anti-immigrant 















Ethnocentrism . .360* 
(.022) 
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Notes: Table entries are probit coefficients. Standard errors given in parenthesis. *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001. Dependent variable is vote choice for Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 1 = 





To better illustrate how American ethnic identity affected White voters, Figure 5.5 
plots the effect of American ethnic identity on the probabilities that White Americans voted 
for Trump by partisan affiliation. I begin first with White Democrats. At the lowest level of 
American ethnic identity, a White Democrat has just a .1 predicted probability of voting for 
Trump. By contrast, a White Democrat with the highest level of ethnic identity has a .75 
predicted probability of voting for Trump. Thus, moving from least to most salient on the 
ethnic identity scale is associated with a 74-point increase in the predicted probability of a 
White Democrat voting for Trump.  
 
Figure 5.5: Predicted Probabilities of White Americans Voting for Trump by American 










Notes: Probit model contains the same controls for vote choice and as the baseline model but is 
re-estimated with the categorical variable for partisanship from the 2016 ANES (item V161155) 
instead of the 7-point party ID scale. Probit model contains a categorical-continuous interaction 
term between the partisan categories and the composite ethnic identity variable. All covariates in 
probit model set to their means.  
 





Next, a White independent voter at the lowest level of American ethnic identity has 
just a .25 predicted probability of casting their ballot for Trump. Conversely, a White 
independent with the highest level of ethnic identity has a .76 predicted probability of casting 
their ballot for Trump. Consequently, moving from lowest to highest levels of ethnic identity 
is associated with a 51-point increase in the predicted probability of a White independent 
voting for Trump. Lastly, a White Republican at the lowest levels of American ethnic identity 
has just a .32 predicted probability of voting for Trump. By comparison, a White Republican 
voter with the highest levels of ethnic identity has a .98 predicted probability of casting their 
ballot for Trump. Therefore, moving from the lowest levels of ethnic identity to the highest 
along the scale is associated with a 66-point increase in the predicted probability of a White 
voter casting their ballot for Trump.  
 
 
The Relationship Between American Ethnic Identity and Ethnocentrism 
While the probit models in Table 5.2 provide some evidence of a meaningful 
interplay between American ethnic identity and White ethnocentrism, this chapter is also 
interested in assessing the extent to which American ethnic identity and ethnocentrism are 
distinct constructs that shape White vote choice. This is important because it could be the 
case that ethnic identity is acting as a proxy for ethnocentrism or vice versa. To better 
quantify the extent with which American ethnic identity is a predictor of White vote choice 
that is independent of the effects of ethnocentrism, therefore, I specify a structural equation 
model (SEM). The SEM model uses a form of causal path analysis that assesses the direct 
effect of American ethnic identity on White vote choice, as well as any indirect effects by 
virtue of the significant positive relationship between American identity and ethnocentrism. 





effects of ethnocentrism, we would expect ethnocentrism to be a substantial mediator of 
American ethnic identity.  
 
Figure 5.6: SEM Model Showing Direct and Indirect Effects of Ethnic Identity on 











Notes: Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between ethnic identity and White 
vote choice as mediated by ethnocentrism. Structural equation model contains the same controls 
for vote choice as Model 2 in Table 5.2. ***p < .001. Cases weighted using ANES post-election 
weight (full sample). Sample limited to non-Hispanic White Americans.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES.  
 
Figure 5.6 presents the results of the structural equation model (SEM). The 
standardized coefficient between American ethnic identity and White vote choice for Trump 
was statistically significant (𝛽 = .063, p < .001), as was the standardized coefficient between 
ethnocentrism and White vote choice (𝛽 = .096, p <.001). The standardized indirect effect 
was (𝛽 = .015 x 𝛽.= ⁡ .096), or 𝛽 = .00144. As such, the total indirect effects were less than 





partial versus full mediation.53 Nonetheless, a partial mediation is significant because it 
indicates that not only is there a significant relationship between ethnocentrism and White 
vote choice, but there is also a significant (albeit less salient) direct relationship between the 
American ethnic identity and the Trump vote. In sum, American ethnic identity and 
ethnocentrism are closely related yet distinguishable constructs that shape White vote choice. 
However, it seems that ethnocentrism is the more salient derivation of White in-group 
identity that predicts how Whites voted for President in 2016.  
This second sub-section has explored whether American ethnic identity was a 
significant predictor of support for Trump. With a unique measure of American ethnic 
identity using items from the 2016 ANES, I have found using probit regression that Whites 
with salient levels of American ethnic identification were statistically significantly predicted 
to vote for Trump. However, given that American ethnic identity and ethnocentrism are 
closely related concepts in the literature, it was necessary to run the vote choice models with 
both measures to see which derivation of White in-group identity was the more robust in 
predicting support for Trump. The findings from this sub-section indicate that ethnocentrism 
was the more salient variation of White in-group identity in predicting vote choice for Trump.  
 Overall, then, the results are important because they lend empirical weight to the 
cultural decline thesis (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Even though ethnocentrism is the more 
potent derivation of White in-group identity in explaining vote choice, it is important to note 
that the models indicate that these two distinct forms of in-group identity are, nonetheless, 
both significantly associated with voting for Trump. The findings thus lend credence to 
Norris and Inglehart’s (2019) assertation that 2016 was a particularly salient year for radical 
populist actors such as Trump, who made concerted efforts to court White voters who were 
 
53 This is because the inclusion of ethnocentrism as a mediator variable in the SEM model does not 






concerned about America’s cultural decline. Despite these contributions to the “cultural 
decline” thesis, however, it remains to be seen whether ethnocentrism is robust against the 
final form of White in-group identity – namely White racial identity. Therefore, the final sub-
section analyses the robustness of White racial identity as a predictor of vote choice for 
Trump.   
 
White Racial Identity 
The chapter now turns to assess whether White racial identity is also a robust form of 
White in-group identity that predicted vote choice for Trump in 2016. Quantifying whether 
this is indeed the case is vitally important if we are to assess whether the cultural decline 
thesis is a robust explanatory context for understanding why 54 per cent of Whites voted for 
Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2018). To make these contributions, the sub-section 
begins by exploring how White racial identity is theoretically distinct from the other forms of 
White in-group identity analysed thus far. I unpack two salient derivations of White racial 
identity – namely White identity and White group consciousness (Jardina, 2019) – outlining 
the key differences between the two constructs and hypothesising how both affected vote 
choice in 2016. Next, I run White identity and White group consciousness in two separate 
logit models to see which construct is the more salient predictor of vote choice for Trump. 
Lastly, I specify interactive models to see whether White racial identity is mediated by the 
effect of ethnocentrism - the more robust form of White in-group identity conceptualised 
along the lines of ethnicity.  
 
What is White Racial Identity? 
White racial identity is different from the two forms of White in-group identity 





in-group identity around race and not ethnicity. Whereas ethnicity-based identities define the 
in-group according to a common national, ancestral, linguistic, or cultural origin,54 race-based 
identities define the in-group along the lines of shared racial features. The second key 
difference between White racial identity and ethnicity-based derivations relates to the ways in 
which political actors utilise cues to appeal to different ethnoracial groups. Political actors 
seeking to mobilize “the people” along the lines of ethnicity deploy ethnic cues as strategies 
of popular mobilization. Conversely, political actors mobilizing “the people” along the lines 
of race will utilise racial cues. Racial cues are ‘prejudice relevant’ signals that determine 
whether members of a given racial group perceive a political message or event as racially 
relevant (Hoggard et al. 2017: 411).  
Trump’s explicit appeals to race have been shown to make White Americans’ racial 
attitudes more salient (Tesler 2017). There are two pervasive forms of Whiteness that were 
“activated” by Trump in 2016. These are White identity and White group consciousness 
(Sides et al., 2017; Jardina 2019). Before running White identity and White group 
consciousness in the vote choice models55, it is useful to parse out the differences between 
the two constructs. White identity is a form of dominant group identity in which Whites 
identify with their own race. More than this, however, White identity is also a politicised 
identity - a ‘lens through which many Whites interact and engage with the political world’ 
(Jardina 2019: 40). Meanwhile, White group consciousness is a co-articulation of White 
racial identity and the specific set of politicised beliefs that Whites have about their own 
group. Racially conscious Whites therefore identify as White, feel that Whites are 
 
54 Or indeed a combination of these four ethnic traits.  
55 White identity is a single-item measure that askes Whites how important being White is to their 
identity. White group consciousness is a 3-item measure that includes the White identity item, as well 
as an item that asks how likely it is that Whites are unable to find jobs due to employers favouring 
non-Whites, and an item that asks how important is it that Whites work together to change laws that 





discriminated against as a racial group, and support collective action to maintain their 
dominant status (Jardina 2019: 41).   
The theoretical differences between White racial identity and White group 
consciousness have important implications for their respective salience as predictors of vote 
choice for Trump. Jardina (2019) hypothesises that White group consciousness is more 
salient than White identity as a predictor of preferences for political candidates because the 
construct is more closely related to the political attitudes and behaviour of White Americans 
(41). Whites may identify with their racial group, but this identity alone is not necessarily 
enough to electorally mobilize Whites to vote for a given candidate. 
 
White Racial Identity as a Predictor of White Vote Choice 
Is Jardina’s hypothesis robust to testing in the vote choice models? I now turn to test 
whether White identity and the three-item group consciousness measure predict vote choice 
for Trump. Once again, these models contain additional controls for both racial resentment 
and anti-immigrant sentiment. Racial resentment is important to account for given the close 
theoretical relationships between White identity and anti-Black attitudes (Jardina 2020). 
Similarly, Jardina (2019) posits that Whites’ anxiety and concern for their ingroup plays an 
important role in shaping White opposition to immigration. Whites do not simply express a 
greater preference for restricting immigration because of group-specific outgroup attitudes 
(for instance, White animus towards Latinos). In fact, while these attitudes may be a factor in 
opposing immigration, the primary argument is that Whites are concerned that the large 
influxes of non-White immigration threaten their dominance over America’s culture and it’s 
political and economic institutions (Jardina 2019: 164). In this way, the effects of White 
identity on vote choice are also likely to be influenced by attitudes towards immigration. To 





presents the results of two OLS models in which the single-item White identity measure and 
the three-item group consciousness measure were regressed against the anti-immigrant index. 
As indicated by Table 5.3, both the single-item White identity measure (𝛽 = .050, p <.001) 
and the three-item group consciousness measure (𝛽 = .076, p <.001) are positively related to 
the anti-immigrant attitudes index. In substantive terms, this means that higher levels of 
White identity and White group consciousness are associated with more salient anti-
immigrant attitudes. The results of Table 5.3 therefore provide empirical weight to the 
hypothesis that White racial identity is closely related to anti-immigrant attitudes.  
 
Table 5.3: OLS Models for White Racial Identity Items and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes 




White identity .050*** 
(.005) 
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Notes: Table entries are standardised OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors given in 
parentheses. Data are weighted. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001.  
 






Having established that White racial identity is positively related to anti-immigrant 
sentiment, I now turn to present the results of the vote choice models. Table 5.4 depicts the 
results of two probit models that predict vote choice for Trump. Model 1 controls for White 
identity, and Model 2 controls for the three-item group consciousness measure. It is clear 
from Model 1 that White identity is a weak predictor of support for Trump. As evidenced by 
Table 5.4, the single-item measure from the ANES is weakly positive at 𝛽 = .068 and does 
not approach the conventional p <.05 benchmark for levels of statistical significance. 
Contrastingly, Model 2 indicates that White group consciousness is a stronger predictor of 
vote choice for Trump relative to White identity. The 3-item measure is positive at the 𝛽 = 
.147 level and is statistically significant at the p <.01 level.  
To better demonstrate the effects of White identity and White group consciousness on 
voting for Trump, I also graph the predicted probabilities that Whites voted for Trump at 
each level of White identity and White consciousness. The results of the postestimation are 
graphed below in Figure 5.4. I begin first with the results of the postestimation for White 
identity. Among those who thought that being White was “not at all important” to their 
identity, a voter has a .77 predicted probability of casting their ballot for Trump. By contrast, 
those who thought that being White was a “extremely important” part of their identity have a 
.82 predicted probability of casting their ballot for Trump. Therefore, moving from low to 
high importance along the White identity measure is associated with a 5-point increase in the 
predicted probability of a White voter casting their ballot for Trump. Lastly, the bottom panel 
in Figure 5.4 depicts the results of the postestimation for the three-item group consciousness 
measure. As indicated here, a White voter with the lowest levels of group consciousness has 
just a .62 predicted probability of casting their ballot for Trump. Conversely, a White voter 





Trump. Consequently, moving from the lowest to the highest levels of group consciousness is 
associated with a 31-point increase in the predicted probability of a White voter casting their 
ballot for Trump.   
 
Table 5.4: Probit Models Predicting Vote Choice for Trump with White Racial Identity 
Items 












Racial resentment .341*** 
 
.336*** 

































































Notes: Table entries are probit coefficients. Standard errors given in parenthesis. * p < .05 
** p < .01 *** p < .001. Dependent variable is vote choice for Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 1 = 
“Trump”. Cases are weighted using ANES post-election weight (full sample). Sample 
limited to non-Hispanic White Americans. 
 

































Notes: Probit models contain the same controls for vote choice and as Models 1 and 
2 in Table 5.3. All covariates in probit model set to their respective means. Vertical 
lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. Dependent variable is vote choice for 
Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 1 = “Trump”. Cases are weighted using ANES post-election 
weight (full sample). Sample limited to non-Hispanic White Americans. 
 
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
 
 
The Relationship Between White Racial Identity and Ethnocentrism 
The results thus far indicate that White consciousness is the more robust form of 
White in-group identity that predicts Whites vote choice for Trump. However, it is also 





White in-group identity – namely ethnocentrism.56 It could be the case that White 
consciousness and ethnocentrism are distinct forms of in-group identity that both mobilised 
Whites to vote for Trump. However, it could also be the case that White consciousness 
functions as a proxy for ethnocentrism or vice versa. Quantifying which form of in-group 
identity is the most salient predictor of vote choice is important if we are to understand 
whether the “cultural decline” thesis is a robust explanatory context for understanding why so 
many Whites voted for Trump in 2016. Consequently, to further test the robustness of the 
“cultural decline” thesis, I now turn to consider the nature of the relationship between White 
consciousness and ethnocentrism as predictors of White vote choice in 2016. 
To determine whether Whites voters in 2016 with high levels of racial self-
identification or group consciousness were also ethnocentric, I use correlation analysis. Table 
5.5 depicts the pairwise correlations between the single item for White identity and the 
composite measure of White group consciousness, and ethnocentrism from the 2016 ANES. 
Across both measures of White racial identity, the correlation is positive and statistically 
significant at the p <.01 level. Whites with salient levels of racial self-identification and 
group consciousness are also likely to be ethnocentric. Despite this correlation, however, it is 
important to note that the coefficients do not indicate a strong relationship.57 Therefore, it can 





56 In White Identity Politics, Jardina (2019) analyses the nature of the relationship between American 
identity and White identity (pp. 119-122). However, Jardina (2019) does not analyse the nature of the 
relationship between ethnocentrism and White identity. This is an important lacuna, given that I have 
shown ethnocentrism to be the more salient form of White in-group identity than American ethnic 
identity in predicting White vote choice for Trump.  






Table 5.5: The Correlation Between White Racial Identity and Ethnocentrism   
 Pearson Correlation p 
White Identity .295 
(1,671) 
** 
White Consciousness .438 
(1,659) 
** 
Notes: Table entries are Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients. Number of cases 
given in parenthesis. ** p <.01. Cases are weighted using ANES post-election weight 
(full sample). Sample limited to non-Hispanic White Americans.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
 
To better assess the extent to which ethnocentrism and White racial identity are 
independent forms of White in-group identity that affected White vote choice in 2016, I 
specify another SEM model. This SEM model assesses the extent to which there is a 
significant direct effect between White consciousness and White vote choice for Trump when 
ethnocentrism is specified as a mediator variable (MV). For further evidence that White 
consciousness is an independent predictor of support for Trump, we would not expect to see a 
significant mediating effect on White consciousness by virtue of its significant positive 
relationship with ethnocentrism.  
Figure 5.8 presents the results from the structural equation model (SEM). The results 
indicate that the standardised coefficient between White consciousness and vote choice for 
Trump was statistically significant (𝛽 = .034, p <.001). The significant relationship between 
ethnocentrism and White vote choice is also evidenced by the positive and statistically 
significant standardised coefficient (𝛽 =⁡ .134, p <.001). The standardised indirect effect for 
White consciousness as mediated by ethnocentrism was (𝛽 = .022 x 𝛽 = .134) or 𝛽 = .00294. 
The total indirect effects were therefore less substantial than the direct effect of White group 





White consciousness on vote choice because the predictor remained weakly positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, it is evident from the mediation model that White 
consciousness and ethnocentrism functioned as separate and distinct forms of White in-group 
identity that shape White vote choice.  
 
Figure 5.8: SEM Model Showing Direct and Indirect Effects of White Consciousness on 








Notes: Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between white consciousness and 
White vote choice as mediated by ethnocentrism. Structural equation model contains controls for 
vote choice, sociodemographic indicators, and region. ***p < .001. Cases weighted using ANES 
post-election weight (full sample). Sample limited to non-Hispanic White Americans.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
 
In this principal section, I have analysed the salience of three forms of White in-group 
identity. Part of the contribution of this thesis to the White voting behaviour literature lies in 
the ability to (i) demonstrate which of these forms of identity were the more robust predictors 
of support for Trump, and (ii) whether or not they function as predictors of White vote choice 
that are independent of one another. The results indicate that the activation of three forms of 
in-group identity (ethnocentrism, American ethnic identity, and White racial identity) were 





more salient than others. White Ethnocentrism is the most salient derivation of White in-
group identity formulated along the lines of ethnicity. Further, and despite the close 
relationships between ethnocentrism and ethnic identity in the literature, it is evident that 
both are distinct forms of in-group identity that shape White vote choice.  
These salient forms of group ethnic identity are also distinct from those centered 
around racial identity. I find some correlation between White ethnocentrism and White racial 
identity, but the interactive models nonetheless indicate that the two are distinct and 
significant predictors of support for Trump among Whites. While I have quantified the extent 
to which in-group identity mattered in 2016, close attention must also be paid to the salience 
of Whites’ animosity towards out-groups. This is because an essential dimension to the 
“cultural decline” thesis is Whites’ animosity towards non-White racial groups and minorities 
(Mutz, 2018; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). As such, the chapter now turns to test the 
robustness of the “cultural decline” thesis further by analysing whether salient levels of racial 
prejudice explain why Whites voted for Trump in 2016.  
 
Non-White Racial Prejudice 
In this section I explore why racial resentment was such a salient predictor of White 
vote choice in 2016. I begin defining racial resentment and track the salience of racial 
resentment as a predictor of vote choice in the Obama era through to the election of Trump in 
2016. Next, I unpack a framework developed by Whitley and Kite (2010) to understand the 
causes of racial resentment. I then operationalize items from the 2016 ANES into Whitley 
and Kite’s (2010) hypothesized causes of symbolic racism. I assess the robustness of Whitley 
and Kite’s (2010) framework by controlling for their causes of symbolic racism in regression. 
The purpose of testing for these causes in regression is to see whether any of the 





voters.58 Testing these hypotheses is critically important if we are to understand whether the 
“cultural decline” thesis is a robust explanatory context for understanding why 54 per cent of 
White voters cast a ballot for Trump in 2016.  
Racial resentment is interchangeable with the idea of symbolic racism. Symbolic 
racism is a coherent belief system whose sentiments are manifested in a number of negative 
beliefs of African Americans. It represents a newer form of racism relative to more traditional 
forms of prejudice such as “old fashioned” or “Jim Crow” racism (Sears & Jessor, 1996; 
Tesler, 2012). These older belief systems incorporated the social distance between Whites 
and African Americans, were rooted in biological racism, and were characterised by support 
of formal discrimination and segregation (Henry & Sears, 2002, p. 253). Contrastingly, in 
their seminal measure of racial resentment, Henry and Sears (2002) define modern symbolic 
racism as Whites’ endorsements of four specific beliefs:  
 
1. That Black Americans no longer face much prejudice or discrimination. 
2. That the failure of Black Americans to progress stems from their unwillingness to work 
hard enough.  
3. That Black Americans are demanding too much too fast. 
4. That Black Americans have gotten more than they deserve (Henry & Sears, 2002, p. 
266). 
 
Scholars of the voting behaviour literature have found that racial resentment was a salient 
predictor of 2016 vote choice among Whites (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Abramowitz 
 
58 I also assess the robustness of racial resentment as a measure of Whites’ racial attitudes to see 
whether racial resentment is merely acting as a proxy for other constructs. It is important to do so 
because the academic literature shows that racial resentment is closely related with individualist 
attitudes (Tarman and Sears 2005) or salient forms of broader resentment towards non-White 





and McCoy, 2019).59 It is important to note that the aim here is not to simply rerun the 
analyses from such studies. We know from these studies that racial resentment predicts vote 
choice for Trump. However, there is a paucity of knowledge as to why racial resentment was 
so salient in 2016. What follows in the analysis to come is my attempt to better understand 
the forces that explain racial resentment in 2016. To understand the importance of racial 
resentment as a predictor of White vote choice, it is also necessary to explore the salience of 
racial resentment before Trump in 2016. While the issue of race has long defined American 
electoral politics, I am referring specifically to the election of the nation’s first non-White 
President in 2008, US President Obama.  
 
A “Most Racial” America 
It is important to begin by noting that racial resentment as a salient factor in White 
vote choice was primed by Obama and not by Trump. Tesler (2016) argues that the election 
of Obama to the US Presidency in 2008 did not usher in a “post-racial” America, but rather a 
“most racial” one. This “most-racial” context polarized mass politics by issues of race and 
racism (Tesler, 2015). The racialisation of American politics during the Obama era was 
reflected in trends of partisan realignment by which White Americans shifted towards the 
Republican Party. Tellingly, the most significant predictor of the shift of Whites towards the 
Republican Party during the Obama era was negative racial attitudes towards African 
Americans (Sides et al. 2017: 38). This trend plays out in analyses of the post-election data 
from 2016. For instance, Sides et al. (2017) find that Whites’ attitudes towards Blacks were 
more significantly correlated with vote choice in 2016 than 2012.  
 
59 Across studies, racial resentment is measured with a composite variable composed of four items that 





This “most racial” context is important because it explains why, even though Obama 
was not on the ballot in 2016, racial resentment was more salient as a predictor of White vote 
choice in 2016 relative to the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections. If racial resentment was 
primed and made salient by Obama, then we would expect Whites’ negative evaluations of 
Obama to mediate the effect of racial resentment as a predictor of White vote choice in 2016. 
To assess this hypothesis, I use two measures of Whites’ evaluations of Obama as mediator 
variables (MV).60 To quantify the extent to with salient levels of racial resentment in 2016 
interact with Whites’ negative feelings towards Obama, I estimate interactive models. These 
models start with the same variables as the baseline model but add an interaction term 
between the racial resentment scale and one of the two key explanatory variables (Obama job 
approval, and Obama feeling thermometer). I plot the various marginal effects61 of racial 
resentment at the values of each of the explanatory variables in Figure 5.8.  
These interactive models help to clarify whether the salience of racial resentment as 
predictor of White vote choice in 2016 is explained by Tesler’s “racial spillover” thesis. The 
top panel in Figure 5.9 graphs the marginal effects of racial resentment by Whites’ 
approval/disapproval of Obama’s job performance. Among Whites who approve of Obama’s 
job performance, the marginal effect of racial resentment is 0.8 percentage points and is 
significant at the p <. 001 level. Among Whites who disapprove of Obama’s job 
performance, the marginal effect of racial resentment is 0.2 percentage points. While levels 
of significance decrease, the marginal effect nonetheless remains significant at p <.01.  
 
 
60 The first measure is a categorical variable that asks Whites whether they approve or disapprove of 
Obama’s performance as President. The second measure is a feeling thermometer where Whites had 
to rate Obama on a scale between 0-100. Because higher scores corresponded to warmer feelings 
towards Obama, the item was reverse coded so that a higher thermometer rating corresponded to 
cooler feelings for Obama.  
61 Each marginal effect is the change in probability associated with the racial resentment scale when 





















Notes: Interactive probit models contain the same controls for vote choice and sociodemographic 
indicators as the baseline model. Top panel contains categorical-continuous interaction term 
between Obama approval and racial resentment scale. Bottom panel contains a continuous-
continuous interaction term between Obama thermometer and racial resentment scale. All 
covariates in interactive probit models set to their respective means. Vertical lines are 95 percent 
confidence intervals. Dependent variable is vote choice for Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 1 = “Trump”. 
Cases are weighted using ANES post-election weight (full sample). Sample limited to non-
Hispanic White Americans. 
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
 
A similar pattern emerges in the bottom panel of Figure 5.9. Racial resentment 
persists among Whites with lower levels of negativity towards Obama. However, when 





resentment no longer predicts vote choice.62 The consistent results of both models is that 
racial resentment is mediated by attitudes towards Obama among those with negative 
evaluations of the 44th President, but persists among those with more positive evaluations. In 
sum, the interactive models indicate that Whites’ opposition to Obama mediates the effect of 
racial resentment as a predictor of White vote choice in 2016. Racially resentful Whites are 
correlated with voting for Trump. However, it is clear that negative evaluations of Obama 
specifically fed into White racial attitudes. The empirical evidence thus lends weight to 
Tesler’s (2015) “most racial” thesis. Thus, if we are to begin to understand the salience of 
racial resentment in 2016, it is useful to do so through this lens. The discussion so far has 
provided context as to why racial resentment remained a salient predictor of vote choice in 
the post-Obama era. The next step is to understand the specific determinates of racial 
resentment in 2016.  
 
The Causes of Racial Resentment 
To assess the significant drivers of racial resentment in 2016, I defer to an explanatory 
framework outlined in the academic literature (Whitley & Kite, 2010). Whitley and Kite 
(2010) outline six factors that feed into modern symbolic prejudice:  
 
1. belief in equality of opportunity. 
2. low belief in equality of outcome. 
3. implicitly anti-Black effect and negative stereotypes. 
4. racialised beliefs in traditional values. 
5. group self-interest. 
 
62 Racial resentment becomes a statistically insignificant predictor of White vote choice for Trump 





6. low knowledge of Black people.  
 
Modern symbolic prejudice, Whitley and Kite (2010) note, is rooted in the ‘belief in 
equality of opportunity’ (206). Equality of opportunity is underpinned by the idea of 
meritocracy – or the system by which individuals are conferred with success or power 
because of their abilities. Whites who believe in equality of opportunity are likely to 
emphasise the importance of individuals being able to have the same access to resources such 
as education. Belief in equality of opportunity is accompanied by low belief in equality of 
outcome. Equality of outcome, contrastingly, is a system that emphasises the need to 
eliminate material inequalities or other structural barriers to promote equality of condition. 
Low belief in equality of outcome therefore explains why so many Whites are supportive of 
the idea of racial equality, but do not often favour policies designed to address racial 
structural barriers, such as affirmative action policies in college admissions (Kluegel and 
Smith 1982).  
Whites with racist beliefs also hold implicitly negative attitudes towards African 
Americans. These negative attitudes are manifested in belief in negative Black stereotypes. In 
addition, many Whites with symbolically racist views also have a racialised belief in the 
importance of “traditional values” such as industriousness and self-discipline. Whites with 
such beliefs are likely to think that the behaviour of Blacks does not conform along the lines 
of these “traditional” value sets. Whites with salient levels of symbolic racism also exhibit 
high levels of group-self-interest. Group self-interest manifests itself in the perception that 
Whites are discriminated against as a racial group. This arises because of the perceived 
deprivation of opportunities from policies designed to benefit non-Whites. It holds that 
Whites must work together if they are to protect themselves against initiatives viewed as 





racism is a paucity of knowledge about African Americans. This paucity is explained by a 
lack of group contact with Blacks and may manifest itself in low levels of awareness of the 
structural inequalities that African Americans face as a consequence of their race.    
 Having unpacked these six causes of symbolic racism, the chapter proceeds to assess the 
extent to which Whitley and Kite’s (2010) framework is a robust explanatory model for 
understanding the salience of racial resentment as a predictor of White vote choice in 2016. 
Specifically, I am interested in analysing whether these causes are linearly and significantly 
related to high levels of racial resentment among White 2016 voters. To empirically test this 
hypothesis, it was necessary to operationalise items from the 2016 ANES into measures of 
Whitley and Kite’s (2010) causes of symbolic racism. 
 The first step was to then assess whether these operationalised measures were linearly 
and significantly related to racial resentment. As such, a series of multiple linear regressions 
were run to predict racial resentment from belief in meritocracy, negative Black stereotypes, 
White consciousness, and low levels of awareness of racial structural inequalities. The results 
are presented in Table 5.6. Across models, all five variables statistically significantly 
predicted racial resentment at the p <.001 level. To better illustrate the relationship between 
each of the predictors and racial resentment, I also plot each of the explanatory variables at 
each level of the dependent variable in Figure 5.9. Scanning across each of the panels in 
Figure 5.9, we can see a clear linear relationship between each of the predictors and racial 
resentment.  
These predictors are also robust to controlling for vote choice and sociodemographic 
indicators. I find, consistent with the relationship between fundamentalist Christianity and 
racial attitudes in the academic literature, that racial resentment is particularly associated with 
Whites who identify as Evangelical or “born again” Christians (Calfano and Paolino 2010).  I 





correlation between racial resentment and Whites with an investment in ideological 
conservatism. The regression models indicate that racial resentment is also a function of low 
levels of education, suggesting that a more parochial ontology might increase one’s level of 
racial resentment (Federico 2005). Even after taking these other variables into consideration, 
however, all items operationalised into measures of Whitley and Kites’s (2010) causes of 
racial resentment are significantly related to racial resentment among White 2016 voters.  
Overall, the results suggest that Whitley and Kite’s (2010) model functions as a 
robust explanatory framework for understanding why racial resentment was an especially 
strong predictor of White vote choice in 2016. Not only are all predictors linearly related to 
racial resentment among 2016 the subset of White Trump/Clinton voters from the 2016 
ANES, but it is also possible to discern which contribute to the model the more than others. 
As such, it is clear which of these known factors were the most salient in driving White’s 
racial resentment. Indeed, the strongest predictors of racial resentment among White 2016 
voters according to the full model was a belief in negative Black stereotypes (𝛽 = .572) and 
low levels of awareness of the structural barriers to equality faced by African Americans (𝛽 = 
1.025). These findings are consistent with those of the academic literature, which report that 
salient beliefs in negative group stereotypes and a lack of awareness of out-group grievances 
are associated with a lack of intergroup contact (Dixon & Rosenbaum, 2004; Brambilla et al., 
2012; Stathi et al., 2012).63  
In this second principal section, I have provided context as to why racial resentment 
remained such a salient predictor of White vote choice relative to the 2008 and 2012 elections 
when Obama was on the ballot for President. Consistent with Tesler’s “most racial” thesis, I 
have found using interactive probit models that Whites’ negative feelings of disapproval 
 
63 The 2016 ANES does not contain an item asking Whites how much contact they report with non-





towards Obama mediate the relationship between racial resentment and White vote choice for 
Trump. Next, I applied Whitley and Kite’s (2010) framework of the causes of symbolic 
racism to understand which predictors were most closely associated with salient levels of 
racial resentment among White 2016 voters. The results of the multiple regression models 
indicate that, while all of Whitley and Kite’s (2010) predictors are linearly related to the 
racial resentment, some factors were more strongly associated with the dependent variable. 
These predictors were closely associated with a lack of intergroup contact (i.e. with between 
White Americans and non-White ethnoracial groups), which feeds into salient beliefs in 
negative group stereotypes.  
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Notes: Table entries are OLS coefficients, robust standard errors, and significance values (*** p 
<.001). Models also includes controls for party ID, ideology, gender, age, marital status, education, 
income, union status, Evangelical status, and region. Dependent variable is racial resentment scale. 
Cases are weighted using ANES post-election weight (full sample). Sample limited to non-Hispanic 
White Americans. 
 







































Notes: Graphs depict the relationship between each predictor against each level of the dependent 
variable racial resentment. Lines represent fitted values. Grey shaded areas are 95 percent 
confidence intervals. Models also include controls for party ID, ideology, gender, age, marital 
status, education, income, union status, Evangelical status, and region.  
 
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
 
 
The essential contribution of this second principal section to the academic corpus on 
White voting behaviour thus lies in the ability to discern which factors were most closely 
associated with salient levels of racial resentment among White 2016 voters. In doing so, 
they also lend empirical weight to the “cultural decline” thesis promoted by scholars of the 







In this chapter, I have tested the robustness of the “cultural decline” thesis as an 
explanatory context for Trump’s victory. The ethnoracial makeup of the US has changed 
profoundly since the passing of the 1965 Immigration Act. Subsequent demographic change 
in the past few decades means that Whites’ numerical majority is shrinking. This change has 
begun to feed into a sense of loss and decline among White Americans. Today, many Whites 
feel that their dominant group position is being eroded by non-White ethnoracial groups, who 
compose an increasingly large proportion of the US population. The perception of threat has 
triggered a defensive reaction from White Americans, who in the 2016 election co-articulated 
an emphasis on the importance of in-group identity with broad levels of animosity towards 
America’s racial minorities.  
The critical aim of this thesis chapter was to test whether Whites with salient of 
cultural anxiety were predicted to vote for Trump. To do this, I asked two questions. The first 
asked whether Trump activated any particular form of White in-group identity (H3), and if 
so, which was the most salient. The results of the regression models indicate that White 
ethnocentrism, American ethnic identity, and White racial identity, are all salient forms of 
White in-group identity that predicted vote choice for Trump in 2016. However, we find 
variations in the respective salience of these identities. Ethnocentrism is more salient than 
American ethnic identity and is therefore the more robust form of White in-group identity 
articulated along the lines of ethnicity. White racial identity is also distinct from other forms 
of in-group identity that are conceptualised along the lines of ethnicity, and is likewise a 
significant predictor of White vote choice. The results indicate that the election of Trump 
marked a critical juncture where these previously dormant White in-group identities could be 





Of course, White in-group favouritism is only one side of a two-sided coin. This 
brings us onto the second question the chapter aimed to answer, which was whether Trump’s 
victory is also explained by salient levels of resentment towards non-White racial groups 
(H4). The answer to this question is yes; racial resentment predicts vote choice for Trump 
among White Americans. However, it is critically important to note that this animosity was 
not primed by Trump himself, but by America’s first Black President. Consistent with 
Tesler’s (2015) “most racial” thesis, Whites’ negative feelings towards Obama mediate the 
relationship between racial resentment and vote choice for Trump. Understanding the 
salience of racial resentment in this context is vital if we are to begin to understand its causes. 
The results of the multiple regression models that operationalise Whitley and Kite’s (2010) 
causes of symbolic racism into correlates of racial resentment clarify the drivers of racism in 
2016. Because of these models, we now have better understanding of the salient cultural 
forces that shaped vote choice for Trump in 2016.   
 Given the statistical significance of the various constructs tested for in the vote choice 
models in this chapter, it is clear that the cultural decline thesis is a robust explanatory 
context for understanding Trump’s victory in 2016. Having tested the robustness of the 
cultural decline thesis as an explanatory context for Trump’s victory on the part of White 
Americans in 2016 with my tests of H3 and H4, I proceed to test the robustness of the third 
and final explanatory context for White vote choice for Trump in the next chapter. Whereas 
in this chapter I have assessed whether Trump’s victory is explained by the salience of 
various White in-group identities and high levels of racial prejudice towards non-White 






Chapter 6: “Hunkered Down” or Mobilized by the Threat of Demographic Change? 
Diversity and Voting for Trump  
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter assessed the robustness of the “cultural decline” thesis as an 
explanatory context for understanding Trump’s victory in the 2016 US Presidential election. 
This was achieved by analysing the salience of three psychological dispositions/white in-
group identities (H3),64 as well as the salience of out-group racial prejudice (H4) as 
predictors of White 2016 vote choice. Having considered this secondary explanatory context, 
the thesis now turns to analyse the third and final explanatory context for understanding 
White vote choice for Trump. This third explanatory context is the “changing America” 
thesis.  
There are two competing hypotheses underpinning the “changing America” thesis, 
namely the “exit route” (H5) and the “voice route” (H6). The “exit route” hypothesis 
contends that there is a link between increasing ethnic diversity and crumbling social capital 
in advanced Western democracies such as the US (Putnam, 2007; Murray, 2010; Abascal & 
Baldassarri, 2015). The hypothesis is based on the assumption that diversity causes Whites to 
withdraw from aspects of public and civic life - including formal participation in politics such 
as voting in elections. Conversely, the “voice route” hypothesis contends that the threat of 
diversity might actually mobilise Whites to vote (Major et al., 2018). The hypothesis being 
that Whites express negative attitudes towards increasing ethno-racial diversity and vote for 
radical right populist actors such as Trump, who promise to reduce immigration (Kaufmann 
& Goodwin, 2018).  
 





 The objective of this chapter is to test the robustness of Putnam’s (2007) and 
Kaufmann and Goodwin’s (2018) hypotheses as frames through which we can better 
understand why 54 per cent of Whites voted for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018). 
Meeting this objective is crucial to meeting the wider research objective underpinning the 
doctoral thesis, which is to understand the salient predictors of White vote choice for Trump. 
The findings from this chapter will test the robustness of the “changing America” thesis as an 
explanatory context for understanding White vote choice for Trump.  
Importantly, the findings will also be comparable to those of the preceding two 
chapters because of the standardized coefficients and similar baseline covariates controlled 
for in regression. In the upcoming discussion chapter, this will allow us to assess the 
comparative salience of the “changing America” thesis relative to explanations grounded in 
short-term economic anxiety and longer-term trends in downward economic mobility (left 
behind thesis), and the salience of dominant-group identities and non-White racial prejudice 
(cultural decline thesis) examined in the previous chapters 4 and 5 (respectively) of this 
doctoral thesis. Therefore, to meet the specific objective of this chapter, and the broader 
objective underpinning the thesis, this chapter asks the following questions:  
 How did diversity affect White Americans’ in relation to their levels of participation 
in the 2016 election?  
i) Does diversity cause Whites to “hunker down” (Putnam, 2007) and withdraw 
from aspects of public and civic life – especially from formal forms of electoral 
participation such as voting?  
ii) Or, might Whites’ attitudes towards the threat of increasing ethnoracial diversity 






The chapter begins with a contextual section that outlines how America’s demographics 
have changed since the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, which ended historical quotas 
on immigration from outside Western and Northern Europe. Next, the chapter tracks the 
decline of community in the US, which is claimed by key American social capital theorists 
such as Putnam (2000) to have started in the early 1970s. To bridge the link between 
increasing ethno-racial diversity and crumbling social capital, the chapter then unpacks 
Putnam’s (2007) “hunkering down” thesis. I also explore the relationship between lower 
levels of social capital and Whites’ contact with diversity using a subset of non-Hispanic 
Whites from the most recent wave of the General Social Survey (GSS). I then assess the 
robustness of the “voice route” hypothesis by seeing if Whites threatened by diversity were 
predicted to vote for Trump. I conclude by reflecting on the significance of the findings and 
lay the groundwork for the comparison of the robustness of the “changing America” thesis to 
the other two explanatory contexts earlier assessed in the upcoming discussion chapter.  
 
America’s Changing Demographics 
In order to begin to understand how diversity affects White Americans today, it is 
useful to consider how America’s demographics have changed over the last few decades. For 
much of its history, America was a predominately biracial nation. At turn of the Nineteenth 
Century, America was almost exclusively composed of Whites of primarily Western and 
European origin/ancestry, as well as African Americans. In 1900, these two racial groups 
composed 99% of the total US population, with non-Hispanic Whites composing 87%, and 
African Americans composing 12%, respectively (US Census Bureau/IPUMS USA).  
Large influxes of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe during the last major 
waves of European immigration to the United States between the 1890s and 1917 were 





“Nordic” or “Anglo Saxon” stock (Higham, 2002, p. 277). Nativist concerns fed into national 
immigration policymaking at the end of the last major wave of immigration. In 1924, 
members of Congress proposed the Johnson-Reed Act, whose provisions effectively banned 
all immigration from the Asian continent, and enacted strict quotas on immigration from 
Eastern and Southern Europe. The Johnson-Reed Act had a dual purpose in that it both 
restricted immigration from non-Western and Northern and European countries and drew a 
tight formulation of American citizenship to “preserve” the idea of US ethnic homogeneity. 
As scholars have noted, this construction of American citizenship was one that was 
essentially White (Ngai, 2005, p. 25; Jardina, 2019, p. 155).65 The Johnson-Reed Act had the 
effect of limiting non-White immigration to the United States for the next four decades. 
Resultingly, many of the those that did migrate to the US during this time were from Western 
and Northern Europe, as well as Canada. 
The most significant divergence from the Immigration Act of 1924 came with the 
passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. The 1965 law abolished the quota 
systems of the Johnson-Reed Act in favour of a more liberal immigration policy. Removing 
restrictions on immigration from Asia and non- Europeans states significantly altered the 
immigration demographics of the United States. To better illustrate this effect, Figure 6.1 is a 
slope graph that depicts the top birthplaces of America’s foreign-born population at each 
Census year beginning in 1920. In 1920, 86% of all foreign-born persons in the United States 
were from either Canada or Europe. 
 
65 Congressmen in favour of the Johnson-Reed Act spoke with candour about the fact that the 
underlying purpose of the bill was to preserve an essentially White conceptualisation of American 
citizenship. For instance, Senator Ellison DuRant of South Carolina, a nativist influenced by the 
works of thinkers such as Madison Grant, spoke on the floor of the Senate asking his colleagues to 





Figure 6.1: Birthplaces of America’s Foreign-Born Population, 1920-2018 
 
Notes: So that the longitudinal dataset was small enough to be computational for machine learning, full Census 
counts (where available) were not selected. Instead, the following samples were selected for the specified 
census/intercensal years: 1920 (1%); 1930 (1%); 1940 (1%); 1950 (1%); 1960 (1%); 1970 (1%); 1980 (5%); 
1990 (5%); 2000 (ACS); 2010 (ACS); 2018 (ACS). Sample limited to cases where individuals were not born in 
any of the 50 states or Washington D.C. N = 3,216,276.  
 






As Figure 6.1 indicates, the foreign-born population of the United States between 
1920 and 1970 was largely composed of immigrants from these sources. Post-1970, however, 
we begin to see a significant uptick in the percentage of foreign-born persons from Mexico, 
Asia, the Caribbean, and Central and South America. The demarcation point at which 
European and Canadian immigrants no longer constituted a majority of the foreign-born 
population according to Figure 6.1 was 1980. 
Whether intentional or unintentional,66 the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act 
profoundly changed the demographics of the United States. The first effect of the 1965 Act 
was to dramatically increase the foreign-born population. Foreign-born persons constituted 5 
percent of the US population in 1965 - a number which swelled to 14 percent in 2016 (Pew 
Research Center, 2015). The second effect of the 1965 Act was to alter the ethnic and racial 
demographics of the US. Between 1965 and 2015, Pew found that post-1965 immigrants, as 
well as their children, accounted for 55 percent of overall population growth. Post-1965 
immigrants and second-generation immigrants added 72 million people to America’s 
population growth as the nation grew from 193 million people in 1965 to 324 million by 
2015 (Pew Research Center, 2015). It is this growth in particular that has made America less 
non-Hispanic White and more ethno-racially diverse. This is because, and as demonstrated by 
Figure 6.1, post-1970 immigrants to the United States have come from predominately non-





66 At the time of the bill’s passage through Congress, US Senators such as Ted Kennedy were 
adamant that the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act would not alter the ethnic and racial 
demographics of the US (Chin, 2015, p. 49). However, other scholars and commentators have seen 
the 1965 Act as more nefarious in that it represented a deliberate attempt to alter the demographics of 
















Source: US Census Bureau/American Community Survey  
 
Figure 6.2 depicts how America’s ethnoracial demographics are changing over time 
as a consequence of increased non-White immigration and higher birth rates among non-
Whites. Just before the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, the 1960 
Census data indicate that non-Hispanic Whites composed 85.4 percent of the US population. 
Over time, this number begins to decrease. Importantly, the decline in the non-Hispanic 
White population between 1960 and 2018 is not primarily driven by an increase in the 
African American population, which increases by just 2.9 percent between these timepoints. 
Rather, it is driven by increases in the Hispanic/Latino and Asian populations; the Hispanic 
population increased from 3.2 percent in 1960 to 18.4 percent in 2018 - an increase of 15.2 
percent. Meanwhile, the Asian population increased from 0.5 percent in 1960 to 5.9 percent 






The Decline of Social Capital 
The previous section provided a brief explanatory context outlining how post-1965 
immigration has changed the ethnic and racial demographics of the US. As ethnoracial 
heterogeneity has increased in subsequent decades, numerous scholars have noted a 
precipitous decline in social capital and a weakening of the bonds of community (Putnam, 
1995; Rahn & Transue, 1998; 2000; Paxton, 1999). In this short section, I track post-1972 
trends in the decline of social capital using a subset of non-Hispanic Whites from the GSS. I 
also consider reasons for the decline in social capital. Bridging an important link between 
increasing diversity and crumbling social capital, I unpack Putnam’s (2007) “hunker down” 
thesis. I note how Putnam’s (2007) thesis is important in the diversity/social capital literature 
because it posits that diversity causes Whites to withdraw from community life and reduces 
their estimations of trustworthiness.  
For parsimony, I track trends not related to the specific set of activities that make up 
social capital, but rather the essential function that is needed for social capital itself. This 
essential function is social trust (Putnam 2000). By social trust I am not referring to specific 
trust in one’s neighbours or work management. Rather, I am referring to the general 
expectation that others will do the right thing. Social trust is the bedrock of social capital. It is 
difficult to ‘think of any form of social capital that would exist without trust’, notes Murray 
(2010: 251). Scholars in the study of community health frame the notion of trust through the 
idea of reciprocity (Newton 2001; Subramanian et al. 2002; Lochner et al.,2003). For Putnam 
(2007), reciprocity is the expectation that others will ‘immediately’ and ‘perhaps without 
even knowing you’ provide a favour in the confidence that it will someday be returned (134). 






Since the inception of the GSS in 1972, the survey has asked three questions that seek to 
gauge the robustness of the socialised norms of Americans:  
 
1.  Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted, or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people? 
2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance, or would they try to be fair?  
3. Do you think that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly 
looking out for themselves?  
 
Source: GSS Codebook (2019)  
 
Figure 6.3 graphs trends in the socialised norms of White Americans beginning with 
the inception of the GSS in 1972 and ending with the most recent wave in 2018. Before I 
unpack these trends, it is important to note that Putnam demonstrates that social trust began 
to decline prior to the inception of the GSS in 1972 (2000, p. 142). However, a limitation of 
Putnam’s dataset is that the data are not parsed by race and/or ethnicity. As such, we cannot 
know how that decline affected White Americans in particular. Elucidation of these tends is 
thus important because it allows us to gauge how the socialized norms of Whites have 
changed over time. White Americans’ levels of generalised trust declined by 8 percentage 
points between 1972 and 2002. Trust continued to decline in the GSS waves between 2004 
and 2018, however the decline was less precipitous relative to that of the preceding three 
decades.  
 The dashed line in Figure 6.3 concerns Whites’ estimations of the fairness of others. 





estimations of the fairness of others among Whites remained high and relatively stable 
between the early Seventies and early Eighties. Beginning in the mid-Eighties, however, 
Whites’ estimations of fairness began to decline markedly. While a majority of Whites (57%) 
still believed that others were generally fair by the 2002 wave of the GSS, this nonetheless 
represented a decrease of 7 percentage points relative to the high watermark of 64% of 
Whites who thought the same in 1984. Notwithstanding similarities to trends with trust, the 
data in the post-2002 waves of the GSS indicate a small uptick in the percentage of Whites 
who believe that others are fair. Given the weakness of this increase relative to the steep 
decline observed between 1978 and 2002, however, positive estimations of the fairness of 
others among Whites are not rebounding noticeably.  
 
Figure 6.3: Trends in the Socialised Norms of White Americans, 1972-2018 
 
Notes: Sample limited to White Americans (1972-1998) and non-Hispanic Whites 2000-2018.  
 






Lastly, the dotted line Figure 6.3 concerns Whites’ estimations of the helpfulness of 
others. While there is some variation in Whites’ estimations of the helpfulness of others 
between survey waves, it is important to note that the 52 per cent of Whites who believed that 
others are generally altruistic in the 2018 GSS is actually 3 per cent higher than the 49 per 
cent of Whites who believed the same in 1972.  
In sum, and with the exception of Whites’ estimations of the helpfulness of others, the 
data presented thus far indicate an erosion of the robustness of the socialised norms of White 
Americans. Ever since Putnam’s landmark Bowling Alone (2000) was published, scholars of 
the social capital literature have developed hypotheses to explain the precipitous decline in 
social capital. Arguably the most significant development comes from Putnam himself. After 
Bowling Alone, Putnam found a significant relationship between crumbling levels of social 
capital and increasing levels of ethnic heterogeneity. Putnam (2007) reported that ethnic 
diversity – at least in the short to medium turn – reduces levels of social capital. In a large-n 
national survey, Putnam found that Americans,67 living in more ethnically heterogeneous 
communities68 tended to “hunker down”. Putnam (2007) describes hunkering down as a 
condition in individuals withdraw from public life who become less trusting of their 
neighbours. “Hunkered down” individuals, Putnam found, were less likely to carpool and 
considered television to be their most important form of entertainment (2007: 143). 
 This section has provided an overview of the trends in the decline of Whites’ levels of 
social capital from the early 1970s to 2018. The decline of social capital has important 
implications for the role of community in the lives of many White Americans. In a 
neighbourhood with less social capital, individuals are less likely to participate in community 
 
67 Although, not Whites specifically.  





and political organisations, have less social interaction, report lower levels of happiness and 
life satisfaction, and have lower levels of collective efficacy. The sum of such changes is that 
those living in communities with lower levels of social capital live more isolated lives than 
those in communities with higher levels of social capital. Putnam (2007) demonstrates that 
these conditions can be caused by increasing levels of ethnic heterogeneity in America at the 
community level. In the decade since Putnam’s (2007) landmark study, America has become 
even more ethnically and racially diverse. Quantifying the relationship between low levels of 
social capital and Whites’ contact with diversity is thus critically important if we are to 
understand how “hunkered down” Whites behaved electorally in 2016. The next section 
addresses this important lacuna.  
 
Testing the Link Between Diversity and Social Capital 
To examine the link between diversity and social capital, I again turn to the General 
Social Survey (GSS). If contact with diversity is indeed related to lower levels of social 
capital among White Americans, then we should observe a significant association between 
the two constructs across multiple years, and with the different measures of social capital. I 
begin by examining the strength of the association between the robustness of Whites’ 
socialised norms and neighbourhood heterogeneity. To assess the strength of this association, 
I pool the responses of White Americans to the items of interest in my analysis. These were 
the three items concerning Whites’ socialised norms (estimations of the trustworthiness, 
fairness, and helpfulness of others).69 My variable for measuring contact with diversity is a 
dichotomous variable where White respondents were asked if there were any members of the 
opposite race living in their neighbourhood (1 = “yes”; 0 = “no”). With these items, I 
 
69 Of course, robust socialised norms are not the only measures of social capital. However, these three 
items are among the few in the GSS for which there are comparable data over time and asked at 





conducted a series of Chi Square tests of association to see if low levels of social capital and 
neighbourhood heterogeneity were positively and significantly associated. These results are 
presented below in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6.1: Chi Square Tests of Association Between Social Capital Items and 
Neighbourhood Heterogeneity  




Can people be trusted 30,726 24.991 .029 *** 
People helpful or looking after 
themselves 
30,671 67.858 .047 *** 
People fair or try to take 
advantage 
30,593 99.805 .057 *** 
Notes: Data are pooled estimates of cross-sectional data (1972-2018). Sample limited to 
White Americans (1972-1998); non-Hispanic Whites 2000-2018. 
 
Source: GSS 1972-2018 Cross Cumulative Data (2019) 
 
As depicted in Table 6.1 , the tests indicated a significant association between the 
variable for neighbourhood heterogeneity and the three social capital items of distrust (𝑥2 (2) 
= 24.991, p <.001), lower estimations of the helpfulness of others (𝑥2 (2) = 67.858, p <.001), 
lower estimations of the fairness of others (𝑥2 (2) = 99.805, p <.001). A series of Fisher’s 
exact tests indicated modestly sized-yet-significant associations between the items for 
Whites’ socialised norms and neighbourhood heterogeneity (p <.001). These tests are 
consistent with Putnam’s (2007) “hunker down” thesis in that neighbourhood heterogeneity is 
positively and significantly associated with lower estimations of the trustworthiness, fairness, 
and helpfulness of others. Not only do these results conform to Putnam’s original hypothesis, 





diversity is increasingly eroding social trust in advanced Western democracies (Dinesen et al. 
2020; Stolle et al., 2008; Gundelach and Freitag 2014).  
 Estimations of trust might be among the most important measures of social capital, 
but they are not the only indices. Next, I turn to examine the link between diversity and 
Whites’ levels of institutionally oriented political participation. Perhaps the most important 
indicator of such participation in advanced Western democracies is voting in elections. 
Presidential elections are certainly the most visible and, arguably, the most important type of 
election in American democracy. In areas with greater ethnic heterogeneity, Putnam reported 
that respondents had a frequency of registering to vote less (2007: 149). To test this 
hypothesis further, I examine levels of participation in Presidential elections among Whites 
who live in multiracial neighbourhoods. I am particularly interested in the strength of this 
relationship over time – i.e. whether Whites’ levels of non-participation in elections have 
increased as neighbourhood heterogeneity has also increased. An advantage of the GSS 
cross-sectional file is that it contains items that ask whether respondents voted in every 
Presidential election since 1968, as well as measures of the racial composition of 
neighbourhoods. As such, I am able to plot the strength of the relationship between non-
participation and neighbourhood heterogeneity across elections.   
Figure 6.4 is a periodogram that depicts how the strength of the association between 
neighbourhood heterogeneity and non-participation in Presidential elections has changed over 
time. Of particular interest is the y-axis, which plots the level of the Phi coefficient (𝜑 ) 
representing the effect size of this association.70 As indicated by Figure 6.4, neighbourhood 
heterogeneity was negatively associated with non-participation in Presidential elections 
 
70 I report the mean square contingency coefficient (or Phi) because my measures are dichotomous. 
My measures of electoral participation concern whether respondents voted in a given election 
between 1968 and 2016 (1 = “did not vote”; 0 = “voted”). The neighbourhood heterogeneity item is 
the same as that in Table 6.1 (dichotomous variable for whether or not there were any members of the 





between 1968 and 1972, implying that neighborhood heterogeneity was actually correlated 
with greater participation. However, the strength of this association began to increase 
between the late 1970s and early 1980s, such that neighborhood heterogeneity became 
increasingly correlated with non-participation. The association weakened between the 1992 
and 2000 presidential election cycles but became stronger in the post-2000 election cycles.  
 























Notes: Sample limited to White Americans (1968-1998); non-Hispanic Whites 2000-2016. Data 
smoothed using locally estimated regression (LOESS)  
 
Data source: GSS 1968-2018 Cross Sectional Cumulative Data (2019) 
 
The overall trend of Figure 6.4 is such that the association between non-voting and 
neighbourhood heterogeneity has increased over time. This observation makes sense given 





immigration to the US. As a consequence of this increasing diversity, interaction with non-
Whites has become an important factor in the daily lives of many White Americans.  
The evidence presented thus far concerning decreases in social trust and estimations 
of fairness - as well as the links between diversity and Whites’ socialized norms and their 
non-participation in presidential elections - suggest that Whites who live in multiracial 
neighbourhoods may be “hunkering down”. However, while some Whites respond to 
diversity by “hunkering down”, there is also a significant body of literature which shows that 
Whites have increasingly reacted to this growing diversity by moving away from more 
diverse locales to more racially homogenous areas (Rossell 1975; Boustan 2010). In the next 
section, therefore, I assess whether neighbourhood heterogeneity is also positively and 
significantly associated with White geographic mobility.  
 
White Flight as a Response to Increasing Diversity 
The exodus of Whites from increasingly diverse areas is known as “White flight” 
(Kruse 2013). It is the process by which White Americans move from racially heterogenous 
urban and suburban areas to exurban and rural areas. The key phenomenon underpinning 
White flight is what sociologists call the “tipping point”. In the context of White flight, the 
“tipping point” occurs when ‘the proportion of non-whites exceeds the limits of the 
neighborhood’s [sic] tolerance for interracial living’ (Grodzins 1958: 6). This “tipping point” 
began in the Civil Rights era when Midwestern cities such as Cleveland, OH, and Detroit, MI 
experienced a marked decline in their respective White populations (Grodzins 1958). The 
literature shows that White flight was driven, among other things,71  by attempts to achieve 
 
71 Scholars have equally questioned this account, noting that many Whites responded to integration by 
means of violence, intimidation, and legal tactics (Seligman 2005). Elsewhere, others argue that 
White flight occurred due to demographic pressures. Boustan (2007) argues that White flight occurred 





integration by means of forced bussing, which had the effect of driving some White families 
from urban areas during the Seventies (Frey 1979; Clark 1987; Araújo 2016). 
To begin to explore the second research question posed in this chapter – namely, are 
Whites more proactive in their response to America’s increasing diversity than Putnam’s 
(2007) thesis might seem to indicate - the thesis now turns to test the hypothesis that Whites 
have moved from diverse areas because of their opposition to living in diverse 
neighbourhoods. The contemporary White flight literature tends to look at the phenomena of 
White flight at the spatial level using Census data (Pais et al. 2009; Kye 2018). Such analyses 
are adept at observing the phenomena of White flight as a function of neighbourhood 
heterogeneity. However, an important limitation of the Census data is that we are unable to 
gauge whether White geographic mobility operates as a function of Whites’ opposition to 
living in a diverse neighbourhood.72 To address this important lacuna, I turn to the GSS. For 
my dependent variable, the GSS contains an item asking respondents whether they have lived 
in the same place since they were 16.73 My key explanatory variables include the item 
concerning whether a respondent lives in a heterogeneous neighbourhood, and a measure 
which asks respondents whether they favour/oppose living in a neighbourhood which is half 
African American.  
In order to determine if White geographic mobility is indeed related to opposition to 
neighbourhood heterogeneity, de minims, I account for several potentially competing factors 
in my mobility model.74 Mobility behaviour is often dependent on economic and employment 
 
South to the Midwest. In addition, the influx of post-1965 immigrants who came to America during 
the Fourth Wave of migration also contributed to these demographic changes (Frey & Liaw, 1998).  
72 Even in studies where individual level data are used, the important relationship between opposition 
to living in a diverse neighbourhood (vis-a-vis the racial composition of respondent neighbourhoods 
themselves) and geographic mobility is not explored (Crowder, 2000; Crowder & South, 2008).  
73 The three categories are: 1 = “same city”; 2 = “different city, same state”; 3 = “different state”.  
74 While it is hypothesized that party ID might also affect mobility behaviour, I do not control for 





factors (Saben 1964; Ladinsky 1967; Schlottmann and Herzog 1981). Accordingly, I include 
controls for respondents’ subjective evaluations of changes to their personal finances, labour-
force status (participant or non-participant), and occupational prestige. In addition to these 
economic/labour force characteristics, I also control for demographic characteristics known 
to influence geographic mobility. These include gender (Shauman and Xie 1996), age (De 
Jong et al. 1995), subjective evaluations of health (Longino et al. 1991; Curtis et al. 2009), 
marital status (Davanzo 1976), education (Rosenfeld and Jones 1987), homeownership, and 
income. Lastly, I include a measure concerning respondents’ subjective evaluations of 
neighbourhood safety. 
 GSS data for the years 1972 to 2018, Table 6.2 provides the results of a multinomial 
probit (MNP) model where the categories of White geographic mobility are regressed against 
the two items concerning neighbourhood heterogeneity and the controls just described. 
Among Whites who reported moving to a different city but residing in the same state, 
neighbourhood heterogeneity is positively related to White geographic mobility, however the 
effect is not statistically significant (p = .115). Whites’ opposition to living in a 
heterogeneous neighbourhood is, likewise, weakly correlated with mobility behaviour, and 
the effect does not begin to approach accepted levels of significance. However, this pattern of 
insignificance begins to change when it comes to Whites who have moved states. Among 
Whites who reported moving states in the GSS, neighbourhood heterogeneity is strongly and 
significantly associated with geographic mobility (𝛽 = .395, p <.001). The effect for 
opposition to living in a diverse neighbourhood is also marginally stronger among Whites 
who have moved states than it is for Whites who have not moved states. However, the effect 







Table 6.2 Determinants of White Geographic Mobility, 1972-2018 
























































































Notes: Table entries are coefficients. Robust standard errors given in parenthesis. Dependent 
variable is respondent geographic mobility since age 16 (reference category = 1 “same 
city”). Estimates are from a pooled cross-sectional sample of White Americans (1972-1998) 
and non-Hispanic White Americans (2000-2018). Model controls region and year FEs. Data 
are weighted. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001 
 
Source: GSS 1972-2018 Cross Sectional Cumulative Data (2019) 
 
 While Table 6.2 indicates a positive relationship between living in a heterogeneous 
neighborhood and moving to a different state (p <.001), we must interpret the results of the 
mobility model with a great deal of care. This is because of the insignificant effect of 





but within the same state. Since the relationship between neighborhood heterogeneity and 
White geographic mobility differs for inter-city and inter-state migration, we cannot read the 
results of the model as conclusive proof of White flight. Indeed, if neighborhood 
heterogeneity is conducive of White flight, then we would have expected the neighborhood 
heterogeneity item to be a significant predictor of multiple types of mobility. Furthermore, 
given what we know about patterns of White migration,75 it is difficult to quantify why 
neighborhood heterogeneity would impact interstate migration but not other types of mobility 
– for instance intercity migration. However, these results are consistent with geographic 
mobility scholarship which finds that race is somewhat predictive of patterns of interstate 
migration but not local migration patterns (Frey and Liaw 1998). In sum, though some 
significance is observed through the neighborhood heterogeneity item on the dependent 
measure is observed, this cannot be taken as conclusive proof that diversity causes White 
flight.    
Given this mixed set of results from Table 6.2, I assess whether neighbourhood 
heterogeneity is indeed an important moderator of Whites’ opposition to living in a diverse 
neighbourhood. Specifically, I assess whether mobility behaviour is more strongly associated 
with opposition to living in a diverse neighbourhood among Whites who actually live in more 
racially heterogeneous neighbourhoods. To determine if this relationship can be observed, I 
again turn to the GSS. I want to know if the effect of opposition to living in a diverse 
neighbourhood on mobility behaviour is more powerful among Whites who live in a 
heterogeneous community. I would expect the effect of neighbourhood heterogeneity on 
mobility behaviour to become more salient as the levels of opposition to living in a diverse 
neighbourhood increase. To test this further, I re-estimate the MNL model, but add an 
 
75 For instance, Kruse (2013) demonstrates that Whites moved from metropolitan Atlanta to 





interaction term between the two items concerning neighbourhood heterogeneity. After re-
estimating the model, I then used postestimation to assess the nature of the interaction 
between neighbourhood heterogeneity and Whites’ opposition to living in a diverse 
neighbourhood. The results of the postestimation are presented in Figure 6.5.  
 
Figure 6.5: The Marginal Effect of Neighbourhood Heterogeneity on the Probability of 












Notes: Estimates of marginal effects based on results of the multinomial probit model in Table 
6.2. Interaction term added between the neighbourhood heterogeneity item and the item 
concerning Whites’ opposition to living in a diverse neighbourhood. All covariates in MLT model 
set to their respective means. Estimates are from a pooled cross-sectional sample of White 
Americans (1972-1998) and non-Hispanic White Americans (2000-2018). Data are weighted. 
 
Source: GSS 1972-2018 Cross Sectional Cumulative Data (2019) 
 
Figure 6.5 graphs the marginal effects of neighbourhood heterogeneity on the 
probability that a White American will be geographically mobile by each category of opinion 





indeed reveals an important interactive relationship between the key variables. The 
interaction is such that, as opposition to neighbourhood heterogeneity increases, 
neighbourhood heterogeneity is associated with a greater probability that a White will be 
more geographically mobile. Importantly, this relationship is strongest among Whites who 
have moved the farthest geographically, with the marginal effect being the largest for Whites 
who have moved to a different state.  
In this section, I have attempted to show that Whites are exiting increasingly diverse 
locales because of their opposition to living in multiracial neighbourhoods. While I found 
evidence that neighborhood heterogeneity impacts interstate migration among Whites, it is 
important to qualify that I found limited evidence that neighborhood heterogeneity impacts 
inter-city migration within the same state. Given this mixed pattern of results, it cannot be 
definitively proven that neighborhood heterogeneity impacts all types of White geographic 
mobility. What then, are the implications of moving away from racially heterogeneous 
communities for Whites’ levels of social capital? This is an important consideration because 
racially and ethnically homogenous communities consistently experience better outcomes for 
various measures of community life (Costa & Kahn, 2003). Importantly, among these 
outcomes are higher rates of civic engagement and participation. In the next section, 
therefore, I explore how community homogeneity fosters better social capital outcomes for 
White Americans whose households are geographically distant from more diverse locales.  
 
Social Capital and Community Homogeneity 
In the last section, I found some evidence that neighbourhood heterogeneity and 
Whites’ opposition to living in diverse neighbourhoods is associated with an increased 
probability that Whites will be geographically mobile. Though, it is important to qualify that 





consequence of White flight, Whites are moving to predominately exurban and rural areas; 
what characterises these areas is that they are overwhelmingly White. I have also shown how 
community heterogeneity fosters lower levels of social capital and leads Whites to “hunker 
down”, as Putnam (2007) puts it. In this section, I am interested in testing the reverse of 
Putnam’s (2007) thesis as it applies to Whites living in overwhelmingly White communities. 
That is, I am interested in whether community homogeneity fosters greater levels of social 
capital and, by extension, greater participation. If Whites in increasingly diverse locales 
hunker down and report lower levels of social capital, I expect the inverse to be the case for 
Whites who live in more homogenous neighbourhoods.  
To test my hypothesis, I turn to the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a 
monthly survey of around 60,000 US households compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). While primarily a survey to gauge trends in employment, the CPS often includes 
supplemental topics. Importantly, several of these CPS Supplements measure dimensions of 
social capital, including volunteerism, civic engagement, and rates of voting. I selected a 
subsample of non-Hispanic White Americans over the age of 18 for my analysis. To measure 
volunteerism in homogenous communities, I turn to the 2015 Volunteer Supplement. To 
measure civic engagement, I turn to the 2017 Civic Engagement Supplement. And to measure 
rates of voting, I turn to the 2016 Voter Supplement. All surveys contained common 
sociodemographic variables which I included in the construction of my dataset via the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).  
 I draw my key dependent variables from these respective CPS Supplements. My key 
explanatory variable is a measure of household proximity to a metropolitan area, which I use 
as a proximate variable to measure community homogeneity. Metropolitan status is a robust 
proximate measure of community homogeneity. The 2012-2016 ACS estimates show that 





urban areas reported as non-Hispanic White (Pew Research Center, 2018). Conversely, non-
metropolitan areas are overwhelmingly White (Frey, 2017).  
With these variables, I estimated a series of probit models controlling for 
sociodemographic and regional characteristics. After running the regressions, I then used 
postestimation to estimate the probability that Whites will have the propensity to volunteer/be 
civically engaged by the proximity of their household to a metropolitan area. I graph the 
marginal effects of household proximity to a metropolitan area on the probability that Whites 
will volunteer/be civically engaged/vote in Figures 6.6-8. Before I unpack the results, it is 
important to note that I have coded the variable for metropolitan status so that a higher value 
equates to a household being closer to proximity to a metro area. If community homogeneity 
fosters greater social capital, therefore, I would expect that the probability that a White will 
volunteer/be civically engaged/will vote to be the highest among Whites who live in non-
metro areas, since these areas are more racially homogenous.76 And the trend of the marginal 
effect will be such that the probability of volunteering/being civically engaged/voting will 
decrease as metro area proximity increases. 
In Figure 6.6, I graph the marginal effects of household proximity to a metropolitan 
area on the probability that Whites will volunteer. As the top left panel in Figure 6.6 
indicates, the probability that White living in a non-Metropolitan area will volunteer is 
around two points greater than that of a White living in a Metropolitan core. The effect of 
household proximity to a metro area is even stronger when it comes to Whites’ attendance at 
public meetings. The predicted probability that a White American who lives in a non-metro 
area will attend a public meeting is 23 points higher than that of a White who lives in a 
 
76 Metropolitan status is a robust proximate measure of community homogeneity. The 2012-2016 ACS 
estimates indicate that urban areas are becoming increasingly diverse, with only 44 per cent of the 
population of urban areas reported as non-Hispanic White (Pew Research Center, 2018). Conversely, 





central city. This trend persists for neighbourhood volunteerism, too. As indicated by the 
bottom left panel in Figure 6.6, the probability of a White living in a non-metropolitan area 
working with people in their neighbourhood is 16 points higher than that of a White living in 
a metropolitan core. Lastly, the bottom right panel concerns the propensity of Whites to 
donate to charity. The results show that the predicted probability of a White donating to 
charity is higher among those who actually live in closer proximity to metro areas. The 
probability that a White who lives in a central city will donate to charity is 3 points higher 
than that for a White American who lives outside of a metro area.  This finding is important 
because it lends weight to the hypothesis that Whites who live in more racially homogenous 
communities will exhibit higher levels of social capital across a variety of measures.  
The results for Whites’ levels of civic engagement are presented in Figure 6.7. The 
top panel in Figure 6.7 concerns whether White Americans boycotted a company or product 
based on their political or social values. Whites who live in non-metro areas have a .86 
predicted probability of boycotting based on their personal values. The marginal effect of 
metro area proximity on the probability of boycotting a company or product is 4 points lower 
for those Whites who live in central cities. As indicated by the bottom panel in Figure 6.7, 
Whites who live in non-metropolitan areas also have a .86 predicted probability of contacting 
a public official. And moving from being least proximate to a metro area to most proximate is 
associated with a 4-point decrease in the propensity of contacting a public official.  
Finally, the results for the relationship between household proximity to a metro area 
and Whites’ propensity to be electorally engaged are presented in Figure 6.8. The top panel 
in Figure 6.8 concerns whether Whites over the age of 18 were registered to vote in the 2016 
election. Whites who live outside of metro areas had a .81 predicted probability of being 
registered to vote in 2016 and moving from least proximate to most proximate to a 





registered voter. This trend continues when it comes to the probability of a White American 
having voted in the 2016 election, too. The bottom panel in Figure 6.8 shows that Whites 
who live outside of metropolitan areas had a .68 probability of having voted in 2016. The 
probability of having voted in 2016 decreases as the households of Whites respondents in the 
CPS become more proximate to a metropolitan area. The marginal effect is such that a White 
living in a metropolitan area is four points less likely to have voted in 2016 than a White 
living in a non-metro area.  
 Overall, these sets of results paint a portrait of impressive consistency. When it comes 
to volunteerism, Whites who live in non-metropolitan areas have a higher probability of 
volunteering, attending public meetings, and working with people in their own 
neighbourhoods. The same goes for levels of civic engagement among Whites who in live in 
non-metropolitan areas. Whites who live in these areas have a higher probability of 
boycotting a company or product based on their own social or political values and are also 
more likely to contact a public official. Whites who live in non-metropolitan areas also have 
a higher probability of being registered to vote in the most recent Presidential election and 
having actually voted in 2016. An analysis of the Census data thus points to higher levels of 
social capital (in respect to volunteerism, civic engagement, and voting) for Whites who live 



















Source:  2015 CPS Volunteer Supplement/IPUMS University of Minnesota (2020)
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Notes: All probit models control for region, gender, age, marital status, number of 
own children in household, homeownership status, education, income, and labour 
force status. All covariates are set to their respective means. Sample limited to non-
Hispanic White Americans aged 18 or over. Data are weighted. Vertical lines 
represent 95 per cent confidence intervals.  
 
Source: 2016 CPS Voter Supplement/IPUMS University of Minnesota  
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The only measure to buck the trend was for levels of charitable giving. Some studies 
have shown that intergroup contact fosters lower levels of charitable giving (Amankwaa & 
Delvin, 2017). Parsing into levels of charitable giving by race, however it seems that the 
effect of ethnic diversity decreasing philanthropic behaviours is driven by low levels of 
charitable giving by minority groups themselves (Andreoni et al., 2016). This observation 
might explain why levels of charitable giving are lower overall in metro areas. For further 
research on levels of giving by race see (Mesch et al., 2006). 
These results are important as they begin to clarify how contact with diversity feeds 
into Whites’ levels of civic engagement/participation and their electoral behaviour. 
Consistent with Putnam’s (2007) “hunker down” thesis, contact with diversity leads Whites 
to become less civically engaged.77 While Putnam’s theory applies to Whites who live in 
more diverse geographic locales, however, the phenomenon of White flight means that many 
Whites have exited diversity locally to live in more homogenous (i.e. overwhelmingly White 
communities). For this particular group of Whites, then, it is not the case that contact with 
diversity negatively affects their levels of civic engagement. Whites in more homogenous 
neighbourhoods will have less contact with diversity simply because the fact that they are 
living in a community which is 90 per cent non-Hispanic White.78 The literature consistently 
shows that community homogeneity fosters greater levels of social capital (Fieldhouse & 
Cutts, 2010), and my analysis of the data here reflect this. As such, Trump’s victory in 2016 
 
77 Nonetheless, there are competing explanations beyond diversity that might lead Whites in metro 
areas to become less civically engaged. When it comes to voting, for example, one reason that White 
turnout might be lower in metro areas is that Republican partisans feel as though their vote counts less 
in more diverse areas.  
78 Despite high rates of racial homogeneity in rural areas, it is important to note that rural America is 
also becoming more ethnoracially diverse, and that this diversity is largely driven by influxes of 
Hispanic immigrants (Lichter 2012). This observation is important because recent work suggests that 
predominately White areas which experienced large increases in Hispanic immigration were more 
likely to exhibit anti-immigrant attitudes (Newman 2013). This work is also consistent with studies of 
the “halo effect” on populist voting, which suggests that proximity to diversity in exurban areas may 
also predict voting for populist parties (Rydgren and Ruth 2013; Newman et al. 2018).  
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cannot be understood by Whites’ contact with diversity. As such, if diversity does matter in 
the context of understanding Trump’s victory in 2016, then for Whites in overwhelmingly 
White communities, perhaps it has more to do with their perceptions of diversity vis-a-vis 
contact with diversity as a consequence of living in a multi-ethnic neighbourhood. 
In the next section, therefore, I examine how perceptions of diversity affects Whites’ 
political behaviour. Many Whites increasingly see diversity as a threat to their group status 
(Major et al., 2018; Mutz, 2018). Scholars such as Mutz (2018) have tended to focus on the 
nature of group threat in the context of the perceived threat that racial and ethnic minorities 
and forces such as globalisation pose to Whites’ dominant group status. Here, however, I am 
specifically interested in the relationship between the threat posed by demographic change, 
most notably the impending realisation that Whites will no longer constitute a majority of the 
US population by 2042.  
To test this relationship, I first probe the sources of majority-minority threat. 
Consistent with the literature (Craig & Richeson, 2014), I hypothesise that exposure to 
information from news sources that have a proclivity to promote conspiracies concerning the 
impact of demographic change on Whites’ majority status has led to the radicalisation of 
Whites’ perspectives concerning diversity. Next, I hypothesise that these attitudes also feed 
into Whites’ political behaviour. Specifically, I expect that Whites will be distrustful of 
politicians for their failure to reduce immigration coming from non-White countries. In turn, 
this will foster lower levels of efficacy in mainstream politics. Consequently, Whites will 
increasingly turn away from mainstream politics and support radical movements and actors 
whose culturally conservative platforms appeal to Whites who are most threatened by the 
prospect of demographic change. Lastly, I test the relationship between majority-minority 
threat and vote choice for Trump. I expect that Whites with salient levels of majority-
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minority threat will have a high probability of voting for Trump, and that the construct will 
be independent of other predictors such as conservative ideology.  
 
The Radicalisation of Whites’ Perspectives 
In this section I analyse the sources of group status threat. I hypothesise that exposure 
to information regarding demographic change from certain sources of news has led to the 
radicalisation of Whites’ perspectives. To assess this hypothesis, I assess the relationship 
between news consumption and majority-minority threat. Specifically, I am interested in 
whether the relationship between news consumption and majority-minority threat is strongest 
among Whites whose principal information sources have a proclivity for promoting 
conspiracies, or endorsing narratives centred around the impact of majority-minority 
demographic change.  
Media sources in advanced industrial societies are adept at portraying putative 
outsiders and minorities as a homogenous collective who are perceived as threatening to the 
interests of the nation (Innes 2010; Esses et al., 2013; Lawlor and Tolley, 2017). These media 
narratives feed into the attitudes of viewers across a variety of contexts, affecting levels of 
sympathy towards minority groups (Sowards and Pineda 2013), and driving anti-immigration 
attitudes (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007; Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes, 2014; Kosho, 
2016). Similar to the ways in which these narratives influence dominant majority attitudes 
towards minorities, I also seek to explore the link between exposure to information and the 
radicalisation of Whites’ perspectives concerning the impact of demographic change. More 
specifically, I hypothesize that the strength of the relationship between news consumption 
and majority-minority threat79 will be stronger among Whites whose primary source of news 
 
79 The majority‐minority threat index combined four items in which respondents were presented with 
information concerning future demographic change. Possible responses ranged from 1 = “strongly 
agree” to 4 = “strongly disagree.” After being presented with this information, respondents were then 
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is from television networks such as Fox. Conversely, I hypothesise the inverse to be true for 
Whites whose primary source of news is from networks such as CNN.8081  
To test this hypothesis, I draw on a series of items from the 2016 Voter Survey in 
which respondents were asked which news network was their primary source of information 
across a range of different news/talk show formats. With these items, I then estimated a series 
of multiple regression models with majority-minority change as the dependent variable. 
Because the sources of news which Americans consume have become increasingly correlated 
with their ideological leanings over time (Iyengar and Hahn 2009), I also control for the 
effect of respondents’ partisanship and ideology in regression. Figure 6.9 graphs the 
predicted margins of the interaction between Whites’ contrasting sources of news against the 
strength of the linear prediction for majority-minority ethnic threat. If my hypothesis holds 
true, then we would expect to see higher predictive margins for Whites who reported that Fox 
was their primary source of news information vis-a-vis CNN.   
Figure 6.9 indicates that the strongest relationships between news consumption and 
majority-minority ethnic threat are among Whites who watch the daily talk shows on Fox. 
The relationship between Whites’ consumption of daily talk shows and the threat of majority-
minority demographic change is stronger among White respondents who specifically reported 
watching Hannity on Fox rather than Anderson Cooper on CNN. The threat of demographic 
 
asked whether they agreed with a series of statements concerning the consequences of greater 
ethnoracial diversity. The first statement was “Americans will learn more from one another and be 
enriched by exposure to many different cultures.” The second statement was “a bigger, more diverse 
workforce will lead to more economic growth.” The third statement was “there will be too many 
demands on public services” (reverse coded). And the fourth statement was “there will not be enough 
jobs for everybody” (reverse coded). The index ranges from 4 to 16 with a Cronbach's α = .78.  
80 Such that the relationship between news consumption and majority-minority threat is weaker.  
81 I chose CNN and Fox as the principal television networks in my models because of the contrasting 
ways in which these networks disseminate and convey information about demographic change. Of 
course, the manner in which these outlets frame information about such changes are largely 
congruous with the broader ideological composition of their respective audiences. On the one hand, 
CNN’s audience is consistently more liberal. Conversely, the audience of Fox is largely conservative 
(Pew Research Center, 2013).  
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change is strongly associated with Whites’ exclusive consumption of Hannity in the daily talk 
show slot. Conversely, Whites who watch Anderson Cooper on CNN have a somewhat looser 
relationship with majority-minority threat than a White Hannity viewer.  
The significant relationship between Whites’ exposure to daily talk shows on Fox and 
the perception of threat caused by demographic change is especially important.82 Networks 
such as Fox are increasingly described as aligned to the concept and narrative of conspiracy 
theories concerning the threat that demographic change poses to America’s decreasing White 
majority (Hagle 2019). Examples include the White genocide conspiracy theory and the 
“Great Replacement” conspiracy theory. In recent years, Fox News commentators have 
increased the prominence of these conspiracy theories in mainstream political discourse by 
highlighting the threat that demographic change poses to White Americans. Commentators 
have noted that the promotion of such conspiracies are especially prevalent among the 
network’s primetime commentators. Key promoters of the White genocide and “Great 
Replacement” conspiracy theories with primetime evening slots include Tucker Carlson,83 
Laura Ingraham,84 and Jeanine Pirro85. The fact that majority-minority threat was most 
significantly associated with Whites’ exposure to information disseminated in the daily talk 
show slots of the network’s schedule thus makes sense in this context.   
 
 
82 For further robustness, these findings are also confirmed by a series of two-way ANOVAs that I 
conducted to compare whether the mean levels of majority-minority threat were significantly different 
depending on Whites’ sources of news consumption. The results of these two-way ANOVAs are 
presented in Appendix A. 
83 Commentators note that Carlson, who has called White supremacy a “hoax” among other things 
(Rueb & Taylor, 2019), has made “Great Replacement” theory a ‘nightly fixture’ on his primetime 
evening show (Rousseau, 2019).  
84 Likewise, Adam Serwer (2019) of The Atlantic notes that Laura Ingraham’s remarks about 
‘massive demographic change’ caused by an influx of illegal immigrants are reflective of historical 
patterns of American nativism grounded in White nationalist conspiracy theories.  
85 Elsewhere, Jeanine Pirro commented that the plot of those who hated President Trump and his 
voters was to ‘remake America’ by ‘bring[ing] in the illegals’. Echoing the underlying contention of 
“Great Replacement” theory, Pirro noted this was a plot to ‘replace American citizens with illegals 
who will vote for Democrats’ (Neese 2019).  
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Figure 6.9: The Relationship Between Majority-Minority Threat and Whites’ Sources 
of News  
 
 
Notes: All models specified with a two-way interaction term between the CNN/Fox variables. 
Dependent variable is level of majority-minority threat. All covariates in models are set to their 
respective mean values. Data are weighted. Sample limited to non-Hispanic White Americans. 
Vertical lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
 
Source: 2016 Voter Study 
 
I have shown so far that the radicalisation of Whites’ perspectives can be explained 
by exposure to news sources such as Fox, which increasingly promote conspiracy theories 
related to the impact of majority-minority ethnoracial change on the dominant-status of 
Whites. Importantly, the radicalisation of perspectives concerning demographic change also 
modifies the political behaviour of White Americans. For instance, exposure to information 
about majority-minority change has been shown to result in the radicalisation of White racial 
attitudes (Craig & Richeson, 2014a). Exposure to information concerning the threat of 
demographic change to dominant-majority status also leads Whites to endorse more 
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conservative policy positions, (Craig & Richeson, 2014b) and support socially conservative 
political movements such as the Tea Party (Willer et al., 2016). 
In the era of whiteshift (Kaufman, 2018), demographic change is increasingly 
functioning as a lightning-rod that attracts disillusioned majorities to radical right populist 
actors. In the next section, I assess whether the threat of impending majority-minority 
demographic change leads to an increase in levels of support for Trump among White 
Americans 
 
Immigration Views, Trust, and Support for the US Radical Right 
The last section analysed the sources of group threat. I found that Whites’ exposure to 
information concerning the impact of majority-minority demographic change from sources of 
news such as Fox is closely related to salient levels of majority minority threat. However, 
resonance between what Whites hear on TV regarding the perceived threat of diversity to 
their majority status and the rhetoric of Trump during the 2016 campaign is only one factor. 
Another important factor is the relationship between the immigration views of White voters 
and the increasing distrust so many have with their elected representatives. When voters in 
liberal Western democracies feel as though their representatives no longer speak for them on 
issues such as immigration, they abandon mainstream politics in favour of political offers 
from actors/parties of a more radical bent (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).   
In this section, I analyse the relationship between immigration views, trust in 
politicians, and support for radical right movements and actors. I am interested in whether 
Whites who had become distrustful of mainstream politicians for their failure to reduce 
immigration turned to Trump. To assess these contentions, I first assess whether immigration 
preferences and trust are linearly related. Next, I track levels of political interest among 
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White Americans with a preference for immigration reduction. Lastly, I use data from the 
2016 ANES to see how receptivity to authoritarianism, low levels of political efficacy, and  
anti-politician sentiment all feed into Whites’ levels anti-immigrant sentiment. I argue that 
the interaction between these factors provided fertile ground for a radical actor such as 
Trump to become the receptacle for the votes of Whites who had hostile views of 
immigrants.  
The first step was to assess whether hostile immigration views are related to low 
levels of trust in government. The literature on the relationship between immigration and 
trust has tended to focus on trust in the social capital context. Such analyses are primarily 
concerned with the relationship between immigration views and lower levels of generalised 
trust. These studies gauge levels of generalised trust using items related to socialised norms 
that are similar to those found in seminal sociological surveys such as the GSS (Kesler & 
Bloemraad, 2010). Here, however, I am interested in the ways in which the perceived failure 
of mainstream politicians to halt immigration feeds into levels of political trust among voters.  
While there is some literature on the relationship between immigration views and trust in 
politicians in a number of advanced Western democracies (McLaren, 2012; Chang & Kang, 
2018), I am not aware of any significant studies concerning the US. Therefore, not only is 
further testing this hypothesis important to addressing the second research question posed in 
the current chapter, but the findings also provide a novel contribution to the existing literature 
on trust and immigration in US politics.  
Therefore, to assess the strength of the relationship between hostile views on 
immigration and distrust of government among White Americans, I estimated a multiple 
regression model. I draw on items from the 2016 ANES for my analysis. My dependent 
variable was respondents’ proclivity to trust those in Washington to do what is right. My key 
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explanatory variable is a composite measure of anti-immigrant sentiment.86 The results of the 
multiple regression model are presented in Table 6.3. 
 






















































Notes: Table entries are standardized OLS coefficients. Standard errors 
given in parentheses. Dependent variable is level of trust in those in 
Washington to do what is right. Cases are weighted using ANES post-
election weight (full sample). Sample limited to non-Hispanic Whites.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
 
 
86 I include controls for economic evaluations, social capital (interpersonal trust and participation in 
voluntary organisations), and sociodemographic indicators. For additional robustness, I also control 
for liberal-conservative ideological self-placement and party ID (ranging from strong Democrat to 
strong Republican), as an individual’s ideological/partisan leanings are likely to be connected to 
attitudes towards immigration, with Whites who identify as Republican/conservative being most 
hostile towards immigrants (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014). 
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Table 6.3 shows that, even after controlling for predictors known to be related to 
political trust, including assessments of national economic trends, levels of social capital, and 
partisanship/ideology, anti-immigrant views are positively and significantly related to distrust 
of those in Washington, 𝛽 = .021, p <.01. Thus, the results indicate that Whites immigration 
views are indeed affecting perceptions of those in Washington.  
Having established that there is a significant correlation between immigration views 
and distrust of government, the next step was to assess how this distrust feeds into Whites’ 
engagement with politics. The literature has long shown that higher levels of distrust in 
government are also associated with lower levels of political interest (Watts, 1973; Craig, 
1979). Consistent with the “voice route” hypothesis (Kaufmann & Goodwin, 2018), however, 
Whites who are highly polarized by their views on immigration might be the exception to this 
rule. That is, Whites with salient levels of anti-immigrant sentiment might have low levels of 
political efficacy when it comes to mainstream politics. However, Whites’ levels of political 
interest will nonetheless remain high as it is the case that they are abandoning the main 
political parties in favour of radical movements who promise to restrict immigration. To 
analyse levels of political interest among White Americans with a preference for immigration 
reduction, I graph the percentage of Whites who reported being “very interested” in national 
elections by election year in Figure 6.10 below. I limit my sample to Whites who wanted 
immigration decreasing “a little” or “lot” across each wave of the ANES.  
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Notes: Sample limited to non-Hispanic White Americans who want levels of immigration to be 
decreased either “a little” or “a lot”. N = 6320. Data smoothed using locally estimated 
regression (LOESS).  
 
 
Source: ANES Cumulative Datafile  
 
Figure 6.10 shows that levels of political interest among Whites with a preference for 
immigration reduction were 38 per cent in 1992. 1992 was a notable election because of the 
candidacy of Ross Perot. Perot stood on a platform of protecting American workers from 
unfair foreign competition. Synthesising anti-immigration policy with a protectionist message 
on trade, Perot (1993) warned that trade deals such as NAFTA would result in an increase of 
illegal immigration from Mexico, flooding the US labour market with cheap foreign workers 
(p. 72). After Perot’s significant third-party challenge in 1992, political interest plummeted in 
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1996.87 This low figure of 25 per cent in 1996 was followed by a gradual increase in levels of 
political interest in every subsequent election cycle.  
It is important to place the figures concerning the electoral cycles between 2000 and 
2016 within the context of Congressional immigration policy during the 2000s and early 
2010s. The rise in political interest among Whites with a preference for immigration 
reduction has coincided with attempts by the federal government to pass a series of 
amnesties. Attempts to pass the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act88 in the 110th 
Congress (2006-2007) were met with a sharp backlash. Indeed, the offices of Representatives 
and Senators were inundated with so many calls against the law that the Congressional 
switchboard was shut down for a time (Tichenor, 2016, p. 261).  
There was a further significant attempt to pass amnesty via the Border Security, 
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013. The views of Whites 
on the proposed 2013 immigration reform bill are well documented. For instance, a 2013 Pew 
Research survey showed that Whites were broadly supportive of allowing illegal immigrants 
to stay in the US, with 67 per cent of non-Hispanic Whites in favour of granting legal status 
to illegal aliens (Pew Research Center, 2013). Though, this figure was markedly less for non-
White racial groups. Here, 82 per cent of African Americans and 80 per cent of Hispanics 
supported allowing illegal immigrants to remain in the US.  
 The results of Figure 6.10 are consistent with Kaufman and Goodwin’s (2018) “voice 
route” hypothesis in that levels of political interest among Whites with a preference for 
immigration reduction are not decreasing. Far from becoming disinterested in politics, it is 
rather the case that Whites are increasingly turning away from mainstream politicians and 
 
87 Perot ran again in the 1996 Presidential Election, but interest in his candidacy among the media and 
the general public failed to reach levels of his 1992 run for President. This was reflected both in pre-
election polling and in his lower vote share in 1996 relative to 1992.  
88 If passed, the Act would have provided a pathway to citizenship for some 12 million illegal 
immigrants.  
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political parties to support radical political movements who better-speak to their views on 
immigration. Indeed, Americans’ dismay at Congress’s attempts to pass amnesty are reflected 
in increased levels of participation in movements that aim to restrict immigration (Ball 2013). 
For example, Numbers USA spearheaded the populist revolt against the 2007 amnesty. The 
grassroots conservative movement had less than 50,000 members in 2004. By July 2007, at 
the peak of the lobbying effort against the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, this 
number had swelled to 450,000 (Pear, 2007). Increased participation in such movements were 
thus early signs during the 2000s that a certain cohort of Americans were beginning to 
abandon mainstream politics in support of more radical alternatives.  
Perhaps the most significant conservative movement to arise during the backlash to 
immigration reform in the early 2010s was the Tea Party movement. While the Tea Party has 
been framed as a fiscally conservative movement that calls for lower taxes and a reduction of 
the US national debt, scholars have noted that the Tea Party is also a culturally conservative 
movement whose members are mobilised by out-group anxiety and nativism (Barreto et al., 
2011; Tope et al. 2015). Demographically, the Tea Party is an overwhelmingly White 
movement whose supporters are less educated than those who are non-supporters 
(Williamson et al., 2011; Arceneaux & Nicholson 2012; Abramowitz 2013).89  
By 2016, it was clear that Trump had become the repository for the votes of Whites 
with a preference for immigration reduction. I do not seek to make restatements of this point, 
since the relationship between hostile immigration views and support for Trump is already 
well documented in the literature (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Rather, the argument I make for 
my analysis here - and one that, importantly, has not been unpacked - is that Whites 
 
89 I highlight these demographic indicators because, tellingly, non-college educated Whites (Trump’s 
core base of support) were also among the least supportive of providing a pathway to legal residence 
for illegal aliens in the 2013 Pew Survey. Indeed, only 61 per cent of this demographic believed that 
illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay legally in the US (Pew Research Center, 2013).  
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dismayed by their elected representatives for their failure to reduce immigration were drawn 
to Trump. This is because they saw him as a strong leader who was willing to circumvent 
Congress in order to implement a restrictionist immigration agenda. While authoritarianism 
has been correlated with vote choice for Trump across a number of political psychological 
studies (MacWilliams, 2016; Mather & Jefferson, 2016; Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Womick et 
al., 2019), the interaction between immigration views and authoritarianism has not been 
explored in this context.  
I hypothesise that the relationship between immigration views and receptivity to 
authoritarianism is indeed interactive. The interaction will be such that Whites with salient 
levels of anti-immigrant sentiment who are least trusting of politicians, and have low levels 
of political efficacy, will be the most receptive to the idea that the US needs a strong leader. 
To test this hypothesis, I ran a three-way ANOVA to determine the effects of anti-politician 
sentiment, low levels of political efficacy, and receptivity to authoritarianism90 on Whites’ 
levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Table 6.4 provides a summary of the results from the 
three-way ANOVA estimated by means of a univariate generalised linear modelling (GLM) 
procedure.91 Statistical significance was accepted at p <.01 for main effects. These effects 
were qualified by a statistically significant three-way interaction between anti-politician 
sentiment, low levels of political efficacy, and receptivity to authoritarianism, F(6, 2041) = 




90 Anti-politician sentiment is measured on a 5-point scale where respondents were asked if 
“politicians are the main problem in the US”. Efficacy is measure on a 5-point Likert scale where 
respondents were asked if “people like me have no say in what the government does”. And 
authoritarianism is measured on a 5-point Likert scale where respondents were asked if the US “needs 
a strong leader to take the country back to its true path”. 
91 Again, I specify party ID and ideology and covariates in the univariate GLM model because of the 
close relationships between these variables and distrust of politicians and anti-immigrant sentiment in 
the literature (Hajnal & Rivera).   
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Table 6.4: Three-Way ANOVA Summary Table for Effects of Anti-Politician 
Sentiment, Low Political Efficacy, and Authoritarian Receptivity on Anti-Immigrant 
Sentiment 
Effect F p 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects   
Party ID 22.168 .000*** 
Ideology 45.235 .000*** 
Anti-Politician 6.421 .000*** 
Political Efficacy 5.894 .000*** 
Strong Leader 35.813 .000*** 
Political Efficacy X Strong Leader 2.411 .001** 
Political Efficacy X Anti-Politician 2.082 .007** 
Strong Leader X Anti-Politician 2.835 .000*** 
Political Efficacy X Strong Leader X 
Anti Politician  
1.965 .000*** 
Notes: Adjusted 𝑅2 = .402. Data are weighted. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001.  
 
Source: 2016 ANES 
 
To better illustrate the interaction between these factors, it is useful to compare the 
estimated marginal means for anti-immigrant sentiment across levels of the independent 
variables. For Whites who strongly disagreed that the US needed a true leader to take the US 
back to its “true path”, who had the highest levels of political efficacy, and who was least 
likely to agree that politicians were main the problem in the US, the estimated marginal mean 
for anti-immigrant sentiment was 4.06.92 Contrastingly, Whites most receptive to the idea that 
the US needed a strong leader, who reported the lowest levels of political efficacy, and the 
 
92 The minimum score on the anti-immigrant scale is 3, with a maximum of 12 for those being the 
most hostile towards immigrants.  
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highest levels of anti-politician sentiment, the estimated marginal mean for anti-immigrant 
sentiment was 9.485.  
The results of the three-way ANOVA are important because they highlight that low-
efficacy, distrust of mainstream politicians, and a desire for a strong leader presented a 
perfect confluence of factors for a radical actor like Trump to garner electoral success among 
Whites with hostile immigration views in 2016. Trump was fiercely critical of what he 
described as “the elites” for their failure to fix America’s immigration system during the 
campaign (Kruse 2018). However, it was a co-articulation of these sentiments with Trump’s 
positioning of himself as a strong leader who operated outside of the existing political system 
in Washington that was also significant in appealing to Whites who had low levels of efficacy 
in mainstream politics. Having established that 2016 was unique in that the election cycle 
presented a unique opportunity for a radical populist actor to mobilise Whites who had 
previously given up on mainstream politics, I now proceed to examine whether Whites who 
were threatened by demographic change in 2016 have a high probability of voting for Trump.  
 
The Effect of Majority-Minority Threat on White Vote Choice 
In this section I assess whether Whites threatened by the prospect of ethnoracial 
demographic change were mobilized to vote for Trump in 2016. To do this, I employ an 
analytic strategy that works in three ways. First, I operationalise survey items from a national 
large-N dataset that ask White respondents whether they are threatened by demographic 
change into a composite measure of majority-minority threat. Next, I use this measure in 
regression to see whether Whites threatened by demographic change have an increased and 
statistically significant probability of voting for Trump. Lastly, I analyse whether the threat of 
demographic change was a predictor of White vote choice that was unique to 2016, or 
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whether majority-minority threat is a construct that shapes the vote choice of White 
Republican partisan identifiers across election cycles.  
My principal source of data to gauge Whites’ levels of majority-minority threat is the 
2016 Voter Survey (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, 2016). The 2016 Voter Survey 
does not contain a single measure of majority-minority threat. Rather, it presents respondents 
with information regarding Census projections concerning the fact that non-White ethnoracial 
groups will constitute a majority of the US population by 2043. After being presented with 
this information, respondents are then asked whether they agree/disagree with the following 
four statements concerning the impact of impending demographic change:  
 
1. Americans will learn more from one another and be enriched by exposure to many 
different cultures.  
2. A bigger, more diverse workforce will lead to more economic growth.  
3. There will be too many demands on government services.  
4. There will not be enough jobs for everybody.93 
 
Source: 2016 Voter Survey 
 
For the purpose of my analysis, these items were computed into a single variable.94 
With this computed measure of majority-minority ethnic threat, the first step was to assess 
whether Whites are broadly threatened by the prospect of demographic change. Figure 6.11 
 
93 One concern with the measure of majority-minority threat is that the additive index may be tapping 
into White voters’ material assessments about the impact of demographic change, as opposed fears 
about cultural change itself. To assess whether this was the case, I estimated an additional vote choice 
model which includes only the first item (cultural assessments) in the index. Results of this additional 
vote choice model do not appear to differ substantively from those presented in Table 6.5, and are 
presented in Appendix B.  
94 The new computed variable labelled majminthreat had a minimum score of 4 and a maximum score 
of 16. Overall, the four items composing the measure had a Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .782.  
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graphs the distribution of majority-minority threat among White Americans. As evidenced by 
Figure 6.11, White Americans are not broadly threatened by the prospect of demographic 
change; the bell-shaped normal distribution curve is displaced slightly to the left of a mid-
range score of 10. Indeed, the mean score for majority minority threat among the sample of N 
= 6,178 White Americans is 9.58.  
 











Source: 2016 Voter Survey 
 
Next, I ran an independent samples t-test on the sample of N = 5,445 Whites who 
voted for either of the major party candidates in 2016 to see if there were significant 
differences in levels of majority-minority threat between categories of two-party vote choice. 
The results of the independent samples t-test showed that White Trump voters had 
statistically significantly higher levels of majority-minority threat (10.894 ± .042) compared 
to Whites who voted for Clinton (7.974 ± .045), t (28) = -47.839, p <.001. 
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Table 6.5: Probit Model Showing Effect of Majority-Minority Threat on White Vote 























































Notes: Table entries are beta coefficients. Standard errors given in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable vote choice for Clinton or Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 1 = “Trump”. 
Sample limited to non-Hispanic Whites. *p <.05 **p <.01***p <.001.  
 
Source: 2016 Voter Survey 
 
While these results quantify the extent to which there are differences between subsets 
of White 2016 voters, they do not inform us as to the relative salience of majority-minority 
threat as a predictor of White vote choice for Trump. As such, I estimated a binary probit 
model with the computed measure of majority minority threat as an explanatory variable of 
White vote choice. Table 6.5 presents the results from the vote choice model. I also control 
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for variables known to influence Presidential vote choice such as partisanship and ideology, 
as well as a host of sociodemographic/economic indicators. As indicated by Table 6.6, the 
coefficient for majority-minority threat is positive and significant at 𝛽 = .401, p <.001.   
 


















Notes: Probit models contain the same controls for vote choice and as probit model in Table 6.5. 
All covariates in probit model set to their respective means. Vertical lines are 95 percent confidence 
intervals. Dependent variable is vote choice for Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 1 = “Trump”. Cases are 
weighted. Sample limited to non-Hispanic White Americans. 
 
Source: 2016 Voter Survey  
 
Figure 6.12 uses the results of the probit model to graph the predicted probability of 
voting for Trump by levels of majority-minority threat. As Figure 6.12 shows, higher levels 
of majority and minority threat are associated with an increased probability of voting for 
Trump. Moving from the lowest score of perceived threat to the highest score increased the 
predicted probability of voting for Trump by .91 (out of a maximum of 1.0). In 
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contextualising these results it is important to note the large changes in the probability that a 
White voter will choose Trump for President occur while holding all other variables known 
to influence Presidential vote choice at their respective means. This includes variables that 
are especially significant in the era of increased polarisation in American electoral politics, 
such as partisanship and political ideology.  
An important consideration regarding the relationship between salient levels of 
majority-minority ethnic threat and White vote choice for Trump is whether the effect was 
unique to the 2016 election, or whether this is simply the continuation of a trend among 
White Republican partisan identifiers. Answering this question is not straightforward because 
I am not aware of any presidential election surveys from 2012 that include items regarding 
levels of perceived ethnic threat. Despite this lacuna, the 2016 Voter Survey contains an item 
on respondents’ recall of their 2012 Presidential vote choice. As such, I use this item to 
assess whether majority-minority threat was an especially salient force in shaping White vote 
choice in 2016. Table 6.6 presents the results of a bivariate probit model that simultaneously 
predicts the 2012 and 2016 two-party vote of White respondents. I use bivariate probability 
regression here because the simultaneous estimation of two vote choice models for 2012 and 
2016 allows me to account for the fact that a White voter’s choice for President in 2016 was 
likely related to their vote choice in 2012. As Table 6.6 shows, the coefficients for majority-
minority threat are more strongly associated with the vote choice of whites in 2016 (𝛽 = .210, 
p <.001) than they are for 2012 (𝛽 = .095, p <.01).  
To get a better sense of how majority-minority threat mattered in the 2016 election 
relative to the 2012 election, I used postestimation techniques on the bivariate probit model to 
examine the probability of a White individual switching their vote between 2012 and 2016. 
These results, presented in Figure 6.13, which indicates the predicted probability of being a 
White voter who switched from Obama to Trump (an Obama-Trump voter) or Romney to 
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Clinton (a Romney-Clinton voter) based on the change in the level of majority-minority 
threat. Figure 6.13 graphs this predicted probability while holding all other 
sociodemographic covariates at their respective means.  
 
Table 6.6: Bivariate Probit Estimates of the Effect of Majority-Minority Threat on Two 












































































Notes: Table entries are probit coefficients. Robust standard errors given in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable for model 1 is vote choice for Obama or Romney; 0 = “Obama”; 1 = 
Romney. Dependent variable for model 2 is vote choice for Clinton or Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 
1 = “Trump”. Sample limited to non-Hispanic Whites who voted for either of the two major 
presidential candidates in 2012 and 2016. Rho = .479. N = 4,239. *p <.05 **p <.01***p 
<.001.  
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Figure 6.13: Probability of Voting for Obama or Trump and Romney or Clinton by 














Notes: Predicted probabilities based on bivariate probit model presented in Table 6.6. All 
sociodemographic covariates in bivariate probit model set to their respective means. Vertical bars 
are 95 per cent confidence intervals. Sample limited to non-Hispanic Whites who voted for either 
of the two major presidential candidates in 2012 and 2016 
 
Source: 2016 Voter Survey 
 
The graph shows that moving from a position of not being threatened to being 
threatened by demographic change was strongly associated with being a White Obama-
Trump voter. A White voter most threatened by majority-minority demographic change was 
almost four times as likely to be an Obama-Trump voter than one who was less threatened by 
the prospect. This increase in the probability of being an Obama-Trump voter with higher 
levels of perceived threat coincided with a decline in being a Romney-Clinton voter. 
Whilst Figure 6.13 demonstrates that majority-minority threat was more important 
for predicted the 2016 vote than the 2012 vote, how can we be sure that this 2016 effect is 
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about Trump’s emphasis on immigration and demographic change rather, than an Obama 
effect on the issue of race (Tesler 2012; 2016)? To explore the possibility that an anti-Obama 
effect routed in racial resentment is not driving these effects, I estimate an additional 
bivariate probit model. This model begins with the same set of variables presented in Table 
6.6, but includes additional controls for racial resentment (measured using the standard 4-
item battery), as well as a four-point ordinal item that asks respondents how favourable they 
view Obama (1 = “very favourable,” 4 = “very unfavourable”). If an anti-Obama effect 
rooted in racial resentment is driving this significant effect on 2016 vote choice through 
majority-minority threat, de minimis, then we should expect to observe a weak and 
insignificant effect through majority-minority when the additional controls are added to the 
model. The results of the additional bivariate probit model are presented below in Table 6.7. 
 As evidenced by Table 6.7, accounting for these two additional variables in the model 
slightly reduces the size of the bivariate probit coefficient for majority coefficient for 
majority minority threat (𝜷 =⁡. 𝟏𝟗𝟑) relative to the estimates presented in Table 6.6 ( 𝜷 =
⁡. 𝟐𝟏𝟎). However, it is important to note that majority minority threat remains a statistically 
significant predictor (p <.01) of 2016 vote choice relative to 2012 despite the addition 
controls for racial resentment and unfavorable views of Obama. Given these results, we can 
be reasonably confident that the effect of majority-minority threat on the 2016 vote is not 
being significantly mediated by a distinct anti-Obama effect grounded in Whites’ feelings of 
racial resentment.   
In sum, my analysis of the 2016 Voter Survey data reveals that majority-minority 
threat mattered more in shaping the 2016 vote choice of White Americans than it did in 2012, 
and that is was related to an increased probability of White Obama voters moving into the 
Trump column in the next election cycle. Consequently, the threat of increasing ethnoracial 
diversity was an important predictor of White choice in 2016, a finding that is consistent with 
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other findings in the academic literature which use other principal sources of data (Craig et 
al., 2018; Knowles & Tropp, 2018; Major et al., 2018; Mutz, 2018).  
 
 
Table 6.7: Bivariate Probit Estimates of the Effect of Majority-Minority Threat on Two 
























































































Notes: Table entries are probit coefficients. Robust standard errors given in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable for model 1 is vote choice for Obama or Romney; 0 = “Obama”; 1 = 
Romney. Dependent variable for model 2 is vote choice for Clinton or Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 
1 = “Trump”. Sample limited to Whites who voted for either of the two major presidential 
candidates in 2012 and 2016. Rho = .100. N = 3,647. *p <.05 **p <.01***p <.001.  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the objective of the chapter was to assess the robustness of the 
“changing America” thesis as an explanatory context for why so many White Americans 
were mobilised to vote for Trump in 2016. At the core of the third and final explanatory 
context is the notion of diversity. Since the 1970s, America has changed from a nation that 
was predominately descended from White Europeans to one that is more ethnoculturally 
plural. A significant consequence of this increasing diversity is that interaction with members 
of the “opposite race” and ethnicity has become an increasing factor in the daily lives of 
millions of Americans.  
Groups react to this increasing diversity in different ways. And these reactions are 
best encapsulated in two important and competing hypotheses concerning the ways in which 
diversity modifies group behaviour. In the context of this chapter, of critical importance are 
the ways in which diversity modifies the electoral behaviour of White Americans. Putnam 
(2007) famously contends that diversity causes groups to “hunker down” and become 
withdrawn from civic and community life. Importantly, this means that Whites who live in 
diverse communities will have a propensity to be less electorally engaged. Conversely, 
Kaufmann and Goodwin (2018) contend that diversity actually leads groups such as Whites 
to become more electorally engaged as their opposition to diversity becomes more salient.  
Putnam’s (2007) “hunker down” thesis helps explain why levels of social capital for 
Whites living in diverse communities are so low. However, an important limitation of 
Putnam’s thesis as it applies to understanding Whites’ electoral behaviour in the context of 
Trump is that Whites with higher levels of civic engagement tend to live in Whiter 
communities. This is an important observation because community homogeneity has 
important implications for levels of social capital in such communities. Communities which 
are more racially homogenous will have better social capital outcomes relative to those that 
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are more heterogenous. Importantly, my analysis of the Census data confirms that Whites 
living further away from diverse locales such as metropolitan areas have higher rates of voter 
registration and voter turnout in 2016 than Whites in metropolitan areas.  
Therefore, I would qualify that diversity is an important variable in helping us to 
better understand why so many Whites voted for Trump in 2016. However, it has more to do 
with Whites’ perceptions of diversity rather than their contact with diversity. To understand 
this point, it is useful to think back to the 1970s when forced bussing - policies enacted as a 
part of the broader effort to desegregate in the Civil Rights Era - drove many Whites from 
urban centres in the Midwest such as Chicago and Detroit. Whites chose to move out of these 
urban locales in part because of their opposition to living in multiracial neighbourhoods. In 
doing so, they migrated to exurban and rural areas which were more racially homogenous. In 
these sorts of communities, Whites experience less contact with diversity in their day-to-day 
lives because they are living in neighbourhoods that, demographically speaking, are also 
largely White. For Whites living in overwhelmingly White communities, therefore, 
perceptions of diversity are far more important in shaping Whites’ political behaviour as 
opposed to actual contact with members of the opposite race.  
I have shown that perceptions of diversity are altered via the radicalisation of Whites’ 
perspectives. My hypothesis being that the radicalisation of perspectives occurs when Whites 
are exposed to information concerning the impact of demographic change from television 
Networks such as Fox. To explore this hypothesis, I used data from the 2016 Voter Study 
which included a number of useful variables concerning the principal sources of Whites’ 
news and information. When we compare Whites, who watch Fox as opposed to Whites who 
watch shows on CNN, I find that levels of majority-minority threat are stronger among 
Whites who reported that their principal sources of news tended to be from the former 
network. This important finding helps explain why so many Whites feel threatened by 
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diversity even though they live in homogenous neighbourhoods and have minimal day-to-day 
contact with ethnic minorities; the data indicate that it might have more to do with the ways 
in which their perspectives are modified by media narratives concerning how increasing 
diversity will erode their majority status.95  
Importantly, exposure to information concerning the impact of demographic change 
also modifies Whites’ political behaviour (Craig and Richeson 2014). When we test the 
salience of majority-minority threat against the probability that a White voter will vote for 
Trump, we find that Whites with high threat levels have a greatly increased likelihood of 
voting for Trump. Clearly, then, the results speak to Trump’s ability to court White voters 
who felt threatened by the prospect of losing their majority status. In sum, my analysis of the 
data point to Kaufmann and Goodwin’s (2018) “voice route” hypothesis as being the more 
robust hypothesis that helps us to better-understand Trump’s particular appeal to White 





95 Given the cross-sectional design of the 2016 Voter Study, however it is important to qualify that 
there might be a degree of reverse causality in the Fox News consumption  majority-minority threat 
relationship. For instance, the perceived threat of demographic change might also lead Whites to 
select into media outlets who cover demographic change in a manner which already conforms to their 
existing views.   
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Chapter 7: Bringing it all Together 
 
Introduction 
 The principal and overarching objective of the doctoral thesis was to better 
understand the currents that created the conditions for Trump’s victory in the 2016 US 
Presidential election. To meet this objective, the doctoral thesis sought to understand which 
particular dimension of White estrangement from mainstream politics Trump’s victory best 
represented. On the one hand, the perceived failure of political elites to attest to the economic 
grievances of White voters may explain why so many Whites voted for Trump (Gest 2016; 
Williams 2017) (left behind thesis). Equally, however, scholars posited that Trump’s victory 
was predicated upon his demonisation of racial minorities and other putative outsiders in an 
attempt to appeal to White in-group interests (Jardina 2019; Thompson 2020) (cultural 
decline thesis). Elsewhere, scholars have hypothesised whether Trump’s victory represented 
the successful political mobilization of a cohort of White voters that increasingly felt as 
though their dominant-group position was being threatened by America’s increasing ethnic 
and racial diversity (Major et al. 2018; Mutz 2018) (changing America thesis).  
 In the preceding three principal findings Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I have demonstrated 
how all of these factors are associated with vote choice for Trump to varying degrees. In this 
chapter, the doctoral thesis aims to assess which of these three particular theses has the 
greatest amount of explanatory power when we seek to understand why 54 per cent of White 
voters cast their ballot for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018). To do this, the 
chapter estimates a vote choice model using data from the 2016 Voter Study. Specifically, the 
chapter estimates a model that fully accounts for the various economic, cultural and socio-
cultural explanations of Trump’s victory delineated in the preceding three chapters, as well as 
the host of socio-demographic and structural covariates outlined in the methodology chapter. 
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Crucially, this estimation strategy allows for comparison of the magnitude, direction, and 
significance of the various effects of each explanatory variable. Consequently, we will be 
able to empirically approximate which factor (or, indeed set of factors) were the most salient 
predictors of White vote choice. This is important because we will then be able to tell 
whether Trump’s victory is best understood in light of traditional frameworks that have long 
been applied to understand voter behaviour (for instance, rational choice economic voting), 
or indeed, whether his election represented a more fundamental re-alignment of White voting 
patterns (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018).   
 Once the chapter has established which factor (or set of factors) were the most salient 
in contributing to Trump’s victory, the discussion chapter then turns to assess the limitations 
of this knowledge. One factor to consider is whether any of the other candidates for President 
in 2016 would have been successful in appealing to the same set of economically, culturally, 
and socio-culturally aggrieved Whites that voted for Trump. Therefore, the chapter specifies 
a series of alternative vote choice models where White respondents were presented with a 
number of hypothetical candidate matchups for President.  
 
Economic, Cultural, or Sociocultural Explanations?  
 Now that we have a substantive approximation of the various factors which 
contributed to Trump’s victory in 2016 as outlined in Chapters 4 through 6, this Chapter now 
turns to probe which of these factor(s) – namely economic, cultural, or sociocultural - have 
the greatest amount of explanatory power when we try to understand why 54 per cent of 
White voters cast their ballots for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018).  
To assess which factor (or factors) contributed the most to White vote choice, this 
discussion chapter estimates a vote choice model using data from the 2016 Voter Study. 
Unlike the models presented in the three principal findings chapters, this model crucially 
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accounts for the significant principal explanatory variables in a simultaneous fashion. To 
account for the effects of economic assessments on the probability that a White voter will 
cast their ballot for Trump (left behind thesis), models are estimated with controls for voters’ 
negative national and personal economic assessments. Next, to account for the effects of in-
group favouritism and out-group prejudice (Jardina 2019; Schaffner et al. 2018) on White 
vote choice, models also account for the strength of a respondent’s White identity centrality, 
and their levels of racial resentment. Finally, to account for the effects of perceived threat 
from diversity on vote choice (Major et al. 2018; Mutz 2018), models account for a 
respondent’s levels of dominant majority demographic threat. In addition to these principal 
explanatory variables, the vote choice model also adjusts on the same socio-demographic and 
structural covariates outlined in the methodology section in Chapter 3.  
Figure 7.1 is a plot of coefficients that depicts the various effect sizes of each of the 
variables in the fully specified vote choice model. It is also important to note that, since the 
variables have been rescaled to range between 0 and 1, that the effect sizes in the model are 
somewhat comparable. Points to the right of the 𝑥 axis in Figure 7.1 indicate a positive 
relationship between vote choice and a given variable of interest – or a higher probability of a 
White voter having cast their ballot for Trump. Conversely, points to the left of the 𝑥 axis in 
Figure 7.1 indicate a negative relationship, or a higher probability of a White voter having 
cast their ballot for Clinton.  
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Figure 7.1: Effect Size of Explanatory Variables on Vote Choice for Trump 
 
Notes: Points represent the size of each probit coefficient. The lines are 95 per cent confidence 
intervals. All variables in model scaled to range between 0 and 1. Sample limited to White 
Trump/Clinton voters. Data are weighted. 
 
 
Source: 2016 Voter Study  
 
 As evidenced by Figure 7.1, all of the principal explanatory variables are positively 
related to vote choice for Trump. Despite the fact that the trend of all the explanatory 
variables are in the expected direction, it is important to note that White voters’ negative 
personal economic evaluations, as well as White identity, do not meet the acceptable level of 
statistical significance (p <.05). This is an important observation because while both of these 
predictors were significantly associated with vote choice by themselves in Chapters 4 and 5, 
their statistical significance diminishes when we account for the other predictors in a 
simultaneous fashion. Turning to the principal explanatory variables that retain their 
statistical significance when accounting for all of the explanatory variables, we see that 
White voters’ negative national economic assessments are significant at the p <.05 level. 
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Despite this significant effect, however, it is important to note that the coefficient for 
negative national economic assessments is somewhat small.  
 By way of contrast, both racial resentment and dominant-majority demographic threat 
exhibit much larger effects on vote choice relative to voters’ negative national economic 
assessments. The effects of both variables are strongly significant (p <.001), and are 
surpassed only by Republican partisan identification and conservative ideological self-
placement. Overall, then, an examination of the effect sizes of each of the explanatory 
variables in the fully specified vote choice model points to White voters’ cultural and 
sociocultural concerns being the most salient predictors of vote choice for Trump. 
Conversely, there is less of a case to be made that voters’ economic assessments were 
substantive predictors of White voter behaviour in 2016 net of the other variables in the 
model. To better assist substantive interpretation of the effects of the significant explanatory 
variables on White vote choice, I use postestimation to plot the predicted probability that a 
White voter will cast their ballot for Trump at each level of the explanatory variables. 
Predicted probabilities for negative national economic assessments, out-group prejudice, and 
dominant majority demographic threat are presented below in Figure 7.2.  
Figure 7.2 begins to answer which explanation – namely economic, cultural, or socio-
cultural – best accounts for Trump’s strong showing among White voters in 2016. The top 
left panel in Figure 7.2 indicates that increasingly negative evaluations of the robustness of 
the national economy were associated with a high probability of having voted for Trump in 
2016. A White voter in 2016 who thought that the national economy was in a better state 
relative to the previous 12 months has a .55 predicted probability of voting for Trump. By 
contrast, a White voter who thought that the national economy had gotten worse in the past 
year had a .70 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Therefore, worsening assessments 
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of the robustness of the national economy are associated with an increase in the predicted 
probability of having voted for Trump of 15 points.  
 
Figure 7.2: Vote Choice for Trump as a Function of Negative National Economic 































Notes: Points represent the predicted probability of voting for Trump at each level of the 
significant explanatory variables. The vertical lines are 95 per cent confidence intervals. Predicted 
probabilities calculated by holding gender, marital status, labour union affiliation status, “born 
again” status, and region constant at female, married, union member, “born again” Christian, and 
South, while holding all other variables in model at their respective mean values. Model also 
controls for negative personal economic evaluations, White identity, party ID, ideology, age, 
education, and family income.  
 
 
Source: 2016 Voter Study 
 
 Given this 15-point baseline, a key question to be asked is whether out-group 
prejudice is a more salient predictor of White support for Trump in 2016 than White voters’ 
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negative national economic assessments? The top right panel in Figure 7.2 tests this 
expectation. The graph indicates that a White voter with a minimum score on the racial 
resentment scale has just a .11 predicted probability of casting their ballot for Trump over 
Clinton. Conversely, a White voter with a maximum score on the racial resentment scale has 
a .89 predicted probability of voting for Trump. Consequently, moving from least to most 
resentful on the racial resentment scale is associated with an increase in the predicted 
probability of having voted for Trump of a remarkable 78 points.  
 Lastly, the bottom panel in Figure 7.2 plots the predicted probability of having voted 
for Trump as a function of a White voter’s level of dominant-majority demographic threat. 
The bottom panel indicates that a White voter who scored average on all other values in the 
model but exhibited the highest levels of threat on the dominant majority demographic scale 
has a .86 predicted probability of casting their ballot for Trump. Contrastingly, a White voter 
with a mean score on all other variables who exhibits the lowest levels of threat has just a .35 
predicted probability of voting for Trump. Overall, moving from least to most threatened on 
the threat scale is thus associated with an increase in the predicted probability of a White 
voter preferring Trump over Clinton of 51 points 
 In sum, the results of the predicted probabilities outlined in Figure 7.2 point to racial 
resentment and dominant-majority demographic threat being the explanatory variables that 
are most strongly associated with having voted for Trump in 2016. While voters’ negative 
national economic assessments mattered, it is important to note that the effects on vote choice 
(.15) are dwarfed by those of racial resentment (.78) and dominant majority demographic 
threat (.51) as voters become increasingly resentful and threatened. These results are 
important because they provide us with a further indication that more traditional frameworks 
that have long been used to examine vote choice – for instance, rational choice economic 
voting (Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000) – do not fully account for White voter behaviour in the 
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2016 US Presidential election. Rather, the results are consistent with the observation that 
voters’ cultural and socio-cultural concerns are becoming salient electoral cleavages that 
mobilise individuals to vote for populist actors in advanced Western democracies (Eatwell 
and Goodwin 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2018).  
Having established that racial resentment and dominant majority demographic threat 
exhibited the largest effects on vote choice net of the other explanatory variables in the vote 
choice model, the next section will consider the robustness of these findings. Specifically, the 
chapter will re-estimate the vote choice model with a host of other indicators that are 
associated with both racial resentment and dominant majority-demographic threat. As will be 
clear, this is to assess whether the additional controls substantively affect the significance and 
the direction of the results presented thus far. 
 
Considering Alternative Explanations: Testing the Robustness of Racial Resentment 
and Dominant-Majority Demographic Threat 
 The previous section demonstrated that the effects of racial resentment and dominant 
majority demographic threat appear to account for Trump’s success over and above the 
effects of the other explanatory variables. Nonetheless, it is also important to be aware of 
alternate explanations that have been put forward to explain Trump’s victory, as well as how 
these explanations may intersect with those explored in depth in the doctoral thesis. An 
important factor to consider is the relationship between the Alt-Right and support for 
Trump.96 One possibility is that the effects of out-group prejudice and perceived threat from 
 
96 Inspired by Donald Trump’s nativist campaign, the Alt-Right quickly became Trump’s voluntary 
online army during the 2016 campaign, attacking Trump’s critics on Twitter and other online venues 
(Nagle 2017). This raised new concerns about the Trump campaign, which was already breaking 
taboos on subjects such as race and America’s increasing diversity. The apparent connection between 
the Alt-Right and the Trump campaign was further reinforced when the Trump campaign hired Steve 
Bannon as its chief executive in 2016. Bannon is the former leader of Breitbart News, and at one time 
described Breitbart as “the platform of the Alt-Right” – though there is some disagreement about what 
he meant by this (Green 2017). 
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diversity on vote choice for Trump are being driven by Whites with the most radicalised 
perspectives on issues such as race and demographic change. Indeed, there is evidence of a 
relationship between these views and affect for White nationalist organisations such as the 
Alt-Right (Hawley 2017). Consequently, to assess whether the effects of the variables racial 
resentment and majority-minority threat on vote choice are primarily driven by Whites with 
the most radicalised views in these areas of public opinion, vote choice for Trump is also 
estimated with a feeling thermometer that gauges affect for the Alt-Right.97 
 Individuals with authoritarian attitudes are also likely to hold radicalised views on 
race and demographic change (Kteily et al. 2011). These views are especially salient because 
they can be mobilised into political cleavages by radical right movements and political actors 
who stoke animus and resentment in order to garner political and electoral success 
(Bonikowski 2017). This observation partly explains why social dominance orientation 
(SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)– statistically measurable constructs of 
authoritarian attitudes – are correlated with support for the radical right (Aichholzer & 
Zandonella 2016; Mayer et al. 2020), as well as support for Trump specifically (Choma & 
Hanoch 2017; Womick et al. 2019). Therefore, to assess whether authoritarianism 
substantively affects the coefficients for racial resentment and perceived threat, the vote 
choice model contains an additional control for authoritarian attitudes.98  
 Despite the importance of authoritarian attitudes as a predictor of support for Trump, 
scholars have also proposed that populist attitudes are associated with White racial attitudes 
and public opinion towards the impact of demographic change on Whites’ majority status. A 
 
97 The Alt-Right thermometer ranges between 0 and 100. A minimum score of 0 indicates that a 
White respondent gives the Alt Right “very cool or unfavourable estimations.” By contrast, a 
maximum score of 100 indicated that a respondent gives the Alt Right “very warm or favourable 
estimations.”  
98 Authoritarian attitudes are measured using the standard SDO scale for child rearing. The SDO 
child-rearing scale is composed of 4 items that asks White respondents to choose which behaviours 
are more desirable in child rearing. These are: i) independence or respect for elders; ii) curiosity or 
good manners; iii) obedience or self-reliance, and iv) considerate or well behaved. 
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crucial dimension of populist sentiment is distrust in government, as well as anger at political 
elites (Pauwels 2011; Akkkerman et al. 2014; Oliver and Rahn 2016). In the case of 
ethnonationalist populism specifically, majority groups perceive that political elites favour 
putative outsiders (often immigrants and racial minorities) at the expense of majority-group 
members (Bonikowski 2017). As such, if majority group members (Whites) feel as though 
the system is rigged against them, such feelings are likely to also be grounded in the 
perception that the system is rigged to favour non-group members. Therefore, to assess 
whether populism attitudes affect the signifance of the effects of racial resentment and 
majority-minority threat on vote choice for Trump, models accordingly include additional 
controls for trust in government and anti-elitism.99 
 This discussion chapter tests whether any of these additional variables substantively 
affect the direction and significance of the results of the vote choice model presented in the 
previous section by specifying a series of additional models. These additional models further 
consider the hypothetical relationships between the explanatory variables and Alt right affect, 
authoritarian attitudes, trust in government, and populist sentiment. Consistent with the 
estimation strategy in the three principal findings chapters, these models also control for 
various socio-demographic and structural covariates delineated in the methodology chapter. 
The results of the additional models are presented below in Table 7.1.  
For better comparison with the results of the baseline model, Table 7.1 also contains 
the probit coefficients for the model outlined in the previous section. The second column in 
Table 7.1 contains the additional controls for Alt-Right affect and authoritarian attitudes 
 
99 Trust in government is gauged using a three-point ordinal item that asks respondents how often they 
trust those in Washington to do what is right. Possible responses ranged from 1 “all of the time,” 2 = 
most of the time,” 3 = some of the time.” Anti-elitism is an additive index of three items (Cronach’s 𝛼 
= .59) that ask White respondents the extent to which they agree with the statements: i) “elections 
today don’t matter, things stay the same no matter what happens in Washington;” ii) “people like me 
have no say in what the government does;” and iii) “elites in this country don’t understand the 
problems I am facing.”  
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(measured on the SDO scale). The coefficient for the Alt-Right thermometer is positive and 
significant at p <.001, indicating that greater affect for the Alt-Right is associated with a 
higher probability of having voted for Trump in 2016.100 The coefficient for authoritarian 
attitudes is also a positive and significant predictor of White vote choice in the second model 
p <.05. While the effect of authoritarianism on vote choice does not rival that of White affect 
for the Alt Right in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, the second model 
provides evidence that both variables have a degree of association with vote choice for 
Trump. Importantly, controlling for these additional variables does not affect the direction 
and signifance of the effects of the racial resentment and majority-minority demographic 
threat on vote choice for Trump. Indeed, as evidenced by the slightly larger coefficients for 
both explanatory variables in the second model relative to the baseline model, the results 
indicate that accounting for these additional controls may actually increase the explanatory 
power of racial resentment and majority-minority demographic threat. 
In the third column in Table 7.1, I explore the effects of anti-elitism and distrust in 
government on the explanatory variables. Turning first to examine the effects of trust in 
government, we see that the probit coefficient is positive and significant at the p<.01 level. It 
is important to note that the variable is coded such that higher values are indicative of lower 
levels of trust in government. As such, the third model is indicating that lower levels of trust 
are positively associated with vote choice for Trump. The coefficient for the anti-elitism 
 
100 While this finding would seem to indicate a degree of association between White affect for the Alt- 
Right and support for Trump, it is important to qualify that the proportion of Whites who are willing 
to express positive feelings towards the Alt-Right form a relatively small part of the Trump coalition. 
It is certainly the case that those willing to express support for the Alt-Right form a larger part of 
Trump’s voter base than they did Clinton’s base; results of a one-way ANOVA indicated that there 
were significant differences in levels of Alt-Right affect between White Trump and Clinton voters 
(𝐹[1, 3,365] = 1,470.69, p <.001). An examination of means via Tukey’s post hoc test also indicated 
that Whites who voted for Trump give the Alt-Right a mean thermometer score of 45 out of 100, 
relative to a mean score of just 13 out of 100 for White Clinton voters. Nonetheless, this mean score 
of 44 for White Trump voters is still indicative of relatively cool estimations towards the Alt-Right. 
Indeed, only per 17 per cent of White Trump voters give the Alt-Right a thermometer rating that is 
greater than one standard deviation above this mean value.  
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index is also positively and significantly associated with the probability of a White voter 
having cast their ballot for Trump in 2016 (p <.01).  
 
Table 7.1: Probit Models of Two-Party Vote Choice  
 (1) 
 

































































































































































Trust in government  
 






























Notes: Table entries are probit coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Dependent variables are 
two-party vote choice where 1 = “Trump,” 0 “Clinton.” All variables scaled to range between 0 and 1. Sample limited 
to Whites only. Data are weighted. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001.  
 
Source: 2016 Voter Study  
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Notwithstanding the significant effects of low levels of trust in government and anti-
elite attitudes on vote choice, it is important to note that controlling for these additional 
variables in the model does not substantively affect the coefficients for racial resentment and 
majority-minority demographic threat. Indeed, both of the explanatory variables remain 
significant at the p <.001 level despite the additional controls. Further, and as was the case in 
the second model, there is also some evidence to suggest that accounting for populist 
attitudes may actually increase the explanatory power of out-group prejudice and threat as 
predictors of White support for Trump.  
 Finally, the fourth model in Table 7.1 is the fully specified model, and controls for 
the effects of all four variables simultaneously. Even when accounting for all four variables 
in the vote choice model, we see that racial resentment and majority-minority demographic 
threat are largely robust to the additional controls. Consequently, we can express a relative 
degree of confidence that out-group prejudice and threat are salient predictors of White vote 
choice for Trump that function independently of the effects of affect for White nationalist 
movements, authoritarianism, and populist sentiment.  
 To better understand whether attachment to White identity or racial resentment is 
driving the significant results for majority-minority threat, I estimate another series of vote 
choice models. The results of these additional models are presented below in Table 7.2. 
Model 1 is a baseline vote choice model. Model 2 includes an additional control for White 
identity. Model 3 controls contains an additional control for racial resentment. Model 4 
controls for White identity and racial resentment without the majority-minority threat scale. 
Lastly, Model 5 is a fully specified model that controls for majority-minority threat, White 
identity, and racial resentment.  
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Table 7.2: Testing the Relationship Between Majority-Minority Threat and Vote Choice 
for Trump 
 Baseline With White ID With racial 
resentment 























Racial resentment  
 






















































































































































Notes: Table entries are probit coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Dependent variables are 
two-party vote choice where 1 = “Trump,” 0 “Clinton.” All variables scaled to range between 0 and 1. Sample limited 
to Whites only. Data are weighted. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001.  
 
Source: 2016 Voter Study  
 
As evidenced by the first column in Table 7.2, the probit coefficient for majority 
minority threat is positively related to vote choice for Trump (𝛽 = 2.510, p <.001). Moving 
onto Model 2, including an additional control for White identity does not substantively affect 
the size of the probit coefficient for majority-minority threat - the coefficient remains 
positively related to the dependent measure (𝛽 = 2.523), and retains its p <.001 significance. 
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This finding is noteworthy because it suggests that the relationship between majority-
minority threat and vote choice for Trump might have less to do with attachment to White 
identity. To test this possibility further, Model 3 indicates that controlling for racial 
resentment substantially reduces the size of the probit coefficient for majority-minority threat 
(𝛽 = 1.625), though the coefficient retains its p <.001 level of statistical significance. In 
substantive terms, this means that the relationship between majority-minority threat and 2016 
vote choice is largely driven by outgroup prejudice as opposed to attachment to White 
identity. Indeed, the final model in Table 7.2 confirms this expectation, as controlling for the 
simultaneous effects of White identity and racial resentment yields a remarkably similar 
result to Model 3.   
 
Vote Choice in Alternate Scenarios  
 The previous section explored whether the effects of racial resentment and majority-
minority threat were robust to a host of other indicators that are likely to be correlated with 
White racial attitudes and public opinion concerning the impact of demographic change of 
Whites’ dominant majority status. Having established that out-group prejudice and majority-
minority demographic threat were robust to these additional controls, the discussion chapter 
next turns to assess whether these effects were unique to Trump’s candidacy. As will be 
clear, it is important that we are able to quantify whether Trump was able to uniquely activate 
these sentiments, or whether we would have observed similar effects had another candidate 
been on the ballot in 2016 instead of Trump.  
This latter consideration is a reasonable expectation, given the nature of political 
polarization and the enduring strength of partisanship as a predictor of vote choice in 
Presidential elections. Today, voters “sort” according to their partisan preferences. Sorting 
can be conceptualised as the process through which voters with specific viewpoints migrate 
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to certain groups based on their partisan identity (Levendusky 2009). Sorting has therefore 
given rise to a relative degree of intra-party homogeneity in voter attitudes towards a number 
of issues (Druckman et al. 2013).101 Consequently, it is possible that any significant effects 
on vote choice observed through constructs such as racial resentment are simply indicative of 
the extent of intra-party ideological homogeneity on issues such as race and demographic 
change in an era of high polarization.  
Given the nature of partisan sorting and political polarization, it is necessary to assess 
the extent to which Trump’s candidacy is responsible for the significant effects of Whites’ 
cultural and socio-cultural grievances on two-party vote choice in 2016. To test this 
expectation, I once again turn to the 2016 Voter Study. In addition to asking White voters 
which candidate they cast their ballot for in 2016, the survey also presented respondents with 
a series of hypothetical general election matchups for two-party vote choice. With these 
items, I re-estimated the baseline explanatory model delineated in Table 7.1. The results of 
the alternate models for two-party vote choice are presented below in Table 7.2.  
To allow for direct comparison of the direction, magnitude, and significance of these 
effects relative to the effects of the explanatory variables on actual two-party vote choice, 
Table 7.2 once again contains the results of the vote choice model using validated voter data. 
If a given predictor was likely to be more potent in shaping White voter choice when Trump 
was on the ballot, de minims, then we should expect to observe weaker and less-significant 
effect sizes for each of the explanatory variables relative to the model that estimates actual 
two-party vote choice. The second and third columns in Table 7.3 present the results of two 
 
101 For instance, the Republican Party has become a repository for voters with salient levels of racial 
animus; a pattern of partisan sorting that was partly accelerated during the Obama presidency because 
of race-based opposition to his signature policies such as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Tesler 
2012). 
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models estimating hypothetical two-party vote choice if Trump were replaced with one of the 
unsuccessful candidates for the 2016 Republican nomination.  
These models begin to answer the question of whether Trump was uniquely poised to 
mobilise voters cultural and socio-cultural grievances, or whether another Republican 
candidate would have been able to replicate his success in the general election by appealing 
to the same sentiments. Table 7.3 demonstrates that, if Rubio or Cruz had been on the ballot, 
racial resentment would still have been a significant predictor of White vote choice for the 
Republican candidate. Though the size of the probit coefficient for racial resentment is 
smaller in the vote choice models for Rubio (𝛽 = 2.180) and Cruz (𝛽 = 2.154) than the actual 
vote choice model (𝛽 = 2.489), the coefficients retain their p <.001 level of statistical 
significance across the three models. In substantive terms, this means that anti-Black 
prejudice would have functioned in a similar manner regardless of whether or not Trump was 
the Republican nominee.  
A more noteworthy pattern of results can be seen when it comes to the salience of 
majority-minority threat. As indicated here, the probit coefficient for majority minority threat 
in the alternate models for Rubio (𝛽 = .821, p <.05) and Cruz (𝛽 = .983 p = n.s.) are much 
less substantial in both magnitude and statistical significance than that in the actual model (𝛽 
= 1.487, p <.001). These results are particularly interesting because they suggest that 
perceptions of demographic threat mattered because of Trump’s presence on the ballot. 
Therefore, while outgroup prejudice was likely to be a significant factor in two-party vote 
choice regardless of who was the Republican nominee for President, the findings lend some 
weight to the hypothesis that attitudes towards demographic change were uniquely important 
predictors of White vote choice because of Trump.  
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Table 7.3: Hypothetical Candidate Matchups of Two-Party Vote Choice 
 Clinton vs 
Trump (actual) 
Clinton vs Rubio 
 









































































































































































Notes: Table entries are probit coefficients. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Dependent 
variables are two-party vote choice where 1 = “hypothetical Republican candidate,” 0 = “hypothetical 
Democratic candidate.” All variables scaled to range between 0 and 1. Sample limited to Whites only. Data are 
weighted. *p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001.  
 
Source: 2016 Voter Study 
 
Another factor to consider is how White vote choice in 2016 may have been different 
had Clinton not secured the Democratic nomination. This is an important consideration given 
the stark policy differences in economic policy that emerged between Clinton and Sanders 
 261  
during the 2016 Democratic primaries.102 It is reasonable to expect that Sanders’ willingness 
to vastly increase spending on government welfare programs might have appealed to 
economically-disadvantaged Whites who were otherwise attracted to Trump’s candidacy 
because of his emphasis on protecting the American worker from unfair economic 
competition. 
Beyond differences in economic policy between candidates for the Democratic 
nomination, it is also useful to note that the role of identity politics in the campaigns of both 
Clinton and Sanders were somewhat different. Inclusivity and the championing of America’s 
increasing diversity were integral messages to Clinton’s presidential campaign. By contrast, 
Sanders co-opted a class-based message during his campaign while emphasising these 
aforenoted cultural issues somewhat less than Clinton. Consistent with these observations, it 
is also reasonable to expect that, had Sanders been on the ballot in the general election 
instead of Clinton, that the campaign in the general election might have been less-dominated 
by cultural “wedge” issues. Given the absence of a candidate on the ballot willing to advocate 
for these “wedge” issues, therefore, voters’ cultural and socio-cultural cleavages may have 
been less salient predictors of White vote choice in a Sanders versus Trump race.  
To further explore these theoretical expectations, the final column in Table 7.3 
present the results of another vote choice model in a hypothetical matchup where Sanders is 
the Democratic nominee as opposed to Clinton. As evidenced by the negative coefficient for 
voters’ national economic evaluations, Table 7.3 indicates that Trump may have had less 
appeal to economically-pessimistic White voters had Sanders been on the ballot instead of 
Clinton. We also observe a reduction in the size of the coefficients for White identity, racial 
 
102 A self-avowed socialist, Sanders went further than Clinton in pledging to use the instruments of 
government to improve the economic conditions of the American working-class and middle-class. 
Among Sanders’ proposals, for instance, was Medicare for all, free college tuition, and a $15 
minimum wage (Pearlstein 2016).  
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resentment, and majority-minority threat in the Sanders versus Trump model relative to the 
validated voter model. Consequently, the Sanders versus Trump model provides some 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that White voters’ cultural and socio-cultural grievances 
might have been less salient had Clinton not been on the ballot.  
 Overall, the results of Table 7.3 present some evidence of the enduring strength of 
political polarization and partisan sorting on White political behaviour. The effects of sorting 
and polarization are most apparent when it comes to racial resentment; the coefficient for the 
construct is strongly positive and significant (p <.001) across all models. Despite this finding 
however, it is important to note that there is a degree of heterogeneity in vote choice across 
candidate matchups, and that the effects of certain variables are far stronger when Trump is 
on the ballot.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have explored which particular dimension of White estrangement 
from mainstream politics (“left behind” thesis, cultural decline thesis, changing America 
thesis) has the greatest amount of explanatory power when we seek to understand why 54 per 
cent of White voters cast their ballot for Trump in 2016. To provide a robust synthesis of the 
findings I observed in Chapters 4 through 6, I estimated a series of vote choice models which 
aimed to fully account for the economic, cultural, and socio-cultural predictors of White vote 
choice. In these models, I found that negative national economic evaluations, salient levels of 
racial resentment, and heightened perceptions of majority-minority threat were all 
significantly related to vote choice for Trump (p <.05). Notwithstanding these patterns of 
statistical significance, however, I found substantially larger effect sizes on vote choice 
through racial resentment and majority-minority threat, while White voters’ negative national 
economic assessments exhibited a relatively weaker effect on vote choice. The results of 
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these models indicate that explanations of vote choice embedded in cultural and socio-
cultural understandings of White estrangement from mainstream politics were more salient 
than economic accounts of Trump’s victory. These findings are particularly noteworthy 
because they indicate that Trump’s victory is not entirely compatible with traditional 
frameworks (for instance, rational choice economic voting) that have long been used to 
understand why voters cast their ballots for certain candidates; they speak to a growing body 
of scholarship which attests to a fundamental re-alignment of voters along the lines of culture 
in advanced Western democracies (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018).  
To test the robustness of these cultural and socio-cultural explanations further, I then 
hypothesised whether any of the failed candidates for the 2016 Republican nomination would 
have been similarly poised to appeal to the same set of culturally and socio-culturally 
aggrieved Whites that voted for Trump. In my models exploring vote choice in alternate 
scenarios using the 2016 Voter Study data, I found some evidence that racial resentment was 
likely to a significant factor in 2016 vote choice regardless of who was the eventual 
Republican nominee. While these findings certainly attest to the enduring impact of 
ideological sorting on vote choice (Druckman et al. 2013), they are also noteworthy given the 
robust body of literature which attests to the salience of racial resentment as a predictor of 
White vote choice for Trump specifically (Schaffner et al. 2018). However, we must 
reconsider the extent to which racial resentment was a unique predictor of support for Trump, 
especially if - and as my models show - racial attitudes are similarly predictive of 
hypothetical support for non-Trump Republicans in the general election.   
However, the same cannot be said about Whites’ perceptions of the impact of 
demographic change. When it came to the effects of majority-minority threat in the alternate 
vote choice models, the largest and most significant coefficient was found in the vote choice 
model of actual two-party vote choice (Trump-Clinton). By contrast, the coefficient for 
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majority-minority threat was substantially smaller and less significant in the alternate 
matchups (Rubio-Clinton, Cruz Clinton). These findings are particularly important because 
they provide strong evidence in favour of the argument that Trump was uniquely poised to 
active feelings of threat in 2016. Therefore, while racial resentment exhibited a larger effect 
size than majority-minority threat in the vote choice models, it must be noted that White 
voters’ attitudes towards demographic change were more integral in explaining the Trump 
vote than their attitudes on race. Having explored which factors contribute the most to our 
understanding of Trump’s victory on the part of White voters in 2016, the next chapter will 
conclude with a reflection of the significance of the findings, and will look to potential 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
 
Introduction 
Trump’s unlikely victory in the 2016 Presidential election represented something of a 
fundamental divergence from the post-war electoral patterns of American voters. Widely 
derided as a fringe candidate with little chance of winning power throughout the 2016 
Republican primaries (Brooks 2015), Trump’s rise to the nomination revealed a profound 
schism between party elites and the Republican voters on issues such as trade and 
immigration. When this pattern of success was repeated against Hillary Clinton in the general 
election, this gap between White voters and the elites in Washington became further 
apparent. Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to understand these developments by 
better approximating which particular of dimension of estrangement from mainstream 
politics (“left behind” thesis, cultural decline thesis, changing American thesis)  Trump’s 
victory best represents.  
The conclusion chapter is structured as follows. I begin by returning to my six 
hypotheses in order to assess which of them were borne out by my examination of the voter 
data. This is so that we have a better approximation of which of the three main arguments 
(“left behind” thesis, cultural decline thesis, changing America thesis) offers the best 
explanation for why 54 per cent of White voters cast their ballot for Trump in 2016 (Pew 
Research Center 2018). After exploring my findings, I look to a number of possible avenues 
for future enquiry into White voter behaviour, and outline the original contribution to 
knowledge to which the doctoral thesis lays claim.   
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Explaining the Rise of Trump in 2016 
 In order to investigate the broader research objective underpinning the doctoral thesis, 
the introductory chapter posed three research questions. The purpose of posing these three 
research questions was so that we could begin to better understand which particular 
dimension of White estrangement from mainstream politics Trump’s unlikely victory in the 
2016 Presidential election best representing. A comprehensive review of the vote choice 
literature in Chapter 2 revealed that there was a dearth of comparative awareness and critical 
syntheses of the various explanations for Trump’s victory. Throughout the thesis, I have 
argued that this lack of awareness and synthesis in the existing scholarship is problematic if 
we are to better understand what Trump’s victory best represents. This is an especially 
important consideration given the unprecedented success for right-wing populist actors in a 
host of advanced Western liberal democracies in recent years. On the one hand, Trump’s 
victory could be an aberration. Equally, however, it could be indicative of a wider pattern of 
realignment among a cohort of White voters who increasingly feel as though mainstream 
politicians no longer speak for them (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018).   
So that we can better understand what Trump’s victory means in this context, the first 
section of the conclusion will evaluate how well each research question has been answered in 
light of the broader research objective guiding the thesis. Specifically, the section will 
explore the results and conclusions reached in each of the preceding three chapters, and will 
outline how the findings contribute to our existing understanding of why 54 per cent of White 
voters cast their ballot for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018). Discussion is 
presented in three sub-sections, each of which correspond to a particular dimension of White 
estrangement from mainstream politics that were explored in greater detail in Chapters 4 
through 6 (“left behind” thesis, cultural decline thesis, changing America thesis). After 
exploring which of my hypotheses were borne out by the data, the next sub-section will 
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explore which of the three dimensions of estrangement from mainstream politics provide the 
best explanation for Trump’s victory on the part of White voters.  
 
The Failure of Political Elites to Attest to the Economic Grievances of White Voters  
 A comprehensive review of the vote choice literature in Chapter 2 revealed that first 
significant explanatory context was the “left behind” thesis. In order to test whether the “left 
behind” thesis was a robust frame for helping us better understand why so many Whites 
voted for Trump in 2016, the doctoral thesis posed the following research question:  
 
1. Is Trump’s victory indicative of a White working-class “revolt” against the 
political elites in Washington for their perceived failure to adequately address 
their economic grievances?   
 
Underpinning this first research question was a theoretical tension between two 
competing hypotheses that both attempted to account for vote choice for Trump. Paralleling 
popular narratives after the victory for leave in the 2016 UK “Brexit” referendum (Mondon 
& Winter 2019), the first hypothesis (H1) posited that Trump’s victory was indicative of an 
electoral “revolt” among the White working-class (Gest 2016; Williams 2017).  Proponents 
of the first hypothesis argued that White voters – and in particular those without a college 
degree – were mobilized to vote for Trump because his protectionist “America First” agenda 
resonated with their concerns about unfair foreign competition and downward economic 
mobility.  
By contrast, the second hypothesis (H2) posited that labelling Trump’s as a” revolt” 
on the part of the White working-class is unsupported when one approaches the evidence 
with a more nuanced lens. In support of H2, scholars noted that the economic concerns of 
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White voters were becoming increasingly difficult to extricate from a number of salient 
cultural grievances, including their fears about economic competition with immigrants 
(Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). Consequently, conceptualizing Trump’s victory as a “working-
class” victory would be an oversimplification that ignores a growing body of evidence which 
suggests that race and immigration are becoming increasingly salient predictors of White 
voters’ economic evaluations. Seen in this way, it was Trump’s ability to co-articulation of 
racist/xenophobic sentiment with a message of improving the material economic 
circumstances of White voters that contributed to his unlikely victory.   
 Chapter 4, the first principal findings chapter, set out to assess the empirical 
robustness of the “left behind thesis” by testing the validity of H1 and H2. Chapter 4 assessed 
whether Trump’s victory could be classified as a White working-class revolt by analysing 
non-college educated White voter turnout and vote switching between 2012 and 2016. 
Chapter 4 found that non-college educated White voter turnout was higher in 2016 than it 
was in 2012. Rather than being indicative of a mass mobilization of non-voters, however, 
non-college educated White turnout only increased by 3 points between 2012 and 2016 
(IPUMS CPS 2020). Nonetheless, and despite these small increases in turnout, it is important 
to note that Trump improved on the 2012 performance of Mitt Romney among the socio-
demographic group by converting 18 per cent of those who had voted for Obama in 2012.  
Support for Trump was also heavily concentrated in the US “Rust Belt” – an area of 
the Upper Midwest/Great Lakes states that had experienced the effects of deindustrialization 
since the early Eighties (High 2003). The Rust Belt was an important region to analyse 
because of its large concentration of White voters without a college degree. The electoral 
behaviour of this socio-demographic group is also important to analyse given that they are 
Trump’s most robust voter constituency (Pew Research Center 2018). Despite the importance 
of the Rust Belt to Trump’s victory, however, the results of the regression models probing the 
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relationship between Rust Belt residency and support for Trump were somewhat mixed. On 
the one hand, results of the models using the ANES data in Chapter 4 indicated that working-
class White voters’ protectionist views were significant predictors of 2016 vote choice, and 
that these effects were intensified when we specified an interaction term with Rust Belt 
residency. Nonetheless, the spatial regression model indicated that declines in manufacturing 
employment share were largely unrelated to changes in the Republican vote share between 
2012 and 2016 in the Rust Belt states. Overall, then, the doctoral thesis finds some evidence 
in support of H1. However, it is important to qualify that the evidence was not consistent 
across the individual-level and spatial level.  
The mixed results for H1 begin to answer the first research question posed in the 
introductory chapter; if Trump’s victory cannot be conclusively characterised as a “revolt” on 
the part of White working-class, H2 might be the more robust theoretical approximation of 
Trump victory when looking at it through a “left behind” lens. To assess whether the 
economic grievances of “left behind” Whites were associated with voters’ cultural concerns, 
Chapter 4 also analysed the relationship between White racial attitudes/anti-immigrant 
sentiment on voters’ negative national and personal economic assessments.  
The results on the relationship between racial resentment and economic assessments 
provided particularly strong evidence in support of H2. Rational choice economic voting 
posits that economically aggrieved voters will usually punish the incumbent party if they 
preside over a poor economy (Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000). Usually, such evaluations are 
unlikely to be moored to racial attitudes. In the Obama era, however, scholars have noted a 
“racial spillover” effect by which Whites’ racial attitudes have begun to feed into multiple 
areas of US public opinion (Tesler 2012). Consistent with these developments, Chapter 4 
found that voters’ perceptions of the relative pace of the economic recovery from the Great 
Recession were closely tied to voters’ negative assessments of President Obama. Moreover, 
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these negative evaluations were closely tied to voters’ racial attitudes, with high levels of 
racial resentment being indicative of increasingly worse evaluations of Obama. 
Consequently, the results are consistent with the hypothesis (H2) that White voters’ 
economic assessments are becoming increasingly correlated with their attitudes towards race.  
Taken together, the results from Chapter 4 pointed to H2 being the more robust 
hypothesis that contributes to our understanding of why 54 per cent of White voters cast their 
ballot for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018). The notion of a working class “revolt” 
(H1) implies the mobilization of a large cohort of individuals. However, results of the 
validated voter data indicate that non-college educated White turnout increased only 
marginally in 2016 relative to 2012 (IPUMS CPS 2020). In addition, while the vote choice 
models from Chapter 4 indicate that negative economic assessments mattered in 2016, we 
find that effects were likely to be closely related to White racial attitudes. Consequently, the 
findings from Chapter 4 indicate that Trump’s victory was not characteristic of a reaction 
against the political elites by a cohort of White voters that were solely motivated by “rational 
choice” economic voting (Lewis Beck and Paldam 2000). Rather, negative national and 
personal economic evaluations were shaped by racial animus, and especially towards the 
nation’s first non-White President.  
 
An Appeal to In-Group Members by Capitalising on Fear of the “Other”  
 In light of these findings concerning the “left behind” thesis, then, in what ways does 
the second significant explanatory context (cultural decline thesis) contribute to our 
understanding of Trump’s victory in 2016? In order to test the empirical robustness of the 
cultural decline thesis as a frame for understanding why 54 per cent of White voters cast their 
ballot for Trump in 2016, the doctoral thesis posed the following research question:  
 271  
2. Is Trump’s victory explained by the activation of a number of forms of White in-
group identity/psychological predispositions, as well as out-group prejudice, 
through the usage and deployment of radical right electoral cues?  
 
Underpinning this second research question were an additional two hypotheses that 
account for the relative salience of White in-group favouritism and out-group prejudice as 
predictors of vote choice for Trump. Consistent with the emerging theoretical importance of 
in-group favouritism as a predictor of White Americans’ political behaviour (Jardina 2019), 
H3 proposed that Trump’s victory may have been dependent on the “activation” of a number 
of salient in-group identities. Among these identities was White identity. While White 
identity has already been correlated with affect for Trump (Jardina 2019; Sides et al. 2019), it 
is important to note that these authors did not account for the effects of ethnocentrism (Kam 
and Kinder 2010) or American ethnic identity (Thompson 2020) in their models. I have 
argued that the omission of these forms of White in-group favouritism is problematic because 
we are subsequently unable to empirically assess which form of White in-group favouritism 
is the most potent in shaping White vote choice. In contrast to White in-group favouritism, 
the fourth hypothesis (H4) contends that out-group prejudice – and most especially anti-
Black racism – was an especially salient predictor of vote choice in 2016 due to the continued 
White backlash against the nation’s first Black President, as well as Trump’s demonization of 
racial minorities throughout the 2016 campaign.  
Chapter 5, the second principal findings chapter, set out to test the robustness of the 
cultural decline thesis by testing the empirical validity of H3 and H4. To test H3, I unpacked 
each form of White in-group favouritism (White ethnocentrism, American ethnic identity, 
White racial identity). This strategy involved outlining the ways in which radical right actors 
such as Trump mobilize dominant majority groups through the usage and deployment of 
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radical cues, as well as the extent to which Whites with robust ethnocentric, ethnic, and racial 
identity centralities had a high probability of voting for Trump as consequence of those 
identities themselves. Overall, I found that White ethnocentrism, American ethnic identity, 
and white racial identity were all salient forms of White in-group favouritism that were 
associated with the vote choice of Whites in 2016.  
Despite these significant patterns of results, however, it is important to note that we 
find variations in the respective salience of these identities as predictors of White vote choice 
when additionally accounting for the effects of out-group prejudice in the vote choice 
models. For instance, the effects of both ethnocentrism and American ethnic identity 
disappear statistically when we control for the simultaneous effects of racial resentment and 
anti-immigrant sentiment on White vote choice. By contrast, the effects of Jardina’s (2019) 
three-item White consciousness measure were robust to controlling for the effects of racial 
resentment and anti-immigrant sentiment. Consequently, forms of White in-group 
favouritism articulated along the lines of race appear to be more salient predictors of vote 
choice than Kam and Kinder’s (2010) ethnocentrism measure or Thompson’s (2020) measure 
of American ethnic identity when it comes to estimating vote choice for Trump.  
Crucially, White in-group favouritism is only one side of a two-sided coin (Jardina 
2019); the other side of which is out-group prejudice. This important theoretical distinction 
brings us to H4, which posited that White vote choice might also be explained by salient 
levels of resentment towards non-Whites. In my exploration of H4, I found that this 
resentment was not primed by Trump in 2016. Rather, it was the 8 years of the preceding 
Obama presidency that primed racial resentment, making the construct a salient predictor of 
White opposition to the Democratic Party in 2016. Consistent with developments in the 
White racial attitudes (Tesler 2015), I found that Whites’ negative feelings towards Obama 
mediate the relationship between racial resentment and vote choice for Trump.  
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 Overall, then, the significant results for both White racial identity/consciousness and 
racial resentment in the vote choice models indicate that both White in-group favouritism and 
out-group prejudice were salient predictors of vote choice in 2016. In light of the strong 
evidence in support of both H3 and H4, these findings therefore point to the cultural decline 
thesis as being a robust explanatory context that functions as a frame for helping us better 
understand Trump’s victory on the part of White Americans in 2016. Whereas Chapter 4 
focussed on the relative importance of cultural factors as predictors of White support for 
Trump in 2016, scholars have also noted that White voters’ socio-cultural concerns regarding 
the impact of demographic change on Whites’ dominant majority status may have also 
shaped vote choice in 2016. Consequently, the next sub-section will discuss the results 
concerning the relationship between America’s increasing diversity and White vote choice 
for Trump.   
 
The Successful Mobilization of a Cohort of White Voters “Threatened” by Diversity  
 The third principal explanatory context was the changing America thesis. As noted in 
the previous section, the changing America thesis theorised that there may be a degree of 
association between America’s increasing ethnic and racial diversity and White Americans’ 
electoral behaviour in the 2016 election. In order to test the empirical robustness of the 
changing America thesis as a frame for understanding why 54 per cent of White voters cast 
their ballot for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018), the doctoral thesis posed a third 
research question:  
 
3. Is Trump’s victory indicative of the successful electoral mobilization of a cohort 
of White voters who increasingly feel as though their dominant-majority status is 
coming under threat by America’s changing demographics?  
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There were two competing hypotheses underpinning the “changing America” thesis. 
These were the “exit route” (H5) and the “voice route” (H6). The “exit route” hypothesis 
posited that there is a link between increasing ethnic diversity and crumbling social capital in 
advanced Western democracies such as the US (Putnam 2007; Murray 2010; Abascal and 
Baldassarri 2015). H5 theorized that diversity leads Whites to withdraw from aspects of 
public and civic life - including formal participation in politics such as voting in elections. By 
contrast, the “voice route” (H6) hypothesis contended that diversity might actually mobilize 
Whites to become politically engaged. The hypothesis being that White Americans perceive 
diversity as a threat to their dominant majority status (Major et al. 2018; Mutz 2018), and 
accordingly vote for radical right populist actors who promise to reduce immigration 
(Kaufmann and Goodwin 2018).  
Chapter 6, the third principal findings chapter, set out to assess the empirical validity 
of H5 and H6. Ever since the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, the US has changed from 
a nation that was 85 per cent non-Hispanic White to one in which the demographic group is 
projected to no longer constitute a majority of the US population by 2040. A significant 
consequence of this increasing diversity is that interactions with non-White individuals is 
becoming an increasingly significant factor in the lives of many White Americans. Chapter 6 
explored the ways in which White Americans react to this increasing diversity. An 
exploration of the empirical validity of Putnam’s (2007) “hunker down” thesis (H5) revealed 
that social capital is lower for Whites who tend to live in communities and areas of the US 
that are more ethnically heterogenous.  
Nonetheless, an important limitation of Putnam’s thesis as it might apply furthering 
our understanding of White Americans’ political behaviour is that most Whites who voted for 
Trump tend to live in communities that exhibit higher rates of racial homogeneity (that is, 
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those at are Whiter). I have posited that this is an important observation, given that 
community homogeneity has crucial implications for levels of social capital (and, by 
extension, levels of political participation) within White communities. Indeed, the literature 
demonstrates that communities which have higher rates of racial homogeneity tend to exhibit 
better outcomes across a variety of social capital measures relative to those communities that 
are more heterogenous (Fieldhouse & Cutts 2010). Consistent with these observations in the 
academic literature, my analysis of the CPS data in Chapter 6 indicated that White 
individuals who live in communities that are less geographically proximate from 
metropolitan areas have higher rates of voter registration as well as higher levels of voter 
turnout in the 2016 election relative to Whites that live in metro or metro-proximate areas.103  
  My analysis of the data revealed an important limitation to H5 when we seek to 
understand how White vote choice in 2016 was shaped by White Americans’ relationship 
diversity. The main limitation with H5 was that Whites with higher levels of political 
participation generally live in more homogenous communities, and consequently have less 
frequent contact with minorities than Whites who live in metro areas. There was also reason 
to suspect that it was Whites’ perceptions of diversity that is driving public opinion towards 
demographic change as opposed to negative contact with non-Whites. One example of this is 
the historical phenomena of White flight. As noted in Chapter 6, White flight referred to the 
migration of Whites from urban centres of the Midwest and South to exurban and rural areas 
of the US (Kruse 2013). While there were many reasons for this White out-migration (Frey 
1979), I found that a possible reason for moving was Whites’ opposition to living in racially 
diverse neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, because the relationship between neighborhood 
 
103 Notwithstanding this interpretation, it is important to be aware of other reasons for why White 
turnout might be higher in rural areas. As aforenoted in Chapter 6, one alternative explanation is that, 
in racially heterogenous areas such as urban cores, Whites may feel that their vote counts less if they 
are Republicans.   
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heterogeneity and White geographic mobility differed for inter-city and inter-state migration, 
it is important to qualify that we cannot interpret the findings of the multinomial probit model 
as conclusive proof of this hypothesis.   
To further assess whether diversity was as an important construct that shaped White 
Americans’ electoral behaviour in 2016, therefore, I explored an additional hypothesis which 
posited that it might have more to do with how diversity is perceived by Whites as a threat to 
their majority status (H6) (Major et al. 2018; Mutz 2018). To understand how Whites 
perceptions of diversity (as opposed to their actual contact with diversity) might shape White 
political behaviour, it was useful to consider how perceptions of out-groups can be shaped by 
media consumption (Farris and Silber Mohammed 2018). I refer to the process in which 
Whites’ views towards diversity are shaped by media consumption as the “radicalization” of 
Whites’ perspectives. I hypothesized that this “radicalization” occurs when White individuals 
are exposed to information concerning the impact of demographic change from networks 
such as Fox. Consistent with my theoretical expectations, Chapter 6 found that Whites who 
selectively expose to Fox have higher levels of dominant majority demographic threat 
relative to Whites who get their news from other sources.104 This finding was important 
because it explains why so many Whites perceive diversity as threatening despite the fact that 
they might live in overwhelmingly White neighbourhoods and have minimal day-to-day 
contact with ethnic minorities.  
Critically, scholars have found that exposure to information concerning the impact of 
demographic change leads Whites to exhibit greater levels of political conservatism (Craig 
and Richeson, 2014). Consistent with the findings of Craig and Richeson (2014), I found that 
 
104 Nonetheless, it is important to be aware of possible reverse causality in the Fox News consumption 
 majority-minority threat relationship. For example, the perceptions of threat might also lead 
Whites to select into media outlets who cover demographic change in a manner that already conforms 
to their existing attitudes towards diversity.   
 277  
dominant majority demographic threat was a strong and significant predictor of vote choice 
for Trump in 2016, with increasing levels of threat being associated with an increased 
probability of a White voter having cast their ballot for Trump in 2016. The results of the 
vote choice model are important because they are demonstrative of Trump’s ability to 
mobilize White voters who felt as through their majority status was being eroded by 
America’s increasing diversity. Overall, then, the results from Chapter 6 point to the “voice” 
root (Kaufman and Goodwin 2018) as being the more robust hypothesis underpinning the 
changing America thesis that helps us to better understand how Trump was able to mobilize 
so many White voters around in candidacy in the 2016 election.  
 
Critical Evaluation of the Explanatory Accounts of Trump’s Victory  
The previous sub-section outlined my six main hypotheses which underpin the three 
significant explanatory contexts (“left behind” thesis, cultural decline thesis, changing 
America thesis) explored in the thesis. In this sub-section, I assess which of these three 
explanatory contexts provides the best frame for understand why 54 per cent of White voters 
cast their ballots for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018).  
I first proceed to examine the robustness of the “left behind” thesis. Overall, the “left 
behind” thesis provides a comparatively weak explanation for Trump’s victory. For example, 
my examination of the CPS voter turnout data indicated that White working-class turnout was 
up only marginally in 2016 relative to 2012 (IPUMS CPS 2020). Therefore, it cannot be said 
that Trump’s victory was emblematic of a successful mobilisation of a large cohort of White 
working-class voters. Furthermore, we find relatively weak effects on vote choice through 
White voters’ negative economic assessments across models. While the vote choice models 
in Chapters 4 and 7 indicated that negative national economic (or sociotropic) assessments 
mattered to some degree in 2016, it is important to qualify that these effects are largely 
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consistent with a large literature that speaks to the importance of “pocketbook” voting on 
vote choice. In this model, voters who perceived that the economy was worse in 2016 relative 
to 2012 elected Trump (a Republican) while punishing the incumbent party (i.e., the 
Democrats) for their perceived failure to improve the national economic outlook (MacKuen 
et al. 1992; Lewis-Beck 1985; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Therefore, rather than 
economic assessments being uniquely important predictors of vote choice in 2016, it can be 
said that the significant effects on vote choice through White voters’ negative national 
economic assessments are simply the continuation of a trend, whereby voters punish the 
incumbent party when they perceive that the state of nation’s finances are not in a better 
place than they were relative to the previous election. Consequently, the left behind thesis 
does not provide a large amount of explanatory power when we attempt to understand why 
54 percent of White voters cast their ballot for Trump in 2016 (Pew Research Center 2018).  
Prima facie, the cultural decline thesis provides a strong explanation as to why so 
many Whites may have voted for Trump. Across models in Chapter 5, racial resentment is 
strongly predictive of vote choice for Trump. Indeed, the size of the probit coefficients often 
rival the effects of sociopolitical constructs such as partisanship and ideology. Similarly, in 
Chapter 7, the effects of racial resentment are robust to a number of additional controls, 
including authoritarian attitudes, and positive estimations of the Alt Right movement. Despite 
this consistent pattern of results for racial resentment, however, we must weight them against 
the results of Table 7.3 in Chapter 7, which explored whether candidates other than Trump 
would have likewise been successful in mobilising Whites with salient levels of racial 
resentment. As indicated here, in the hypothetical matchups against Clinton-Rubio and 
Clinton-Cruz, racial resentment would still be a significant predictor of Republican vote 
choice even had Trump not been on the ballot (p <.001).  
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While it is important to note that the effects of racial resentment were stronger in the 
model of actual two-party vote choice in 2016 (Clinton-Trump), the significance of these 
results cannot be understated, because they provide a riposte to the argument that Trump was 
uniquely poised to activate racial resentment in 2016. That is, if the results concerning racial 
resentment are simply the continuation of a trend in ideological sorting, where the 
Republican Party has become a repository for politically-conservative voters with salient 
levels of racial animus over time (Druckman et al. 2013), then it cannot be said that racial 
animus uniquely predicted White vote choice in 2016. In light of these findings, it can be said 
that the cultural decline thesis provides a somewhat robust frame for understanding why 
racially aggrieved Whites might have voted for Trump. However, it is important to qualify 
that White racial attitudes were not uniquely important to the 2016 election, instead existing 
as the function of continuing trends in ideological sorting among politically-conservative 
Whites.  
 It is with these developments in mind that the conclusion chapter finally turns to 
consider the relative explanatory power of the “changing America” thesis. While an 
increasing number of voters feel as though mainstream politicians have not adequately 
addressed their economic plights (Judis 2016), also at the heart of this distance between 
White voters and elites is that many feel as though they are becoming a “minority” in their 
own country (Gest 2016), and accordingly vote for radical political actors who promise to 
halt America’s increasing diversity. Large influxes of non-White immigrants after the 
passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, and subsequent demographic change from higher non-
White birth rates among these post-1965 immigrants, has engendered a fear of status loss in 
many Whites today. The prospect of losing majority status leads Whites to perceive 
outgroups including immigrants and Latinos in a negative light, leading them to feel 
“threatened” by America’s increasing diversity (Major et al; Mutz 2018). As evidenced by 
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the strong set of results for majority-minority threat in Chapter 6, Trump was able to 
successfully capitalise on these feelings – for instance by championing policies that would 
restrict immigration. In doing so, he was able to mobilize Whites with salient levels of 
majority-minority threat around his candidacy.  
 The changing America thesis is an especially potent explanation for Trump’s victory 
when we consider the results of the hypothetical matchup models from Table 7.3 in Chapter 
7. Here, I found that majority-minority threat would not have been a salient predictor of vote 
choice for the Republican candidate had Trump not been the nominee in 2016. Had the 
general election been a race between Clinton and Rubio, the effect majority-minority threat 
on vote choice for the Republican candidate would have been markedly weaker relative to its 
effect on the Trump vote (𝛽 = .821 versus 𝛽 = 1.487), and would have only retained a p <.05 
level of statistical significance. In a hypothetical race between Clinton and Cruz, the effect of 
majority-minority on vote choice for the Republican candidate would not have reached 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  
These findings are particularly important because they suggest that Trump was able to 
activate feelings of threat among White voters in a way that other Republican candidates 
could not. These findings provide a clear point of comparison against those of racial 
resentment, where it was apparent that racial attitudes would have predicted vote choice for 
the Republican candidate regardless of who was the eventual nominee. Because Trump was 
uniquely able to activate feelings of threat, it can there be said that sociocultural explanations 
for Trump’s victory – that is, those primarily grounded in Whites’ fear of losing their 
majority status as a consequence of demographic change - are more salient than cultural 
explanations of Trump’s victory. In this way, the changing America thesis has the largest 
amount of explanatory power when it comes to understanding Trump’s victory in light of his 
strong performance among White voters in 2016.  
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Avenues for Future Research 
  While the doctoral thesis has analysed White voter behaviour in the 2016 election, it 
is useful to explore what the findings presented here might mean for the future study of 
White political behaviour. Future research should also continue to explore the effect of elite 
messaging on race and demographic change on the electoral mobilization of White voters. 
Political candidates are uniquely poised to mobilize voter sentiments through their messaging 
and rhetoric (Zaller 1992). While demonizing immigrants and minorities in an attempt to 
mobilize White voters will have raises number of troubling concerns for the future robustness 
of US intergroup relations and the continued marginalization of non-whites, Trump’s 
successful mobilization of White voters along these lines in 2016 demonstrates that there is 
something of an untapped well for future candidates who might wish to appeal to White 
voters. It is also important to note that the usage and deployment of such elite cues not only 
have significant implications for White public opinion towards immigration and ethno-
religious plurality. Since his victory in 2016, for instance, Trump has been largely successful 
in hijacking the national dialogue on immigration, framing the situation as the US-Mexico 
border as an “invasion” even as the number of undocumented immigrants in the US in the 
first year of his Presidency remained largely unchanged relative to 2007 (Pew Research 
Center 2020). Consequently, framing immigration as a “crisis” may continue to appeal to 
Whites threatened by demographic change as it did in 2016, even if such frames have not 
necessarily been reflective of the actual situation at the Southern border.  
 
Contribution to Original Knowledge 
 Right-wing populist actors have enjoyed a tremendous amount of success across a 
host of advanced Western democracies in recent years (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). The 
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increasing pattern across the West is that voters are turning away from mainstream politics to 
support parties and politicians of a more radical bent. Understanding the motivations that 
mobilise voters to cast their ballots for radical right populist parties and politicians is 
crucially important if we are to better understand whether these developments are indicative 
of a broader re-alignment of voters in advanced Western democracies.  
Turning to examine how these trends have unfolded in the United States, this doctoral 
thesis has sought to understand which particular dimensions of White estrangement from 
mainstream politics Trump’s unlikely victory in the 2016 Presidential election best 
represented. Economic anxiety (Morgan and Lee 2018), in-group favouritism (Jardina 2019), 
out-group prejudice (Schaffner et al. 2018), and dominant majority demographic threat 
(Major et al. 2018; Mutz 2018) have all been correlated with White vote choice Trump to 
varying degrees in the existing literature. Crucially, however, the essential contribution to 
knowledge to which this thesis lays claim is in its ability to better approximate which of these 
factors mattered the most in contributing to Trump’s victory. In this respect, the doctoral 
thesis builds on the burgeoning literature on White political behaviour in the aftermath of the 
2016 election by providing a robust framework that aims to fully account for the various 
economic, cultural, and socio-cultural dimensions of Trump’s victory.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Two-Way ANOVA Results for Levels of Majority-Minority Threat by 
Television Network  
This appendix presents the results of a series two-way ANOVAs run on the same variables 
used in the multiple regression models presented in Figure 6.7. The purpose of this 
alternative model specification is to demonstrate additional robustness of my findings 
regarding the relationship between news consumption and majority minority threat. I specify 
a series of two-way ANOVAs by means of a univariate generalised linear modelling (GLM) 
procedure to account for two covariates (party ID and ideology). The results in Tables A.1-
A.4 paint a similar picture to those of Figure 6.7. We find higher levels of mean threat 
among Whites who exclusively watched news programs/talk shows on Fox as opposed to 
CNN across all four news formats. In contextualising these results it is also important to note 
that Whites who watch Fox have higher mean levels of majority-minority threat even after 
adjusting for the effects of Republican partisanship and conservative ideological self-
placement on those scales.  
 
Table A.1: Two-Way ANOVA Results for Morning Shows (Estimated Marginal Means) 
Network  95% CI 
Fox CNN Mean SE Lower Upper 
No No .485 .003 .479 .492 
Yes .448 .017 .415 .482 
Yes No .528 .007 .514 .543 
Yes .528 .023 .483 .574 
Notes: All variables coded to range from 0 to 1. Dependent variable is threat of majority-
minority demographic change. Party ID and ideology set to their mean values.  
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Table A.2: Two-Way ANOVA Results for Evening Shows (Estimated Marginal Means) 
Network  95% CI 
Fox CNN Mean SE Lower Upper 
No No .491 .003 .484 .498 
Yes .397 .016 .365 .429 
Yes No .507 .007 .493 .521 
Yes .551 .019 .514 .587 
Notes: All variables coded to range from 0 to 1. Dependent variable is threat of majority-
minority demographic change. Party ID and ideology set to their mean values.  
 
 
Table A.3: Two-Way ANOVA Results for Sunday Talk Shows (Estimated Marginal 
Means) 
Network  95% CI 
Fox CNN Mean SE Lower Upper 
No No .494 .003 .488 .501 
Yes .424 .017 .392 .457 
Yes No .497 .007 .482 .511 
Yes .475 .024 .429 .521 
Notes: All variables coded to range from 0 to 1. Dependent variable is threat of majority-
minority demographic change. Party ID and ideology set to their mean values.  
 
Table A.4: Two-Way ANOVA Results for Daily Talk Shows (Estimated Marginal 
Means) 
Network  95% CI 
Fox CNN Mean SE Lower Upper 
No No .492 .004 .485 .499 
Yes .429 .008 .433 .465 
Yes No .524 .008 .508 .540 
Yes .543 .018 .508 .577 
Notes: All variables coded to range from 0 to 1. Dependent variable is threat of majority-
minority demographic change. Party ID and ideology set to their mean values.  
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Appendix B: Additional Vote Choice Model for Effect of Majority-Minority Threat on 
Vote Choice (One Item Measure)  
 
Table B.1: Probit Model Showing Effect of Majority-Minority Threat on White Vote 
Choice in 2016 
 2016 
 




















































Notes: Table entries are beta coefficients. Standard errors given in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable vote choice for Clinton or Trump; 0 = “Clinton”; 1 = “Trump”. 
Sample limited to non-Hispanic Whites. *p <.05 **p <.01***p <.001.  
 
Source: 2016 Voter Survey 
 
 
